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Taking Pedophilia Seriously 
Margo Kaplan* 
Abstract 
This Article pushes lawmakers, courts, and scholars to 
reexamine the concept of pedophilia in favor of a more thoughtful 
and coherent approach. Legal scholarship lacks a thorough and 
reasoned analysis of pedophilia. Its failure to carefully consider 
how the law should conceptualize sexual attraction to children 
undermines efforts to address the myriad of criminal, public 
health, and other legal concerns pedophilia raises. The result is an 
inconsistent mix of laws and policies based on dubious 
presumptions. These laws also increase risk of sexual abuse by 
isolating people living with pedophilia from treatment.  
The Article makes two central arguments: (1) although 
pedophilia does not fit neatly into any existing legal rubric, the 
concept of mental disorder best addresses the issues pedophilia 
raises; and (2) if the law conceptualizes pedophilia as a mental 
disorder, we must carefully reconsider how several areas of law 
address it. Specifically, it argues that sexually violent predator 
statutes expand state power to civilly commit individuals by 
distorting the concept of pedophilia as a mental disorder. At the 
same time, anti-discrimination law is dismissive of pedophilia as 
a mental disorder, excluding it from civil rights protections 
ordinarily associated with mental illness. Closer examination of 
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these distinctions reveals them to be based on questionable 
premises.  
The law should take pedophilia seriously as a mental 
disorder. Many individuals living with pedophilia pose a danger 
to others. Yet we should not categorically deny pedophilia the civil 
rights protections afforded to other mental disorders without a 
convincing normative justification supported by cogent scientific 
evidence. Strengthening civil rights protections for those with 
pedophilia also increases access to treatment and support that 
helps prevent child abuse. 
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I. Introduction 
Ethan Edwards is a pedophile.1 He has also never touched a 
child in a sexual manner and vows he never will.2 Edwards is one 
of the two founders of “Virtuous Pedophiles,” a website dedicated 
to supporting individuals with pedophilia who are morally 
opposed to sexual contact with children.3 The site attempts to 
reduce the stigma of pedophilia by demonstrating that it is an 
unchosen sexual attraction and that many individuals with 
pedophilia live law-abiding lives.4 A section called “Who We Are” 
is full of testimonials from individuals living with pedophilia5 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Who We Are, VIRTUOUS PEDOPHILES (2012), 
http://www.virped.org/index.php/who-we-are (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) 
(introducing Ethan Edwards pseudonym for a man struggling with pedophilia) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The name “Ethan Edwards” 
is a pseudonym. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.; Tracy Clark-Flory, Meet Pedophiles Who Mean Well, SALON, (June 
30, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/07/01/meet_pedophiles_ 
who_mean_well/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (reporting on Virtuous Pedophiles) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. See Who We Are, supra note 1 (presenting testimonials from Virtuous 
Pedophiles members); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (reporting on Virtuous 
Pedophiles); Jennifer Bleyer, How Can We Stop Pedophiles, SLATE (Sept. 23, 
2012, 2:32 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_ 
examiner/2012/09/stop_childhood_sexual_abuse_how_to_treat_pedophilia_.html 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (relating the stories of several pedophiles and 
examining the debate surrounding the treatment of pedophiles) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. Where possible, this Article uses the “people first” language preferred 
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who oppose any sexual contact with children but have nowhere 
else to turn for support.6 They live in fear of discovery, which 
would result in loss of their jobs, friends, and community.7 Many 
contemplate suicide.8 
Pedophilia presents something of a paradox for the law. 
Those who are sexually attracted to children are perhaps the 
most reviled group in our society, regardless of whether they have 
acted on their desires.9 Yet it is commonly presumed that such 
                                                                                                     
in mental illness and disability law. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 74 
(1990) (endorsing individualized determinations of what handicapped 
individuals are capable of doing rather than broad generalizations and fears); S. 
REP. NO. 101-116, at 51 (1989) (stating preference for term “individual with 
handicaps”); JOHN PARRY, REGULATION, LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO 
IMPLEMENTATION, app. A (2d ed. 1996) (outlining key definitions and terms in 
the field). This language refers to individuals first rather than their mental 
illness or disability; for example, as “people living with schizophrenia” as 
opposed to “schizophrenics.” See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 74 (1990); S. 
REP. NO. 101-116, at 51 (1989); JOHN PARRY, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: A PRIMER 
1 (5th ed. 1995) (stressing the importance of language in disability law). 
Because this Article discusses pedophilia as a mental disorder, it therefore uses 
the term “people with pedophilia” or “people living with pedophilia” as opposed 
to “pedophiles,” unless, as with Ethan Edwards, an individual chooses to 
identify himself as “a pedophile.” Who We Are, supra note 1. 
 6. See Who We Are, supra note 1 (including introductory statements from 
over seventy individuals and in-depth testimonials by others). 
 7. See Alice Dreger, What Can Be Done About Pedophilia?, THE ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 26, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/08/ 
what-can-be-done-about-pedophilia/279024/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) 
(answering frequently asked questions about pedophilia treatment) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (describing the 
struggles of an anonymous Virtuous Pedophiles member). 
 8. See Who We Are, supra note 1, (demonstrating that suicidal thoughts 
are prevalent among pedophiles); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (same); Fred S. 
Berlin & Edgar Krout, Pedophilia: Diagnostic Concepts Treatment, and Ethical 
Considerations, in OUT OF HARM’S WAY: READINGS ON CHILD SEX ABUSE, ITS 
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT 155, 157 (Dawn C. Haden ed., 1986) (quoting a 
man with pedophilia who admits thoughts about suicide). 
 9. See JESSE BERING, PERV: THE SEXUAL DEVIANT IN ALL OF US 156 (2013) 
(explaining that men with pedophilia must live in a society that does not 
understand or want to understand their condition); Jay R. Feierman, Human 
Erotic Age Orientation: A Conclusion, in PEDOPHILIA: BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 552, 
553 (Jay R. Feierman ed., 1990) (noting that in Western society men with 
pedophilia face “social ostracism, humiliation, and banishment”); Agustin 
Malón, Pedophilia: A Diagnosis in Search of a Disorder, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 1083, 1094 (2012) (contending that pedophiles are the most feared 
embodiment of perversion in modern society); Bleyer, supra note 4 (explaining 
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individuals have a mental illness and cannot control their urges 
or even their actions.10 The result is an often contradictory mix of 
laws founded on questionable presumptions. These laws and 
policies reflect little consideration of what pedophilia itself is and 
how the law should treat it.  
This Article pushes lawmakers, courts, and scholars to 
reexamine how they understand and treat pedophilia in favor of a 
more thoughtful and coherent approach. It places the law’s 
treatment of pedophilia in the context of the debate over whether 
pedophilia should be considered a mental disorder or whether it 
is better conceptualized as a type of sexual orientation.11 This 
Article argues that, although pedophilia does not fit neatly into 
any existing legal rubric, the concept of mental disorder best 
addresses the issues pedophilia raises. 
The Article further argues that, if we are to conceptualize 
pedophilia as a mental illness or disorder,12 we must rethink how 
the law approaches it. Several areas of the law recognize 
pedophilia as a mental disorder for the purposes of curtailing civil 
rights but exclude it from civil rights protections associated with 
mental disorders. Prosecutors and courts distort the concept of 
pedophilia to justify civilly committing individuals as “sexually 
violent predators” using far lower standards than ordinary civil 
commitment proceedings.13 At the same time, anti-discrimination 
                                                                                                     
that pedophiles are often viewed as “monsters” or “predators”); Clark-Flory, 
supra note 3 (citing pedophilia expert James Cantor as estimating that 
individuals with pedophilia may be the most isolated individuals in society). 
 10. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1092 (positing that pedophilia’s 
classification as a mental illness seems to exacerbate ill will toward pedophiles 
by increasing the perception that they are slaves to their urges and incapable of 
controlling their behavior). 
 11. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 12. This Article often uses the terms “mental disorder” and “mental illness” 
interchangeably. The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual began using the term “disorder” in lieu of illness in its third 
edition. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 5 (3d ed. 1980) (defining mental disorder as a basic concept); 
Massimiliano Aragona, The Concept of Mental Disorder and the DSM-V, 2 
DIALOGUES PHIL. MENTAL NEURO SCI. 1, 3 (2009) (outlining the history of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual and the decision to adopt “disorder”). The two 
terms have no specific set of criteria that distinguish them. Some associate 
“illness” more with a biological basis than “disorder.” See id. (exploring the 
nuances of the terms). 
 13. See infra Part III.B (examining pedophilia as a legal concept). 
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law is dismissive of pedophilia as a mental disorder, excluding it 
from civil rights protections ordinarily associated with mental 
illness.14 Closer examination of these laws reveals them to be 
based on questionable premises.  
The law needs to take pedophilia seriously as a mental 
disorder. While not every person living with pedophilia is 
“virtuous,” the law should not categorically deny individuals with 
pedophilia the civil rights protections afforded to those suffering 
from other mental disorders without a strong normative 
justification supported by cogent scientific evidence. Our current 
treatment of pedophilia is inconsistent with important legal 
principles underlying laws that protect the civil rights of those 
with mental disorders. Moreover, the law takes an awkward and 
incoherent approach because it confronts the issues pedophilia 
raises only after it manifests in criminal behavior. This 
squanders opportunities to treat pedophilia early, which experts 
argue would improve treatment outcomes and prevent child 
sexual abuse.15 
This Article fills a gap in legal scholarship, which too often 
elides the distinction between sexual attraction and the act of 
child molestation, ignoring the many issues that pedophilia in 
itself raises.16 Outside the context of sex offenders, pedophilia is 
relegated to a counterexample or comparison for other topics, 
demonstrating what something else is not.17 Yet legal scholarship 
                                                                                                     
 14. See infra Part IV.A (exploring the pedophilia exception to anti-
discrimination laws). 
 15. See Gerard A. Schaefer et al., Potential and Dunkelfeld Offenders: Two 
Neglected Target Groups for Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse, 33 INT’L J.L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 154, 154 (2010) (explaining that many potential child sex abusers 
remain unknown until they offend and that this represents an undertreated 
body of pedophiles). 
 16. See, e.g., Bhagwan A. Bahroo, Pedophilia: Psychiatric Insights, 41 FAM. 
CT. REV. 497, 500 (2003) (discussing “[p]edophilia as a human behavior” and 
focusing primarily on sex offenses). 
 17. See, e.g., Ann. E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1461, 1476–78 (2011) (distinguishing between polyamory and 
pedophilia); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 846 (2002) (positing 
that gays can distinguish themselves from those living with pedophilia); William 
N. Eskridge Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 477 n.205 (2001) (distinguishing pedophilia from 
homosexuality and disability); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional 
Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1998) (distinguishing homosexuality from 
“an uncontroversially reprobated horror, like pedophilia”). 
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has failed to examine what pedophilia itself is and its legal 
implications.18 It remains largely silent even as recent 
breakthroughs in the neurology of pedophilia have brought mass 
media attention to the social and policy issues pedophilia raises.19 
This Article examines the difficulties in conceptualizing 
                                                                                                     
 18. There is significant scholarship on sex offenses and the punishment or 
civil commitment of sex offenders, a subject different from an analysis of 
pedophilia itself. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of 
Dangerous Offenders, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56 (2004) (discussing the criminal 
law theory implications of detaining dangerous offenders); David J. Gottlieb, 
Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1031 (2002) (arguing 
that statutes that allow for civil commitment of sex offenders raise significant 
constitutional problems); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social 
Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular 
Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69 
(1996) (analyzing propriety of civil commitment for sex offenders); John A. 
Fennel, Punishment By Another Name: The Inherent Overreaching in Sexually 
Dangerous Person Commitments, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
37 (2009) (examining the efficacy and basis for a Massachusetts civil 
commitment statute); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 
98 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2003) (analyzing preventive detention of dangerous sex 
offenders). 
The limited legal scholarship on pedophilia focuses primarily on sex 
offenses and civil commitment statutes but does not address the foundational 
issue of how the law should conceptualize pedophilia in the first place. See 
generally Bahroo, supra note 16; Andrea Friedman, Pedophilia: Laws Fighting 
Nature Instead of Coping With It, 43 SW. L. REV. 253 (2013) (arguing for more 
treatment of pedophiles and less stigmatization under the law); Melissa 
Hamilton, Adjudicating Sex Crimes as Mental Disease, 33 PACE L. REV. 536 
(2013) (discussing the consequences of paraphilia diagnoses for punishment and 
civil commitment of sex offenders); Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment 
Without Psychosis: The Law’s Reliance on the Weakest Link in Psychodiagnosis, 
1 J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIV. COMMITMENT: SCI. & L. 17 (2005) (considering 
psychiatric arguments that criticize civil commitment of sex offenders); Jennifer 
Jason, Note, Beyond No Man’s Land: Psychiatry’s Imprecision Revealed By Its 
Critique of SVP Statutes as Applied to Pedophilia, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1319 (2010) 
(considering psychiatric arguments that critique Supreme Court decisions 
allowing for civil commitment of pedophiles). 
 19. See Tarred and Feathered, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (Apr. 11, 2014), 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/522/tarred-and-feathered 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (examining the treatment of pedophiles by the public 
and by medical professionals) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (same); Casey Schwartz, What Science 
Reveals About Pedophilia, THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 7, 2011), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/06/what-science-reveals-about-
pedophilia.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (reporting on recent coverage and 
research of pedophilia as a mental disorder) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Bleyer, supra note 4 (same); Dreger, supra note 7 (same). 
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pedophilia and proposes that current lawmakers, scholars, and 
courts adopt a more reasoned approach to it.  
Changing the law’s understanding of pedophilia has 
substantial practical implications. Re-examining pedophilia is 
necessary to create criminal and public health laws that 
effectively prevent child sexual abuse. The current approach to 
pedophilia denies individuals living with pedophilia critical civil 
rights protections that would allow them to seek treatment, 
maintain employment, and openly take part in society—all of 
which would assist them in avoiding criminal behavior. These 
laws may therefore have the inimical consequence of increasing 
the risk of child sexual assault.20 
But, while preventing child abuse is a substantial concern, it 
is not the law’s only concern. Taking pedophilia seriously requires 
us to take seriously the rights of people living with it. How the 
law conceptualizes and treats pedophilia influences the ability of 
those living with pedophilia to seek treatment, maintain 
employment, and use public accommodations.21 For those who are 
convicted or suspected of engaging in criminal activity, a 
pedophilia diagnosis influences their sentence and whether they 
will be deemed a “sexually violent predator” and detained 
indefinitely.22 Failure to accurately conceptualize pedophilia 
severely undermines the legitimacy of these laws and practices. 
Diagnosing and treating pedophilia is also a significant public 
health and legal concern. Researchers estimate that 
approximately one percent of the male population—and an 
unknown but presumably smaller percentage of the female 
population—lives with pedophilia, putting its prevalence on par 
with schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorder, and anorexia 
nervosa.23  
                                                                                                     
 20. See infra Part III.A (examining the law’s treatment of pedophilia in 
comparison with anti-discrimination statutes). 
 21. See infra Part III.A 
 22. See infra Part III.B (examining laws that provide for the civil 
commitment of pedophiles). 
 23. See Wesley Stephenson, How Many Men Are Paedophiles?, BBC NEWS 
(July 29, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28526106 (last visited Jan. 
27, 2015) (discussing research by Seto and Contor on the prevalence of 
pedophilia) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Michael C. Seto, 
Is Pedophilia a Sexual Orientation?, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 231, 232 
(2012) (examining the prevalence of pedophilia in men); NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL 
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The lack of legal scholarship examining the concept of 
pedophilia reflects the discomfort that the topic instills.24 Sexual 
attraction to children is, to most people, abhorrent and 
disgusting.25 Individuals who sexually abuse children are 
society’s most loathed criminals; those who feel sexual desire for 
children therefore provoke disgust and suspicion.26 Any analysis 
of expanding the rights of these individuals may seem like 
sympathy for the devil, but the unease this topic provokes only 
underscores the need for more thorough and dispassionate 
analysis.27 Legal scholarship should not avoid thoughtful analysis 
simply because it might lead to uncomfortable conclusions. 
This Article does not dispute the very real harm of sexual 
abuse or argue that pedophilic disorder should excuse criminal 
behavior. Sex with children inflicts significant physical and 
psychological harm.28 This Article does not seek to excuse this 
                                                                                                     
HEALTH, THE NUMBERS COUNT: MENTAL DISORDERS IN AMERICA (2012) (reporting 
estimated percentages of Americans with various mental disorders).  
 24. See Lea H. Studer & A. Scott Aylwin, Pedophilia: The Problem with 
Diagnosis and Limitation of CBT in Treatment, 67 MED. HYPOTHESES 774, 774 
(2006) (asserting that it is difficult to discuss pedophilia dispassionately because 
of biological imperatives to protect children and the outrage that child sexual 
exploitation generates). 
 25. See BERING, supra note 9, at 156 (contrasting pedophilia and other 
types of paraphilia); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (describing how people with 
pedophilia feel treated by society); Malón, supra note 9, at 1094 (explaining that 
people with pedophilia are often viewed as “monsters” or “predators”); Bleyer, 
supra note 4 (same). 
 26. Malón, supra note 9, at 1094 (explaining that people with pedophilia 
are often viewed as “monsters” or “predators”); Bleyer, supra note 4 (same); 
Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (same). 
 27. See Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 774 (stressing the need for 
dispassionate discourse to resolve the problems pedophilia poses). 
 28. See Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: 
Definition, Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and 
Forensic Issues, 82 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 457, 465 (2007) (outlining the effects of 
sexual abuse on children); Peter J. Fagan et al., Pedophilia, 288 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 2458, 2460 (2002) (explaining that sexually abused children are at higher 
risk for mood and anxiety disorders, substance abuse, and suicide); Lillian 
Southwick Bensley et al., Self-Reported Abuse History and Adolescent Problem 
Behaviors, 24 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 163, 165–66 (1999) (examining 
associations between child sexual abuse and antisocial and suicidal behaviors); 
Heather Y. Swanston et al., Nine Years After Child Sexual Abuse, 27 J. CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 967, 968, 977–81 (2003) (reviewing previous studies and 
presenting new statistical evidence of negative effects on child sex abuse 
victims). Some researchers argue that child–adult sexual experience does not 
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behavior; on the contrary, it holds those with pedophilia 
responsible for their actions rather than dismissing them as 
incorrigible monsters that lack the agency to control their 
behavior. People with pedophilia remain responsible for their 
acts; what they cannot control—and deserve no blame for—is 
their desires. 
Part II outlines pedophilia’s general definition, 
characteristics, causes, and treatments. It distinguishes common 
myths from the realities of living with pedophilia. While the term 
pedophilia is often used to refer to child sexual abuse, pedophilia 
is in fact a status of being sexually attracted to prepubescent 
children and not a behavior.29 This sexual attraction likely has a 
biological cause beyond the control of the individual living with it. 
Contrary to popular belief, many individuals living with 
pedophilia believe that sex with children is wrong.30 The 
enormous stigma of pedophilia, however, often isolates them from 
support and treatment.31 
Part III confronts the question of how the law should 
conceptualize pedophilia. Sexologists, psychiatrists, and legal 
scholars usually associate pedophilia with one of two categories: 
(1) a mental disorder or (2) a form of sexual orientation called 
                                                                                                     
inevitably result in psychological harm. See Zander, supra note 18, at 39 
(outlining this research). However, even if this is true, the experience still 
violates the child by overriding his or her ability to make reasoned choices about 
sexual activity. Because children lack the capacity to make these choices, sexual 
activity with them is a de facto violation and therefore a harm. See PETER 
WESTON, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT 116–17 (2004) (discussing the harm of statutory 
rape); ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 217 (2003) (explaining 
that age is a proxy for psychological capacities that are relevant to the validity 
of consent). Although the age at which an individual has the capacity to give 
consent is subject to debate, see WERTHEIMER, supra, at 116–226 (engaging in 
the debate), this Article presumes that prepubescent children lack sufficient 
capacity.  
 29. See STEPHEN T. HOLMES & RONALD M. HOLMES, SEX CRIMES: PATTERNS 
AND BEHAVIORS 110 (3d ed. 2009); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 577–78 
(discussing misuse of the term); Dreger, supra note 7 (same); David Goldberg, I, 
Pedophile, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.the 
atlantic.com/health/archive/2013/08/i-pedophile/278921/ (last visited Jan. 27, 
2015) (relating that many men with pedophilia do not act on their attractions 
beyond viewing child pornography) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 30. See Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (reporting on Virtuous Pedophiles). 
 31. Id. 
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“erotic age orientation.” Part III.A describes the two views and 
the conceptual problems pedophilia poses for each. Part III.B 
argues that, for the purposes of legal analysis, pedophilia should 
be considered a mental disorder and not a sexual orientation. 
Laws that concern sexual orientation increasingly and justifiably 
recognize the legitimacy and value of different types of 
relationships and sexualities. Pedophilic desires are not in 
themselves blameworthy, but they nonetheless involve sexual 
interests that would harm others if acted upon. The legal rubric 
of mental illness provides a more coherent fit for pedophilia and 
is far better suited to address the legal concerns pedophilia 
raises. 
Part IV challenges the law’s current approach to pedophilia 
in the context of civil rights protections and civil commitment. If 
we are to take pedophilia seriously as a mental disorder, 
lawmakers, courts, and scholars must reconsider how the law 
addresses pedophilia in these contexts. Anti-discrimination laws 
such as the Americans with Disabilities Act32 (ADA) define 
disability to include mental disorders that impair major life 
activities.33 Pedophilic disorder, however, is explicitly and 
categorically excluded from ADA protection.34 Part IV.A argues 
that there are good reasons to question the validity of this 
exclusion, and that including pedophilic disorder from disability 
protections afforded to other mental illnesses may be inconsistent 
with the tenets of these laws and counterproductive to the goal of 
preventing child abuse. It examines how existing ADA exceptions 
such as the direct threat analysis can provide a robust response 
to the potential public health and safety concerns that ADA 
protection for pedophilia may raise. Part IV.B argues that 
Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) statutes expand state power to 
civilly commit individuals with pedophilia based on a 
questionable understanding of pedophilia as a mental disorder. 
While there are valid concerns about many of these individuals’ 
propensity for criminal behavior, expanding state power to 
preventively detain in this way is inconsistent with important 
constitutional and criminal law principles.  
                                                                                                     
 32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 33. Id. § 12102. 
 34. Id. § 12211. 
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The Article concludes by considering the implications of the 
Article’s analysis in other areas of law. Deeper analysis of 
pedophilia also helps inform lawmaking concerning other sexual 
interests, sexual orientations, and sexual disorders.  
II. What Is Pedophilia? 
A. Behavior vs. Status 
Pedophilia is not the same as sexual abuse.35 Sexual abuse36 
of a child is a criminal and morally reprehensible behavior.37 An 
individual who sexually abuses a child makes a decision to act, 
and that action harms a child.38 Pedophilia, in contrast, refers to 
a type of sexual interest—specifically an intense and persistent 
sexual interest in prepubescent children.39 Pedophilia need not 
                                                                                                     
 35. See MICHAEL C. SETO, PEDOPHILIA AND SEXUAL OFFENDING AGAINST 
CHILDREN 4 (2008) (introducing the distinction as a foundational concept); 
Donald S. Strassberg et al., Psychopathy Among Pedophilic and Non-Pedophilic 
Child Molesters, 36 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 379, 379 (2001) (examining 
differences between sex offenders who are pedophilic and non-pedophilic); 
Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 776 (explaining that common parlance and 
many clinicians use the terms pedophile and child molester interchangeably); 
Lisa J. Cohen & Igor I. Galynker, Clinical Features of Pedophilia and 
Implications for Treatment, 8 J. PSYCHIATRIC PRAC. 276, 277 (2002) (same); 
Hamilton, supra note 18, at 577–78 (same). 
 36. Though the legal definitions of the terms “sexual abuse” and “sexual 
assault” vary by jurisdiction, this Article uses both phrases to refer to any 
unlawful sexual interaction with a child. See Bahroo, supra note 16, at 499 
(describing the different definitions). 
 37. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2364–
65 (1997) (distinguishing homosexuality from pedophilia on grounds that sexual 
relationships with children are inherently exploitive). 
 38. See Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 465 (outlining effects of sexual abuse 
on children); Fagan et al., supra note 28, at 2460 (same); Swanston et al., supra 
note 28, at 968, 977–81 (same). 
 39. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 697 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V] (outlining diagnostic 
criteria for pedophilia); Anthony R. Beech & Leigh Harkins, DSM-IV 
Paraphilia: Descriptions, Demographics, and Treatment Interventions, 17 
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 527, 529 (2012) (describing various definitions of 
pedophilia); Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 157 (describing sexual desires of 
people with pedophilia); Cohen & Galynker, supra note 35, at 277 (same); SETO, 
supra note 35, at 3 (same). Many variations exist within the broad category of 
pedophilia. Some individuals are attracted exclusively to prepubescents while 
others are also attracted to pubescent adolescents or adults. See SETO, supra 
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entail any behavior; one may be a celibate pedophile, similar to 
how one may have sexual desires for adults while remaining 
celibate.  
Just as not all pedophiles sexually abuse children, not all 
sexual abuse of children is committed by pedophiles. Indeed, the 
majority of child sex offenders do not have a strong or dominant 
sexual interest in children.40 Child sexual abuse is commonly 
motivated by other factors, such as power, control, or sense of 
entitlement, and often occurs within the family.41 
B. Characteristics, Causes, and Treatment 
It is not unusual for children to experience “crushes”—
affection and attraction to other children. As most people age out 
of childhood, so do the people to whom they are attracted. This 
does not happen to people with pedophilia; they grow older but 
remain attracted to children.42 Individuals often first notice their 
pedophilic interest in adolescence.43 
                                                                                                     
note 35, at 4 (differentiating between attraction to pre- and post-pubescent 
children); Beech & Harkins supra, at 529 (same); Cohen & Galynker, supra note 
35, at 280 (same); Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 459 (same). The age and the 
sex of prepubescent children to which the individual is attracted may also vary. 
There is some speculation that those attracted to infants is a variation of 
pedophilia or should be categorized as its own unusual sexual interest. SETO, 
supra note 35, at 4. 
 40. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (estimating that 25% to 
40% of child sex offenders qualify for pedophilic disorder diagnosis). 
 41. See id. (noting that not all sexual abusers are people with pedophilia); 
Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 777 (same); Alan Zarembo, Many 
Researchers Taking a Different View of Pedophilia, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/14/local/la-me-pedophiles-20130115 (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (tracing developments on the purported psychological 
causes of pedophilia) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 42. See Ariadne Ellsworth, Pulling Pedophilia Out of the Dark, BROWN POL. 
REV. (Apr. 26, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/04/pu
lling-pedophilia-out-of-the-dark/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (relating the story of 
“Adam,” who realized as an adolescent that he was attracted to children) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Bleyer, supra note 4 (describing the 
experience of “Spencer,” who noticed that, as he aged, the type of boy he was 
attracted to did not age). 
 43. See Cohen & Galynker, supra note 35, at 278 (noting that, while some 
realize it earlier, many people with pedophilia become aware of their attraction 
during adolescence); Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (providing that 
50% of people with pedophilia develop interest by age fifteen); Studer & Aylwin, 
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Though the exact prevalence of pedophilia in the population 
is unknown, researchers estimate it at approximately one percent 
of the male population,44 with a far smaller but unknown 
prevalence among women.45 Interestingly, some attraction to 
prepubescents seems even more common. Studies of sexual 
arousal indicate that a surprising proportion of the population, 
particularly among men, has fantasized about prepubescent 
children during intercourse or masturbation or may become 
aroused upon viewing images of prepubescents.46  
The last few decades have seen increasing evidence that 
pedophilia is biological and more specifically that it might be 
neurological in origin.47 In studies with large sample sizes, sex 
offenders diagnosed with pedophilia scored lower on intelligence 
tests than non-pedophilic patients, with number of child victims 
negatively correlating with intelligence while the number of adult 
partners positively correlated with intelligence.48 Men with 
pedophilia on average have poorer viseospatial and verbal 
memory scores.49 Individuals with pedophilia have lower scores 
                                                                                                     
supra note 24, at 775 (explaining that paraphilia often develops in adolescence); 
Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 457 (same). 
 44. See Stephenson, supra note 23 (discussing research by Seto and 
Cantor); SETO, supra note 35 (examining prevalence of pedophilia in men). 
 45. Studies of women have been largely limited to sex offenders, which 
severely curtails the ability to make a calculation. See SETO, supra note 35, at 6–
8 (examining several studies and their statistical limitations); Cohen & 
Galynker, supra note 35, at 277–78 (same); Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 524 
(same); Schwartz, supra note 19 (reporting that women commit 6% of child sex 
offenses). 
 46. See Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 775 (examining the prevalence 
of pedophilia in men); SETO, supra note 35, at 7 (citing several studies). One 
study found 62% of men had fantasized about young girls and 3% about young 
boys, while another found that 9% had fantasized about sex with young 
children, with 7% indicating some likelihood that they would have sex with a 
child if they were guaranteed that they would not be identified or punished. 
SETO, supra note 35, at 7.  
 47. See SETO, supra note 35, at 108–11 (discussing neuroscientific study in 
this area). 
 48. Id. at 109. 
 49. See James M. Cantor et al., Cerebral White Matter Deficiencies in 
Pedophilic Men, 42 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 167, 167–68, 177 (2008) (discussing the 
phenomena and showing visual examples); James M. Cantor et al., Intelligence, 
Memory, and Handedness in Pedophilia, 18 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 3, 11 (2004) 
(examining these conclusions). 
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for semantic knowledge and lower executive functioning levels.50 
They are also three times more likely to be left-handed or 
ambidextrous, strongly suggesting a neurological cause.51 Some 
findings suggest that disturbances to neurodevelopment in utero 
or in early childhood increase risk of pedophilia.52 Sex offenders 
with pedophilia are also more likely to report experiencing head 
injuries, a possible source of brain damage, before age thirteen.53 
Brain imaging also evidences a neurological cause. MRIs 
reveal that sex offenders with pedophilia have less white matter 
in their brains than individuals who have committed no offenses 
against children.54 White matter serves as a pathway in the 
brain’s network, connecting various grey matter areas to each 
other and carrying nerve impulse between neurons.55 Researchers 
speculate that pedophilia could result from improper connections 
in the brain, most notably in a network that identifies whether 
environmental stimuli are sexual.56 The brain of an individual 
                                                                                                     
 50. See Yana Suchy et al., Neurocognitive Differences Between Pedophilic 
and Nonpedophilic Child Molesters, 15 J. INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 248, 
252–55 (2007) (reaching these conclusions with statistical analyses). 
 51. See Cantor et al., Cerebral White Matter Deficiencies in Pedophilic Men, 
supra note 49 (discussing the phenomena); Cantor et al., Intelligence, Memory, 
and Handedness in Pedophilia, supra note 49 (examining these conclusions); 
James M. Cantor et al., Quantitative Reanalysis of Aggregate Data on IQ in 
Sexual Offenders, 131 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 555, 559–62 (2005) (demonstrating 
these statistical relationships); see also Jadranka Bacic, MRIs Link Pedophilia 
to Early Brain Development, 5 CANADIAN PSYCHIATRY AUJOURD’HUI 6 (June 2009) 
(reporting on a study involving brains of one thousand people with pedophilia). 
 52. See Cantor, et al., Quantitative Reanalysis of Aggregate Data on IQ in 
Sexual Offenses, supra note 51, at 565 (suggesting this conclusion as the cause 
of both low IQ and pedophilic interests). 
 53. See Ray Blanchard et al., Retrospective Self-Reports of Childhood 
Accidents Causing Unconsciousness in Phallometrically Diagnosed Pedophiles, 
31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 511, 523 (2003) (reaching this conclusion based on 
statistical analysis); SETO, supra note 35, at 109 (same). 
 54. Cantor et al., Cerebral White Matter Deficiencies in Pedophilic Men, 
supra note 49, at 180. 
 55. See Schwartz, supra note 19 (explaining that white matter is the 
substance that connects brain regions to each other); see also Cantor et al., 
Cerebral White Matter Deficiencies in Pedophilic Men, supra note 49, at 180 
(describing the results of a neuroscience study and postulating that low white 
matter volumes increase the risk of developing pedophilia); Dreger, supra note 7 
(“In studies, pedophiles show signs that their sexual interests are related to 
brain structure and that at least some differences existed in their brains before 
birth.”). 
 56. See Bacic, supra note 51 (discussing neuroscience research that 
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with pedophilia may interpret stimuli that usually elicit a 
nurturing and protective response as sexual instead.57 
Psychiatric research calls into question many assumptions 
about the minds of individuals with pedophilia. Contrary to 
common beliefs, individuals living with pedophilic disorder are 
unlikely to have antisocial personality disorder; recent studies 
have demonstrated that sex offenders diagnosed with pedophilic 
disorder score significantly lower on indicators of antisocial 
personality disorder than either non-pedophilic child molesters or 
control groups of non-sex offending criminals.58 Though studies 
are often limited to convicted sex offenders with pedophilia and 
exclude those who do not offend,59 this limitation seems more 
likely to inflate rather than reduce findings of antisocial 
personality disorder. Individuals with pedophilia do experience 
higher rates of mental disorders, most commonly mood and 
anxiety disorders and, in particular, major depression and social 
phobia.60  
                                                                                                     
suggests the brains of people with pedophilia have problems with the circuitry 
that connects sexually responsive parts of the brain); Cantor et al., Cerebral 
White Matter Deficiencies in Pedophilic Men, supra note 49, at 180 (providing an 
explanation for why low white matter volumes may increase the risk of 
pedophilia); Dreger, supra note 7 (“The best current evidence suggests that 
pedophilia results from atypical wiring in the brain.”). 
 57. See Dreger, supra note 7 (noting that brains of those living with 
pedophilia may have “what could be considered a ‘cross-wiring’ in the brain 
anatomy that is responsible for controlling natural social instincts or behavior”); 
Schwartz, supra note 19 (discussing the brain’s network for detecting sexual 
objects in the environment and theorizing that abnormal functioning in the 
brains of people with pedophilia causes children to provoke an erotic response 
rather than the urge to nurture or protect). 
 58. See Strassberg et al., supra note 35, at 380–81 (explaining the results of 
a study that showed that pedophilic child molesters are significantly less likely 
to have a psychopathic personality than non-pedophilic child molesters). 
 59. See, e.g., Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 775 (“As pedophiles 
typically do not identify themselves as such, studies on virtually every aspect of 
pedophilia use convicted sex offenders as the sample pool, and crime statistics 
as a data source.”); Nancy C. Raymond et al., Psychiatric Comorbidity Among 
Pedophilic Sex Offenders, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 786, 786 (1999) (noting every 
participant in the study except one was a sex offender that was court ordered to 
participate in treatment programs); Strassberg et al., supra note 35 (noting that 
the sample included men who were convicted of a sexual offense against a child 
less than fourteen years old). 
 60. See Raymond et al., supra note 59, at 786–87 (discussing the prevalence 
of various mood disorders among individuals with pedophilia). 
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The role of impulsivity in pedophilia and pedophilic behavior 
is also subject to debate. It is commonly assumed that individuals 
living with pedophilia simply “can’t help themselves” and are 
unable to control their impulses to molest children.61 Yet 
individuals with pedophilia rarely spontaneously molest children, 
and the vast majority of sexual abuse of children is 
premeditated.62 A recent study found no connection between 
pedophilia and impulse-aggressive traits and in fact found more 
evidence of inhibition, passive-aggression, and harm avoidance.63 
Similarly, MRI studies have found no evidence to suggest any 
differences in the parts of the brain that relate to self-control or 
impulsivity.64 
Attitudes toward sexual abuse of children vary among 
individuals living with pedophilia. Among those who offend, some 
individuals attempt to justify child sexual abuse, absolving 
themselves of guilt and responsibility by minimizing the harm to 
the child.65 In contrast, some offenders are relieved to be 
                                                                                                     
 61. See Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 462 (noting that, although people 
with pedophilia often report difficulty controlling their behavior, it is rare for 
them to spontaneously molest a child); Six Misconceptions About Pedophiles, 
DISCOVERY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://news. 
discovery.com/human/psychology/misconceptions-pedophilia-111118.htm (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (dispelling the misconception that people with pedophilia 
cannot help attempting to molest a child whenever the opportunity arises) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 62. See Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 462 (arguing that, because 70% to 
80% of sex offenses against children are premeditated, the notion that people 
with pedophilia lack self-control is untenable). 
 63. Lisa J. Cohen et al., Impulsive Personality Traits in Male Pedophiles 
Versus Healthy Controls: Is Pedophilia an Impulsive-Aggressive Disorder?, 43 
COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 127, 132–33 (2002). These researchers proposed 
that pedophilia may be compulsive rather than impulsive—that is, driven by the 
desire to avoid harm and relieve negative feelings rather than to gain pleasure 
and positive feelings. Id. at 127, 132–33. The research on this is limited, 
however, by the fact that it targets sex offenders with pedophilia, excluding non-
offenders. Id. at 129. 
 64. James M. Cantor, Understanding MRI Research on Pedophilia, 
http://individual.Utoronto.ca/james_cantor/blog2.html (last visited Jan. 27, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 65. See Fagan et al., supra note 28, at 2460 (noting that many people with 
pedophilia exhibit cognitive distortions, such as a belief that the child was not 
harmed by abuse); Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 156–57 (contrasting people 
with pedophilia who feel ashamed of their attraction to children with people 
with pedophilia who are not bothered by their sexual interest in children); 
Cohen & Galynker, supra note 35, at 279, 282 (stating that people with 
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apprehended and hope that treatment will help them correct 
their behavior.66 Others, like those on the site Virtuous 
Pedophiles, have never offended.67 Virtuous Pedophiles 
adamantly opposes any sexual contact with children.68 While 
there is no research on the prevalence of attitudes among people 
living with pedophilia, some experts who work with people with 
pedophilia insist that those who embrace their desires are in the 
minority.69 Among those who wish to avoid sexual contact with 
children, some have no trouble resisting while others require 
professional help.70 
Current psychological consensus is that pedophilia is 
amenable to appropriate treatment in many circumstances.71 
Treatment cannot convert sexual interests; therapy to redirect 
sexual attraction away from children toward adults has fared no 
                                                                                                     
pedophilia “routinely deny and minimize the deviant nature of their behavior 
and its destructive impact on children involved”); Schwartz, supra note 19 
(discussing the feelings of denial people with pedophilia may experience). 
 66. Fagan et al., supra note 28, at 2460. 
 67. See Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, 156–57 (noting that some people with 
pedophilia find it easy to resist sexually abusing children); VIRTUOUS 
PEDOPHILES, http://www.virped.org/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (listing goals of 
the organization, which include informing the public that a substantial number 
of people living with pedophilia do not molest children) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Dreger, supra note 7 (“Not every person who 
experiences sexual attractions to children acts on those attractions.”); Clark-
Flory, supra note 3 (discussing people with pedophilia that have never abused 
children). 
 68. F.A.Q., VIRTUOUS PEDOPHILES, http://www.virped.org/index.php/f-a-q 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 69. See Schwartz, supra note 19 (noting that some people with pedophilia 
believe society should not insist that they refrain from acting on their 
attractions, but that this view is expressed by a minority of people with 
pedophilia). 
 70. See Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 3 (comparing people with 
pedophilia that have difficulty resisting temptation and need professional help 
with people with pedophilia that find it easy to resist acting on their attraction 
to children). 
 71. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 534 (discussing various 
psychological studies that show people with pedophilia are less likely to abuse 
children when treated); Cohen & Galynker, supra note 35, at 286 (listing 
predictors of treatment outcomes, which include whether the individual knew 
his victims, the number of victims, and whether the abuse occurred inside the 
home); Bleyer, supra note 4 (describing successful treatment using therapies 
similar to those for addiction). 
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better with pedophilia than it has with same-sex attraction.72 
Instead, successful treatment has focused on cognitive-behavioral 
therapy, often in combination with medication that reduces 
overall sexual desire.73 Some treatments have integrated models 
used for addiction therapy.74 
One shortcoming in the research on treatment is that it 
usually focuses on individuals who have committed sexual 
offenses, with little attention given to the treatment of non-
offending individuals living with pedophilic disorder.75 The lack of 
research and large-scale treatment programs for those outside 
the criminal justice system is a source of frustration among non-
offenders, with some forming their own support groups to fill the 
gap.76  
A relatively new German project seeks to address these 
problems by providing confidential and free treatment for both 
offending and non-offending individuals. Prevention Project 
Dunkelfeld (PPD) offers treatment and support to individuals 
                                                                                                     
 72. See SETO, supra note 35, at 175–76 (discussing the efficacy of therapy 
aimed at changing a pedophile’s interest in children and noting that it is unclear 
whether the therapy results in actual changes in interest or greater control over 
pedophilic sexual arousal); Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 164 (explaining 
that, although therapy attempting to replace the erotic feelings of people living 
with pedophilia about children with age-appropriate stimuli achieved some 
success, “it has not been well established that such changes carry over into the 
non-laboratory situation”); Dreger, supra note 7 (“We have not yet found a way 
to convert pedophiles into non-pedophiles that is any more effective than the 
many failed attempts to convert gay men and lesbians into heterosexuals.”). 
 73. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 534 (discussing various 
psychological studies that show that therapy and medication has reduced 
recidivism by sexual offenders); SETO, supra note 35, at 171–76 (providing an 
overview of various types of treatments for pedophilia and noting a study 
showing that cognitive-behavioral therapy resulted in a significant decrease in 
recidivism among sex offenders); Schwartz, supra note 19 (discussing the use of 
medication that lowers testosterone levels and psychotherapy that involves 
cognitive behavioral methods). 
 74. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 533 (discussing Relapse 
Prevention). 
 75. See id. at 534 (explaining that many more studies have examined 
treatment for sex offenders rather than pedophilia); Cohen & Galynker, supra 
note 35, at 286 (discussing treatment outcomes only among sex offenders). 
 76. See Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (describing support groups formed by 
people with pedophilia who have never offended); Bleyer, supra note 4 
(discussing the difficulty in finding appropriate therapy). 
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sexually attracted to children to prevent sexual offenses.77 It 
employs a public outreach campaign—using billboards, print, 
television, and online advertising—to send three messages to 
individuals living with pedophilic disorder: (1) you are not to 
blame for your sexual attraction; (2) you are responsible for your 
actions; and (3) help is available.78 
PPD’s treatment focuses on preventing individuals from both 
physically abusing children and using child pornography.79 It 
uses both behavioral therapy and, in some circumstances, 
pharmaceutical interventions.80 The therapy focuses on helping 
patients learn “an appropriate perception and appraisal of their 
sexual wishes and needs,” “the identification of and coping with 
dangerous developments,” and “strategies for the prevention of 
                                                                                                     
 77. See M. Beier et al., Encouraging Self-Identified Pedophiles and 
Hebephiles to Seek Professional Help: First Results of the Prevention Project 
Dunkelfeld (PPD), 33 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 545, 545 (2009) (introducing the 
project and describing the international concern about child sexual exploitation); 
Project, PREVENTION PROJECT DUNKELFELD, https://www.dont-offend.org/story 
/78/3878.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (describing the project as a way for 
people with pedophilia to obtain confidential treatment) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); D. RICHARD LAWS & TONY WARD, DESISTANCE 
FROM SEX OFFENDING: ALTERNATIVES TO THROWING AWAY THE KEYS 159–60 (2011) 
(discussing the project and its approaches to prevent child abuse by people with 
pedophilia). 
 78. See LAWS & WARD, supra note 77 (stating the slogan of the media 
campaign: “You are not guilty because of your desire, but you are responsible for 
your sexual behavior. There is help! Don’t become an offender!”); Beier et al., 
supra note 77, at 546 (describing the media campaign and the research that 
supported choosing these three messages); Media Work, PREVENTION PROJECT 
DUNKELFELD, https://www.dont-offend.org/story/84/3884.html (last visited Jan. 
27, 2015) (explaining the goals of the media campaign) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); GEROLD SCHERNER & LAURA KUHLE, INSIGHTS 
OF THE PREVENTION PROJECT DUNKELFELD (Apr. 3, 2013), available at 
http://www.slideshare.net/Sexpo/gerold-scherner-insights-of-the-preventive-
project-dunkelfeld (discussing the need to dispel stigma about pedophilia and 
using the media campaign to further this goal). 
 79. See Beier et al., supra note 77, at 548 (noting that a substantial portion 
of the sample committed child sexual exploitation through child pornography 
and discussing the approach for prevention analyzed by the study). 
 80. See Therapy, PREVENTION PROJECT DUNKELFELD, http://www.dont-
offend.org/story/85/3885.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (“The therapeutic 
procedure integrates behavioural therapy and sexological approaches and also 
includes the option for pharmaceutical support.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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sexual assault.”81 It is provided in both group and individual 
settings and may include family members.82 
PPD has not yet published treatment results indicating 
whether it has been successful in reducing or preventing offenses. 
However, preliminary results indicate that individuals who 
undergo treatment emerge with a balance of characteristics that 
makes them less likely to offend, particularly among those who 
have a history of offending.83 For example, treatment resulted in 
more negative attitudes toward offending, greater victim 
empathy, less emotional loneliness and hostility, and better 
sexual coping skills.84 
C. Living with Pedophilia 
Individuals who have sexual interest in children usually live 
closeted lives.85 It is commonly assumed that such people do not 
self-identify to more successfully victimize children.86 For some, 
this is the case.87 But for those who do not abuse children, the 
closet is both a refuge from societal condemnation and a source of 
profound isolation. Experts and individuals living with pedophilia 
agree that isolation and lack of support is a serious obstacle for 
the prevention of sexual abuse.88 Dr. James Cantor, one of the 
                                                                                                     
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See SCHERNER & KUHLE, supra note 78 (discussing results that show 
both child sex abusers and users of child pornography had less offense-
supportive attitudes after treatment). See generally Zarembo, supra note 41. 
 84. See SCHERNER & KUHLE, supra note 78 (explaining the results of 
treatment for offenders that both sexually abused children and viewed child 
pornography and noting improvement in these four areas).  
 85. See BERING, supra note 9, at 156–57 (discussing the extreme personal 
distress experienced by people with pedophilia because of the need to hide a 
fundamental aspect of their identity). 
 86. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, In Plain View, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 24, 
2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/09/24/in-plain-view (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (“A pedophile . . . is someone adept not just at preying on 
children but at confusing, deceiving, and charming the adults responsible for 
those children.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 87. See id. (describing some pedophilic child molesters’ process of becoming 
integrated in a community to earn trust). 
 88. See Dreger, supra note 7 (noting that many people with pedophilia 
stopped attending therapy because mandatory reporting laws may require their 
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foremost researchers on pedophilia, has argued that individuals 
living with pedophilia are more likely to offend when they have 
no support, noting “[p]eople are most likely to do the most 
desperate things when they feel the most desperate.”89 
Pedophilia is the most shameful and feared of all unusual 
sexual interests.90 Individuals living with pedophilia exist in a 
society that not only does not understand their sexual interests 
but does not want to.91 Psychologist Jesse Bering analogizes an 
individual with pedophilia to a straight person in a witness 
protection program that assigns him a gay identity:  
[Y]ou must convince everyone you meet, for your own safety 
and for the safety of those you care about, that you’re 100 
percent homosexual. Now don’t try too hard to appear gay, 
because you’ll give yourself away, so be stereotypical but not 
too stereotypical, yet don’t ever let your guard down 
either . . . . Watch what you say, where your eyes go, what you 
do in your spare time, whom you’re seen with, and careful 
now, no matter how close you get to someone in this new life of 
yours, no one must ever discover that you’re really a 
heterosexual. All that you hold dear—and I can’t emphasize 
this part enough—hangs in the balance.92 
Comments on the Virtuous Pedophiles website describe 
similar feelings of fear and isolation: 
                                                                                                     
therapist to report them to authorities, which leaves people with pedophilia 
with no support from mental health professionals); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 
(providing an example of a pedophile who has never abused children and started 
an anonymous support group to help people with pedophilia resist abusing 
children). 
 89. Dreger, supra note 7. 
 90. See BERING, supra note 9, at 156–57 (explaining that people with 
pedophilia face a lifetime of defending, rationalizing, or hiding their sexual 
interests because of society’s shame and fear of their sexual interest in 
children); Malón, supra note 9 (stating that people with pedophilia are the most 
feared embodiment of perversion in modern society); Bleyer, supra note 4 
(illustrating a pedophile’s struggle for acceptance and noting the moment he 
realized that what felt entirely natural to him was despised by society); Clark-
Flory, supra note 3 (citing pedophilia expert James Cantor as estimating that 
individuals with pedophilia may be the most isolated individuals in society). 
 91. See BERING, supra note 9 (explaining the personal distress people with 
pedophilia experience because of society’s refusal to try to understand 
pedophilia). 
 92. Id. at 156–57. 
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The only thing keeping me from suicide is knowing my family 
and friends would be devastated. . . . I also wonder how many 
would still care if they knew how I felt about boys. 
* * * 
I have a paralyzing fear of being outed as a pedophile (even 
though I haven’t done anything illegal, the social stigma would 
destroy what little social and family life I have.) 
* * * 
I don’t think I can ever tell anybody in my family, as I’m too 
worried that if people know it will prevent me from growing up 
to have a successful job or do well in my final years of high 
school. It’s such a sensitive topic, and so many people think 
that pedophilia is one of the worst crimes in the world, even 
above murder. But I have not offended, and I wish not to. 
* * * 
I felt like I could never talk about it to anyone and I could talk 
about other things but never really the true problem. I’ve had 
suicidal thoughts for a long time. I just want to talk to 
someone who understands without fear, I don’t know what else 
to do.93 
The artifice is exhausting and yet the repercussions of being 
outed may be worse. When a U.K. news source began a project of 
naming suspected pedophiles, residents throughout the country 
reacted violently to the idea of such individuals living in their 
communities.94 Riots erupted in which police came under fire; 
                                                                                                     
 93. Who We Are, supra note 1.  
 94. See Rebecca Allison, Doctor Driven Out of Home By Vigilantes, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2000, 19:42 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/aug
/30/childprotection.society (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (“Dr. Cloete is the latest 
victim to have been wrongly identified by anti-paedophile campaigners in the 
wave of protests which have swept the country following the News of the 
World’s campaign to ‘name and shame’ alleged sex offenders.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Nicole Martin, Innocent Families Driven Out 
as Paedophile Protest Continues, THE TELEGRAPH, (Aug. 10, 2000), 
http://www.telegraph.co.ul/news/uknews/1352121/Innocent-families-driven-out-
as-paedophile-protest-continues.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (describing a 
mob of 300 people that gathered outside a suspected pedophile’s home and 
screamed “hang him”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Families Flee Paedophile Protests, BBC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2000, 11:14 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/872436.stm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) 
(discussing the need to rehouse some residents because of the violence) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). It is unclear whether the news 
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cars were burned, and windows smashed.95 Mobs targeted and 
attacked those suspected of pedophilia.96 The government was 
forced to relocate several families, and one man killed himself 
after a vigilante attack on his home left him in fear for his life.97 
Even a pediatrician was forced to flee her home after vandals 
mistook her title for the word “pedophile.”98 As Bering notes, 
people living with pedophilia, “aren’t living their lives in the 
closet; they’re eternally hunkered down in a panic room and 
chewing away nervously at their nails.”99 
III. Reconceptualizing Pedophilia in the Law 
This Part analyzes the different ways of conceptualizing 
pedophilia in the law. Part III.A explores pedophilia as a mental 
disorder and as a sexual orientation, and discusses the problems 
each concept raises. Part III.B posits that the legal concept of 
sexual orientation is a poor fit for pedophilia because pedophilic 
sexual interests are defined by intense and recurrent desires to 
engage in conduct that significantly harms others. It argues that 
the legal concept of mental illness far better addresses the issues 
pedophilia raises. 
                                                                                                     
reports are using “pedophile” mistakenly to refer to child molesters rather than 
people living with pedophilia. However, the conflation of these categories in the 
public mind makes the distinction largely irrelevant in this context—either is 
likely to produce significant hostile reactions. 
 95. Families Flee Paedophile Protests, supra note 94 (“Protests have 
escalated from peaceful demonstrations into riots with police coming under fire, 
cars being burned and windows smashed.”). 
 96. See id. (describing the mob violence against people suspected to have 
pedophilia). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Allison, supra note 94 (“Self-styled vigilantes attacked the home of 
a hospital pediatrician after apparently confusing her professional title with the 
word ‘paedophile.’”). 
 99. BERING, supra note 9. 
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A. Pedophilia as Mental Disorder or Sexual Orientation 
1. Pedophilic Disorder 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) recognizes a 
mental disorder characterized by sexual attraction to children, 
which it terms “pedophilic disorder.”100 Pedophilic disorder is part 
of a subset of mental disorders known as “paraphilic disorders,” 
named so because each involves an unusual sexual interest called 
a “paraphilia.”101 
The APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM), the “bible” of modern psychiatry,102 outlines 
three diagnostic criteria for pedophilic disorder.103 Criterion A 
requires recurrent, intense sexual interest in a prepubescent 
child or children that lasts for at least six months.104 The DSM 
defines prepubescence as “generally age thirteen years or 
younger,”105 however it is more reliable to use indicators of 
                                                                                                     
 100. The APA only recently changed the name of this disorder from 
pedophilia to pedophilic disorder. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PEDOPHILIC DISORDERS 
(2013). Much of the research on pedophilic disorder therefore refers to it as 
pedophilia. This change reflects the APA’s distinction between a paraphilic 
disorder and its underlying paraphilia. 
 101. Paraphilias can vary significantly in the type of interest at issue. Some 
concern erotic activities (masochistic disorder involves sexual interest in being 
made to suffer), whereas others concern the individual’s erotic targets 
(pedophilic disorder involves sexual interest in prepubescent individuals). See 
DSM-V, supra note 39, at 685, 694, 697 (describing different types of paraphilic 
disorders). 
 102. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1094 (noting that the description of the 
DSM as a psychiatric bible is not a mere play on words given the normative 
status it has acquired in our society); Gary Greenberg, The Cult of DSM, 
PSYCHOTHERAPY NETWORKER, Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 21 (criticizing the power the 
DSM has over the psychiatric community). 
 103. The DSM did not make this formal distinction between “paraphilia” 
and “paraphilic disorder” until the recent DSM-V. The disorder itself was once 
called a paraphilia; now paraphilias are not disorders, but rather Criterion A of 
paraphilic disorders. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 685–86, 816 (explaining the 
change in terminology from DSM-IV to DSM-V). This distinction did not change 
how paraphilic disorders are diagnosed; it simply changed how we referred to 
them. Id. 
 104. See id. at 697–98 (providing the definition of Criterion A and describing 
the diagnostic features of pedophilic disorder). 
 105. See id. (defining prepubescence).  
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puberty rather than age.106 Criterion B is fulfilled if the 
individual acts on the urges or if the individual’s urges or 
fantasies cause “marked distress or interpersonal difficulty.”107 
Sexual interest is therefore necessary but not sufficient for a 
diagnosis; it must be accompanied by some behavior, distress, or 
interpersonal impairment. Criterion C specifies that clinicians 
should exclude from a pedophilic disorder diagnosis an individual 
under age sixteen as well as an individual in late adolescence 
involved in an ongoing sexual relationship with a twelve- or 
thirteen-year-old.108  
Classifying pedophilia as a mental disorder raises the thorny 
question of how to distinguish which sexual desires indicate 
mental illness rather than typical variations in sexuality.109 One 
reason this is so difficult is that it relies on a coherent concept of 
mental illness.110 While there is no universally accepted definition 
                                                                                                     
 106. See Hamilton, supra note 18, at 560 (explaining that secondary sex 
characteristics associated with puberty may be present before age thirteen and 
noting criticism of the DSM’s definition of pedophilic disorder for this reason). 
Thomas K. Zander argues that this method raises problems because the onset of 
puberty is not a clear line, allowing determinations to “literally devolve into a 
splitting of pubic hairs.” Thomas K. Zander, Adult Sexual Attraction to Early-
Stage Adolescents: Phallometry Doesn’t Equal Pathology, 38 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 329, 329 (2009). 
 107. DSM-V, supra note 39, at 697. All other paraphilic disorders listed in 
the DSM-V require “clinically significant distress” or “impairment” in “social, 
occupational or other important areas of functioning.” See id. at 686, 689, 691, 
694, 695, 700, 702 (providing the definitions of the other paraphilic disorders: 
voyeuristic disorder, exhibitionistic disorder, frotteuristic disorder, sexual 
masochism disorder, sexual sadism disorder, fetishistic disorder, and transvestic 
disorder).  
 108. See id. at 697 (providing the definition of Criterion C). 
 109. See, e.g., Fred S. Berlin, Pedophilia: When Is a Difference a Disorder?, 
31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 479, 479 (2002) (discussing the inevitable value 
judgments required to label a condition as a mental disorder) [hereinafter 
Berlin, Pedophilia: When Is a Difference a Disorder?]; Hamilton, supra note 18, 
at 556–59 (explaining that because pedophilia is a type of mental disorder 
characterized by psychosexual interest in unusual objects, its characterization 
as a mental disorder inherently involves a normative inquiry). 
 110. See Charles Moser, Paraphilia: A Critique of a Confused Concept, in 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SEX THERAPY: INNOVATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES 91, 93–96 
(Peggy J. Kleinplatz ed., 2001) (noting the influence of medicine, religion, law, 
science, society, and culture on the definition of mental disorders and discussing 
the difficultly of defining mental disorders); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 556–59 
(explaining that even within the same timeframe and cultural base there is no 
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of or test for mental illness,111 working definitions possess 
common traits. Most notable among these is the idea of the 
mental dysfunction,112 specifically a disturbance in an 
individual’s ability to think, feel, or relate to others.113 Mental 
                                                                                                     
consensus about what is normal and abnormal, which renders classification of 
behavior as a mental disorder controversial). 
 111. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 182–98 (1984) (describing 
various ways to define mental illness); Allen Frances et al., Defining Mental 
Disorder When It Really Counts: DSM-IV-TR and SVP/SDP Statutes, 36 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 375, 378 (2008) (noting that even the DSM-IV-TR 
states that it cannot provide a precise definition of a mental disorder); Jane 
Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 
593–97 (2002) (describing the difficulty of defining a mental disorder); Aragona, 
supra note 12, at 1–2 (stating that whether disorder is a scientific biomedical 
term or a sociopolitical term that necessarily involves a value judgment is a 
“fundamental philosophical problem underlying discussions on diagnostic 
systems”); Jerome C. Wakefield, The Concept of Mental Disorder: Diagnostic 
Implications of the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis, 6 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 149, 
150 (2007) (noting tests that distinguish disorders from nondisorders rely on 
implicit assumptions about the concept of disorder). 
 112. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 193 (analyzing whether the outcome of a 
particular condition or process defines its function, which allows assessment of 
dysfunction based on deviation from a condition’s function); Korn supra note 
111, at 593–95 (discussing the role of mental dysfunction in defining a mental 
disorder); Wakefield, supra note 111, at 151–52 (distinguishing mental disorders 
from other negative mental conditions by arguing that mental disorders entail 
dysfunction); Aragona, supra note 12, at 5–13 (critiquing the argument that 
dysfunctions are purely factual, rather than containing a normative element); 
Fred S. Berlin, Commentary on Pedophilia Diagnostic Criteria in DSM-5, 39 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW. 242, 242 (2011) [hereinafter Berlin, Commentary 
on Pedophilia Diagnostic Criteria in DSM-5] (describing the criteria of a 
pedophilia diagnosis and arguing that individuals who have sexual urges in 
response to children, regardless of the intensity of the urges, should qualify for a 
pedophilia diagnosis). The DSM-V describes mental illness as a syndrome 
characterized by (1) clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s 
cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that (2) reflects a dysfunction in the 
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental 
functioning. DSM-V, supra note 39, at 20. 
 113. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 20 (using the concept of dysfunction to 
define mental disorder); Aragona, supra note 12, at 5–13 (critiquing the 
argument that dysfunctions are purely factual, rather than containing a 
normative element); Berlin, Commentary on Pedophilia Diagnostic Criteria in 
DSM-5, supra note 112, at 242 (describing the criteria of a pedophilia diagnosis 
and arguing that individuals who have sexual urges in response to children, 
regardless of the intensity of the urges, should qualify for a pedophilia 
diagnosis); Korn, supra note 111, at 594 (explaining that disturbances in 
thinking, feeling, and relating to others that characterizes a mental disorder 
results in a substantially diminished capacity for coping with the ordinary 
demands of life); Wakefield, supra note 111, at 150 (discussing use of 
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disorders are also commonly defined as causing distress, 
impairment, or an increased risk of suffering or death.114  
The distinction between a healthy and unhealthy mind is 
neither objective nor universally accepted.115 In general, 
physicians and psychiatrists define health and illness with regard 
to certain goals—ideas about how bodies and minds should 
operate—with illness being a type or degree of deviance from 
those goals.116 As Michael Moore notes, we deem a heart that 
                                                                                                     
impairment). 
 114. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 193 (disputing this definition); Berlin, 
Commentary on Pedophilia Diagnostic Criteria in DSM-5, supra note 112, at 
242 (describing the diagnostic criteria of pedophilia and using the concepts of 
distress, suffering, and impairment). 
 115. As a result, the psychiatric community and its critics have spent the 
last century debating what constitutes a mental illness. See MOORE, supra note 
111, at 155–216 (providing an extensive discussion about the definition of 
mental illness); Zander, supra note 18, at 28 (“Debates about the validity of the 
construct of ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental disorder’ have raged for the past half-
century.”); Aragona, supra note 12, at 1–13 (providing an example of scholarship 
that rejects a definition of mental disorder and argues mental disorder is best 
understood as a construct, which cannot provide a clear-cut demarcation 
between what is and is not a disorder). Some theorists argue that mental illness 
rarely reflects illness at all, but instead reflects subjective lay concepts and 
value judgments, and that the process of being labeled abnormal and ill causes 
psychological and social harms rather than identifying them. Such skeptics 
warn that psychiatry justifies coercive interventions to impose social norms 
rather than treat legitimate illness. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 155–81 
(challenging these views); Zander, supra note 18, at 28–29 (describing the 
debate about the validity of the construct of mental disorder); THOMAS S. SZASZ, 
THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT 
(1961) (arguing against classifying psychological problems as diseases or 
illnesses); Eric J. Dammann, “The Myth of Mental Illness:” Continuing 
Controversies and Their Implications for Mental Health Professionals, 17 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 733 (1997) (summarizing Szasz’s views and the views of 
Szasz’s critics). 
This Article does not challenge the concept of mental illness. We need not 
have an objective or unanimously accepted measurement of dysfunction in order 
to recognize that it exists. Just because mental illness diagnoses have been used 
for illegitimate purposes in the past does not mean that there is no such thing 
as mental illness. On the contrary, there is significant evidence that many 
individuals do suffer from mental dysfunctions. Few would argue that a severely 
delusional paranoid schizophrenic is perfectly healthy simply because we have 
no objective or universally accepted measurement of health. This Article accepts 
the concept of mental illness and examines the difficulties of using it to 
pathologize sexual interests.  
 116. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 28–29, 189–90 (describing functional 
explanations for mental illness, which evaluate the end state or goal of a system 
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cannot properly pump blood unhealthy because we believe that 
the function of the heart is to pump blood through our circulatory 
system and not, for example, to make noise.117  
There is no established baseline conception of how a sexual 
desire should function to determine when it is not functioning 
properly. Sexual interest spans an enormous range.118 If 
reproduction is its goal,119 then any desire for nonreproductive 
sex might indicate illness; this justification would pathologize a 
                                                                                                     
to determine illness); Berlin, Pedophilia: When Is a Difference a Disorder?, supra 
note 109, at 480 (arguing it is reasonable to describe pedophilia as a disorder 
because of the psychological burdens and impairments individuals sexually 
attracted to children experience); Aragona, supra note 12, at 6 (discussing the 
normative aspect of defining a mental disorder); Wakefield, supra note 111, at 
151 (discussing the definition of mental disorder and arguing it has both a 
normative and factual component). Physical medicine, for example, is concerned 
with a system that maintains certain balances that contribute toward what we 
consider health and survival. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 189–90 (describing 
the functional analysis entailed in determining whether a person is physically 
ill). 
 117. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 189–90 (describing the function of the 
heart as pumping blood, rather than making noise in the chest cavity, because 
pumping blood contributes to the proper functioning of the entire body); 
Wakefield, supra note 111, at 151–52 (noting that because the function of the 
heart is to pump blood, a heart that cannot pump blood is dysfunctional). 
 118. See BERING, supra note 9, at 99–166 (describing different types of 
sexual attractions); Berlin, Pedophilia: When Is a Difference a Disorder?, supra 
note 109 (discussing the diverse spectrum of human sexuality); Lisa Miller, The 
Turn-On Switch, N.Y. MAGAZINE (July 21, 2013), http://nymag.com/nymag/ 
features/fetishes-2013-7/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (discussing myriad sexual 
interests) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Moser, supra note 
110, at 92 (“[Researchers] have yet to find an attribute that has not been 
eroticized. Someone, somewhere will find the most seemingly unlikely stimulus 
erotic.”). 
 119. See Berlin, Pedophilia: When Is a Difference a Disorder?, supra note 109 
(“God or nature has put sexual drive into each and every one of us for a very 
important reason—the preservation of the human race.”); Jerome C. Wakefield, 
Disorder as Harmful Dysfunction: A Conceptual Critique of DSM-III-R’s 
Definition of a Mental Disorder, 99 PSYCHOL. REV. 232, 243 (1992) (arguing that 
the diagnostic criteria of a mental disorder should direct clinicians to evaluate 
whether a particular system or mechanism is failing to function as it naturally 
would); see also Malón, supra note 9, at 1090 (describing this view); Vernon L. 
Quinsey, Coercive Paraphilic Disorder, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 405, 405–07 
(2009) (analyzing coercive paraphilic disorder from an evolutionary perspective). 
But see Jay R. Feierman, A Biosocial Overview of Adult Human Sexual Behavior 
with Children and Adolescents, in PEDOPHILIA: BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS, supra 
note 9, at 8, 26–27 (describing the evolutionary role in nonprocreative sexual 
behavior). 
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host of sexual interests, including same-sex attraction.120 If 
human pleasure and happiness is a goal, then psychology should 
pathologize a far narrower range.121 Changing social mores, 
including prejudices, often inform judgments of what desires are 
pathological.122 The DSM’s current definition of a paraphilia is 
oddly broad and archaic, entailing “[a]ny intense and persistent 
sexual interest other than sexual interest in genital stimulation 
or preparatory fondling with phenotypically normal, physically 
mature, consenting human partners.”123  
The DSM attempts to narrow this category by using 
Criterion B—behavior, distress, or interpersonal difficulty—to 
distinguish when sexual interest in children constitutes a mental 
disorder.124 But these requirements create more problems than 
they resolve. The behavior requirement raises the possibility that 
clinicians will diagnose an individual based on harmful or 
criminal behavior alone.125 Mental health professionals and 
                                                                                                     
 120. See Richard Green, Rejoinder, 31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 505, 505 
(2002) (explaining that if mental disorder is characterized by a failure to 
function in a natural or biologically designated way, then homosexuality is a 
mental disorder). 
 121. See PAUL R. ABRAMSON & STEVEN D. PINKERTON, WITH PLEASURE 3–50 
(2002) (arguing that sex serves the goal of pleasure in itself). 
 122. For example, same-sex attraction was once considered pathological. 
Andreas De Block & Pieter R. Adriaens, Pathologizing Sexual Deviance: A 
History, 50 J. SEX RES. 276, 287–89 (2013); Moser, supra note 110, at 96. 
Psychiatrists also diagnosed slaves that attempted to escape with a 
psychological disorder called drapetomania. Patrick Singy, Letter to the Editor, 
What’s Wrong With Sex?, 39 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 1231 (2010). 
 123. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 685. 
 124. See id. at 685–86, 697–98 (defining Criterion B and explaining its 
application to a diagnosis of paraphilic disorder); Berlin, Pedophilia: When Is a 
Difference a Disorder?, supra note 109, at 479–80 (explaining that pedophilia is 
a disorder because it creates psychological burdens and impairments for an 
individual living in a society that has wisely decided to prohibit adult–child 
sexual interaction). 
 125. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 697–98 (defining Criterion A, which 
includes sexual desires aroused by children, and Criterion B, which includes 
acting on these desires); see also Ray Blanchard, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria 
for Pedophilia, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 304, 305 (2009) (discussing DSM-IV, 
but the criteria were not altered in the fifth edition); Zander, supra note 18, at 
37 (stating that just because behavior is criminal does not justify labeling it as a 
mental disorder); Charles Moser, Letter to the Editor, When Is an Unusual 
Sexual Interest a Mental Disorder?, 38 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 323, 324 (2009) 
(“[J]ust committing a crime does not indicate psychopathy and most criminals 
do not have diagnoses based upon their specific crime.”); Studer & Aylwin, supra 
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governments may therefore use psychiatric diagnoses to 
inappropriately pathologize what is better understood as criminal 
behavior.126 The distress criterion seems counterintuitive; it 
seems reasonable to be more concerned about the mental health 
of an individual who is not distressed by his attraction to 
children.127 Distress and interpersonal difficulty are also 
questionable criteria because they may be caused by the 
individual’s shame and fear of societal response rather than the 
sexual desire itself.128 Given society’s view of those who have 
                                                                                                     
note 24, at 777 (distinguishing child molesters and people with pedophilia by 
noting that a child molester’s primary sexual attraction may not be to children); 
Aragona, supra note 12, at 4 (describing concerns about the medicalization of all 
bad behavior); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 574–77 (supporting the argument 
that sex crimes and psychiatric illness are conflated by noting that forensic 
scientists rely on criminally offensive sexual behavior to fulfill both Criterion A 
and B).  
 126. See Moser, supra note 125 (describing the confusing nature of deciding 
which sex crimes are diagnoses); De Block & Adrians, supra note 122, at 278 
(discussing the medicalization of aberrant sexual behavior steered by the use of 
physicians and psychiatrists as forensic experts to help ensure the state’s 
control over private morality).  
 127. See Blanchard, supra note 125, at 306–07 (referencing other 
psychiatrists who posit that the DSM’s definition of pedophilic disorder excludes 
an individual who masturbates to fantasies of children but is not distressed by 
these thoughts and behaviors); Richard Green, Is Pedophilia a Mental Disorder, 
31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 467, 470 (2002) (critiquing the DSM’s definition of 
pedophilic disorder for excluding an individual that has never acted on his 
sexual attraction to children and is not distressed by his urges). Ray Blanchard, 
the chair of the paraphilia sub-working group for the DSM-V, has argued that 
practitioners need not worry about a pedophile who feels no distress because 
distress must always follow from Criteria A. Blanchard argues that a patient 
who feels sexual desire toward children but does not act on it must feel some 
sort of distress because of his inability to act on it. See Blanchard, supra note 
125, at 307 (“How could one experience a lifetime of sexual ‘urges,’ which are 
never satisfied, with no sense of frustration?”). According to Blanchard, the 
presence of a paraphilia necessitates distress if it cannot be fulfilled; otherwise, 
“can one really say there was an ‘urge’ in the first place?” Id. at 307; see also 
Malón, supra note 9, at 1088 (summarizing Blanchard’s argument that a 
contented pedophile—an individual that never acts on his urges and experiences 
no distress—does not actually exist or is extremely rare). If this is true, 
however, then Criterion B serves no purpose. All individuals with Criterion A 
either act on their desires or do not, and thus Criterion B encompasses all 
individuals who fulfill Criterion A. 
 128. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1084 (discussing the criteria of distress in a 
pedophilic disorder diagnosis); Alan W. Shindel & Charles A. Moser, Why Are 
the Paraphilias Mental Disorders?, 8 J. SEXUAL MED. 927, 928 (2010) (explaining 
that an individual with a paraphilia may experience distress because of societal 
106 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75 (2015) 
pedophilic desires, these criteria could potentially encompass 
anyone who is attracted to children. As one critic notes, “[i]t does 
not seem possible for a person sexually interested in children not 
to be socially impaired in some way because societal norms 
dictate that it is abnormal for a person to be sexually interested 
in children.”129 
Perhaps most importantly, the behavior, distress, and 
interpersonal difficulty criteria cannot resolve the underlying 
question as to why some sexual desires raise the possibility of 
pathology while others do not. Intense, recurrent desire for 
vaginal intercourse with an adult is generally considered normal, 
thus we do not pathologize the desire itself when an individual 
acts on it, even with a non-consenting person.130 Nor is there a 
paraphilic disorder diagnosis for an individual whose intense and 
recurrent desire for vaginal intercourse with an adult causes him 
distress because he simply does not want to have sex until 
marriage. Even if these individuals were diagnosed with mental 
disorders, their interest in vaginal intercourse with an adult 
would be irrelevant to the diagnosis. 
While arguments demonstrate the difficulty in neatly 
categorizing pedophilia as a mental disorder, they do not foreclose 
                                                                                                     
discrimination). The DSM attempts to avoid this problem by requiring that the 
distress and impairment be caused by the paraphilia as opposed to societal 
response. But it is impossible to tease out causation in this way. All distress 
likely has some internal and external cause. An individual may be repulsed by 
his sexual interest for children in part because he finds it morally repugnant 
and in part because he knows society condemns it as morally repugnant.  
 129. William T. O’Donohue et al., Problems with the DSM-IV Diagnosis of 
Pedophilia, 12 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 95, 102 (2000). 
 130. Some psychiatrists have proposed paraphilic coercive disorder be added 
to the DSM’s paraphilic disorder. This proposed disorder requires “recurrent, 
intense sexually arousing fantasies or sexual urges focused on sexual coercion” 
and that either the individual be distressed or impaired by the attractions or the 
individual has sought sexual stimulation by forcing sex on three or more non-
consenting persons on separate occasions. See Paul Stern, Paraphilic Coercive 
Disorder in the DSM: The Right Diagnosis for the Right Reasons, 39 ARCHIVES 
SEXUAL BEHAV. 1443, 1444 (2010) (arguing that paraphilic coercive disorder 
“gives the judicial system the best opportunity to most accurately identify the 
small group of men who have previously committed, and are likely in the future 
to commit, this type of predatory sexual violence”). But this proposed disorder 
again requires an intense and recurrent desire for coerced sex, as opposed to my 
hypothetical, in which a man does not specifically desire coerced sex but decides 
nonetheless to override his wife’s consent. 
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this categorization. Part III.B, infra, will argue that, for the 
purposes of the law, the concept of a mental disorder provides 
perhaps the most adequate means of conceptualizing pedophilia. 
These issues, however, provide room for ongoing debate about the 
nature and dimensions of pedophilia as a mental disorder both in 
psychiatry and the law. 
2. Erotic Age Orientation: Pedophilia as a Sexual Orientation 
The fifth edition of the DSM, as originally published in 
October 2013, referred to pedophilia as a sexual orientation.131 It 
specifically stated that an intense and persistent sexual interest 
in prepubescent children that is not acted on or accompanied by 
distress or impairment is better characterized as a sexual 
orientation than a mental disorder.132 The text provoked an 
immediate and vitriolic response, particularly from conservative 
news sites and bloggers.133 These news sources interpreted it as 
an attempt to normalize pedophilia and promote the sexual abuse 
of children.134 In response, the APA issued a press release 
                                                                                                     
 131. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 698 (comparing pedophilic sexual 
orientation and pedophilic disorders).  
 132. See id. (stating that if individuals “have never acted on their impulses, 
then these individuals have a pedophilic sexual orientation but not a pedophilic 
disorder”). 
 133. See Cheryl Wetzstein, APA to Correct Manual: Pedophilia Is Not a 
“Sexual Orientation”, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2013/oct/31/apa-correct-manual-clarification-pedophilia-not-se/ 
(last updated Oct. 31, 2013) (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (noting “an uproar on the 
internet that the APA had designated pedophilia as a sexual orientation in its 
new [DSM]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Dr. Susan 
Berry, American Psychiatric Association Reclassifies Pedophilia, Backtracks, 
BREITBART, http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2013/11/02/american-
psychiatric-association-reclassifies-pedophilia/ (last updated Nov. 2, 2013) (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (discussing the “public outcry” in response to the DSM-V’s 
classification of pedophilia as a sexual orientation) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Hunter Stuart, Whopping Pedophilia “Sexual 
Orientation” Error Sparks Right-Wing Freakout, THE HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/31/pedophilia-sexual-
orientation_n_4183482.html (last updated Nov. 1, 2013) (last visited Jan. 27, 
2015) (observing that “[c]onservative media outlets and pundits pounced on the 
[DSM-V] statement”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 134. See Wetzstein, supra note 133 (discussing how bloggers bashed “the 
APA for ‘mainstreaming’ deviance and capitulating to pro-pedophile groups”); 
Berry, supra note 133 (citing conservative nonprofit organization’s statement 
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explaining that the term “sexual orientation” was used in error.135 
The press release noted that pedophilic desires that do not fulfill 
Criterion B should be characterized as a sexual interest or a 
paraphilia rather than a sexual orientation.136 
The outcry over the DSM’s textual error demonstrates the 
controversy surrounding the concept of sexual orientation and its 
power. The DSM text did not normalize sexual abuse—on the 
contrary, it specifically designated those who act on pedophilic 
desires as having a mental disorder. But the mere possibility that 
sexual interest in children could be considered a sexual 
orientation sparked outrage. 
While sexual orientation is commonly used to describe the 
gender to which one is attracted, several scholars and advocates 
argue for a more expansive definition.137 Some have proposed, for 
example, that sexual orientation should include an axis of 
sexuality versus asexuality—the extent to which one experiences 
sexual urges or interests at all.138 Sexual orientation might also 
consider the extent to which one focuses sexual interest on others 
as opposed to autoeroticism.139 Other scholars have proposed 
                                                                                                     
that children will ultimately suffer from “any effort to legitimize pedophilia”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Stuart, supra note 133 (noting conservative 
bloggers’ and commenters’ “shared sentiment . . . that this was a logical 
progression from the normalization of homosexuality that began in the 1960’s”). 
 135. See Press Release, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, APA Statement on DSM-5 
Text Error (Oct. 31, 2013) (stating that the term sexual orientation was used in 
error “and should read ‘sexual interest’”). 
 136. See id. (“APA considers pedophilic disorders a ‘paraphilia,’ not a ‘sexual 
orientation.’”). 
 137. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 997, 
1057–58 (2012) (arguing for a broader definition of sexual orientation); Tweedy, 
supra note 17, at 1479–1509 (discussing expanding sexual orientation to include 
the preference of polyamorous relationships); Michael D. Storms, Theories of 
Sexual Orientation, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 783, 783–91 (1980) 
(discussing the limits of common theories regarding the nature of sexual 
orientation); see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 303, 338–344 (2014) (proposing additional axes by which to measure 
asexuality). 
 138. See Emens, supra note 137, at 338–40 (discussing asexuality using 
existing models of sexual orientation); Storms, supra note 137, at 783–91 
(positing asexuality as a distinct sexual orientation). 
 139. See Emens, supra note 137, at 341–42 (discussing asexuality along an 
autoerotic axis); Glazer, supra note 137, at 1054–55 (arguing for separation of 
sexual orientation into general orientation and specific orientation). 
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expanding it to include the extent to which individuals are 
polyamorous as opposed to monogamous.140 More controversial 
definitions of the term might also include whether one is 
attracted to humans, non-human animals, or inanimate 
objects.141 
Those who argue that pedophilia is a type of sexual 
orientation distinguish between different types of sexual 
orientations; sexual gender orientation, the focus of most 
research on sexual orientation, is but one.142 This view places 
pedophilia on a larger spectrum of erotic age orientation, which 
describes how individuals experience sexual attraction to age 
groups ranging from infants to the elderly.143 Erotic age 
orientation contains at least five categories of sexual interest: 
(1) pedophilia (attraction to prepubescents); (2) hebephila 
(attraction to minors in early puberty); (3) ephebophilia 
(attraction to older adolescents); (4) teliophilia (attraction to 
sexually mature persons); and (5) gerontophilia (attraction to the 
elderly).144 Some also categorize nepiophilia (attraction to infants) 
as a separate type of erotic age orientation rather than a subset 
of pedophilia.145 
One difficulty in determining whether pedophilia should be 
considered a type of sexual orientation is that, despite over a 
century of social science research and legal analysis, there is no 
one accepted definition of sexual orientation.146 Several means of 
                                                                                                     
 140. See Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1482–1509 (discussing polyamory as a 
sexual orientation). 
 141. See BERING, supra note 9, at 25, 117–18 (discussing sexual attraction to 
non-human animals and inanimate objects). 
 142. See SETO, supra note 35, at 231 (defining sexual gender orientation). 
 143. See id. at 3–4 & n.1, 231 (explaining sexual age orientation); BERING, 
supra note 9, at 169 (discussing erotic age orientation); Hall & Hall, supra note 
28, at 458 (same). 
 144. See BERING, supra note 9, at 169 (noting the different categories of 
sexual interest); SETO, supra note 35, at 3–4 & n.1 (defining the types of sexual 
interest); Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 458 (discussing categories of sexual 
interest within erotic age orientation). 
 145. See SETO, supra note 35, at 4 (“It is not clear if sexual preference for 
infants . . . represent variants of pedophilia or instead represent different 
paraphilias.”). 
 146. See Emens, supra note 137, at 339–44 (discussing various models of 
sexual orientation); Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525, 541 
(2013) (noting that “there is no unitary definition”); Randall L. Sell, Defining 
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organizing individuals into categories of sexual orientation based 
on sexual interests or behaviors have been proposed, accepted, 
and subsequently rejected and replaced throughout history.147 
The concept of homosexuality148 has transformed over the past 
century from a tendency to engage in same-sex sexual behavior, 
to a type of gender deviance, to an abnormal personality and 
mental disorder, and finally to an affirmative social identity.149 
Still, terms such as “homosexual” and “bisexual” do not have 
universally accepted characteristics.150 Nor are these terms even 
widely accepted by the very communities they identify; those who 
prefer to identify as gay, lesbian, or queer, for example, reject the 
word “homosexual.”151 
Modern conceptions of sexual orientation generally share 
certain characteristics. Perhaps most prominently, sexual 
                                                                                                     
and Measuring Sexual Orientation: A Review, 26 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 643, 
644–49 (1997) (describing confusion surrounding the conceptual definition of 
sexual orientation). 
 147. See Clarke, supra note 146, at 541–42 (noting that the understanding of 
sexual orientation has fluctuated over time). 
 148. I use the term “homosexuality” and “homosexual” throughout this 
Article with reservations. The term itself is not accepted by the lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual community and is, in fact, offensive to many given its clinical history 
and history of disparaging use. See Jeremy W. Peters, The Decline and Fall of 
the “H” Word, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2014, at ST10 (“[T]hat five syllable word has 
never been more loaded, more deliberately used and, to the ears of many gays 
and lesbians, more pejorative.”); GLAAD Media Reference Guide: Terms to 
Avoid, GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/reference/offensive (last visited Jan. 27, 
2015) (explaining why the term “homosexual” is offensive within the gay 
community) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). However, at 
times it is necessary to use the term in order to reference the actual clinical 
concept rather than the fuller modern concepts of sexual orientation or lesbian, 
gay, or bisexual.  
 149. See STEVEN SEIDMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 28 (2d 
ed. 2010) (noting the changing meaning of homosexuality); see also MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 43 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 
1990) (1976) (describing the changing view from sodomy as an aberration in 
behavior to the homosexual as “a species”); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s 
Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 277, 346–47 (2004) (discussing a historical-constructivist view of 
homosexuality). 
 150. See Sell, supra note 146, at 644–49 (outlining the differing 
understandings of terms commonly used to describe sexual orientations). 
 151. See sources cited supra note 148 (discussing the offensive connotation of 
the term “homosexual”). 
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orientation generally involves a type of sexual interest.152 It also 
requires sexual interests have a certain breadth and depth.153 It 
implies something stronger than, say, an individual’s interest for 
individuals with green eyes or dimples.154 Comparing a sexual 
orientation to this type of preference trivializes sexual 
orientation’s depth and its role in the individual’s psyche.155 
Erotic age orientation is similarly defined by sexual interest. 
Such sexual interests must be intense and persistent in order to 
fall into a category; a fleeting attraction to a child is insufficient 
to qualify as pedophilia.156  
Sexual orientation is also widely accepted as immutable, 
unchosen, and likely biological in origin.157 Sexual gender 
orientation is something that one discovers rather than acquires 
and which cannot be reoriented.158 Several theories point to 
                                                                                                     
 152. Some researchers also distinguish different types of psychological 
components, such as sexual interest versus affection and love. See Sell, supra 
note 146, at 648–49 (discussing various psychological components). 
 153. See Emens, supra note 149, at 341–43 (explaining that “polyamorists 
are rarely seen as having a distinct identity”); Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1466–
68 (discussing the concept of sexual orientation as an identity). 
 154. See Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1482–83 (discussing importance of 
“embeddedness”). But see Ruth Hubbard & Elijah Wald, Gay Genes?, in 
PROFITABLE PROMISES: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, SCIENCE, AND HEALTH 81, 83 (1995) 
(describing orientations toward “hair colors, body shapes, [and] racial types”). 
 155. See Sell, supra note 146, at 648 n.10 (explaining that the term “sexual 
preference” “trivializes the depth of the psychological processes involved” and 
“sexual orientation” is more appropriate because “sexual feelings are a basic 
part of an individual’s psyche”); Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1482–83 (noting that 
sexual orientation is integral to an individual’s identity and would manifest 
itself as “strong and consistent”). 
 156. See SETO, supra note 35, at 231–32 (defining pedophilia as “persistent 
and recurrent” sexual attraction to prepubescent children). 
 157. See JOHN MONEY, GAY, STRAIGHT, AND IN-BETWEEN 11 (1988) (stating 
sexual orientation is not a choice or preference); SETO, supra note 35, at 231 
(citing research revealing that “prenatal factors . . . influence sexual gender 
orientation”); Dreger, supra note 7 (describing sexual orientation as “a sexual 
interest that is inborn and unchangeable”). 
 158. See SETO, supra note 35, at 231 (describing sexual gender orientation as 
“innate” and noting that “reorientation therapies have not worked for 
homosexual men”). Indeed, reorientation therapy has been so discredited and its 
attendant risks so high that some states have banned such therapy for minors. 
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West 2013) (forbidding “sexual orientation 
change efforts with a person under 18 years of age”). 
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biological origins for sexual gender orientation, including 
hormone exposure in the womb or genetic predisposition.159  
There is also evidence that erotic age orientation is biological 
in origin and immutable.160 Pedophilia, in particular, likely has 
biological causes, and in particular neurological roots.161 
Researchers are finding similar evidence of neurological 
differences in men with hebephilia—intense attraction toward 
early adolescents.162 There is little research on sexual interest in 
late adolescents and adults—most likely because such sexual 
interest is viewed as normal and unproblematic. However, the 
biological distinctions between individuals living with pedophilia, 
those living with hebephilia, and the remainder of the population, 
indicate that all such sexual interest is likely biological in 
nature.163 
Like mental illness, sexual orientation raises several 
conceptual dilemmas. It is not clear, for example, that sexuality 
can be categorized and measured. Defining and operationalizing 
sexual orientation is complicated by the recognition that sexual 
                                                                                                     
 159. See J. Michael Bailey, Biological Perspectives on Sexual Orientation, in 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL EXPERIENCES 50, 
55–74 (Linda D. Garnets & Douglas C. Kimmel eds., 2003) (explaining the 
neuroendocrine theory, under which sexual orientation depends on patterns of 
hormone exposure); CHERYL L. WEILL, NATURE’S CHOICE: WHAT SCIENCE REVEALS 
ABOUT THE BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 49–54, 63–78 (2009) 
(describing the gestational neurohormonal theory and the genetics of sexual 
orientation); William R. Rice et al., Homosexuality as a Consequence of 
Epigenetically Canalized Sexual Development, 87 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 343, 344 
(2012) (theorizing that fetal development affects an individual’s sexual gender 
orientation). 
 160. See Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 776 (describing arguments that 
“pedophilia, like heterosexuality or homosexuality, represents sexual arousal to 
a particular identifiable group, and is not voluntarily decided, but biologically 
determined”); Dreger, supra note 7 (describing sexual orientation as “inborn and 
unchangeable”). 
 161. See supra Part II.B (discussing the causes of pedophilia in depth). 
 162. See Ray Blanchard et al., Pedophilia, Hebephilia, and the DSM-V, 38 
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 335, 336 (2009) (discussing research results indicating 
that “hebephiles” were intermediate between people with pedophilia and 
teleiophiles with respect to IQ and handedness); James M. Cantor et al., 
Handedness in Pedophilia and Hebephilia, 34 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 447, 447 
(2005) (“Men with primary erotic interests for . . . pubescent children show 
poorer performance on intelligence and other neuropsychological tests.”). 
 163. See Cantor et al., supra note 162, at 457 (presenting evidence of an 
“association between handedness and erotic age preference”). 
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orientation may vary over time and by the fact that many 
individuals resist categorization altogether.164 There is evidence 
that sexuality is fluid and dynamic and defies distinct and fixed 
categories.165 Such definitional problems have prompted some 
theorists and advocates to argue that social science should 
abandon the concept of sexual orientation altogether.166 
Part III.B, infra, will analyze an additional wrinkle in 
conceptualizing pedophilia as a sexual orientation—the 
normative element of sexual orientation. At least with regard to 
the law, sexual orientation has a normative element that is 
inconsistent with the potential harmfulness inherent in 
pedophilia. In the law, sexual orientation has evolved to 
demarcate benign variations in sexuality. Pedophilia, in contrast, 
involves the potential for harm not found in heterosexuality or 
gay or lesbian sexual relationships. For this reason, for the 
purposes of the law, sexual orientation is a poor fit for the concept 
of pedophilia. 
B. Pedophilia as a Legal Concept 
This subpart analyzes the concept of pedophilia as a mental 
disorder or sexual orientation in the law. The difficulties raised 
above have different implications when we consider how each 
concept serves distinct legal purposes and how pedophilia fits into 
these purposes. The concepts of mental disorder and sexual 
orientation serve specific purposes in the law.167 In contrast to 
science, which uses terms and categories to describe or make 
sense of some presumptive objective reality,168 the law is more 
                                                                                                     
 164. See Clarke, supra note 146, at 542–43 (noting that individuals are 
“increasingly redefining, reinterpreting, and renegotiating their sexuality”). 
 165. See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, in THE LESBIAN 
AND GAY STUDIES READER 45, 56 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993) (noting the 
“mobility of sexual desire”); Emens, supra note 149, at 339–40 (discussing how 
sexual desire can vary throughout an individual’s life).  
 166. See Clarke, supra note 146, at 542–43 (advocating for “abandon[ing] the 
search for a unitary theory of sexual orientation”); Tweedy, supra note 17, at 
1471–73 (discussing arguments against sexuality-based categories). 
 167. See Balkin, supra note 37, at 2325–26 (distinguishing legal and 
sociological uses); Dreger, supra note 7 (different meaning of sexual orientation 
for the purposes of the law). 
 168. See Robert A. Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the 
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normative in nature. It reflects moral or value judgments about 
the types of circumstances that merit, for example, legal 
protections or the deprivation of liberty.169 These concerns will 
ultimately define the parameters of the legal concepts of mental 
disorder and sexual orientation.  
This subpart argues that, to the extent that the law must 
consider pedophilia within its current means of categorizing 
sexual interests and identities, pedophilia is better suited to the 
mental disorder category than the sexual orientation category. 
Laws that concern sexual orientation increasingly and justifiably 
recognize the legitimacy and value of different types of 
relationships and sexualities. Pedophilia, while not inherently 
blameworthy, involves a desire that would be harmful to others if 
pursued. Laws concerning mental illness address many of the 
legal concerns pedophilia raises and provides the most coherent 
fit for it. 
The term “sexual orientation” is fairly new to the law.170 
Until the last few decades, the law only marginalized and 
punished the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community. The status of 
being gay, lesbian, or bisexual could not be criminalized,171 but 
the criminalization of same-sex sexual acts provided a rationale 
for lesbians, gays, and bisexuals to be arrested, harassed by 
police, and denied equal rights in areas such as employment, 
housing, and medical care.172  
                                                                                                     
Courtroom, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 360 (2006) (noting that scientific 
use of the terms is “largely descriptive”). 
 169. See id. (describing the normative significance). 
 170. The first case I could find using the term is a 1968 Civil Rights Act case 
challenging the arrests of “hippies” who were questioned by the police about 
their political affiliation and sexual orientation. Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 
881, 882–83 (E.D. Pa. 1968). The court noted that the police could arrest an 
individual for sodomy and investigate a “known homosexual” speaking to a 
juvenile, but they could not arrest an individual “on the basis of suspicion, or 
even probable cause to believe, that the arrestee occupied the status of being a 
homosexual.” Id. at 884. 
 171. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–68 (1962) (holding that 
criminalizing status is unconstitutional). 
 172. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581–82 (2003) (describing effects 
of the criminalization of sodomy on gay individuals); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 
FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54–
89 (2010) (describing how sodomy laws undermined the dignity and equality of 
LGB individuals); Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries 
Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 127–52 
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The concept of sexual orientation has played an important 
role in changing the law’s treatment of the lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual (LGB) community. It helped shift the legal discourse 
from one of marginalization and judgment to one of legitimacy 
and respect.173 Sexual orientation distinguishes LGB individuals 
as a distinct category with immutable—or at the very least 
unchosen—characteristics.174 In doing so, it moves away from the 
rhetoric of defining LGB people simply in terms of behavior and 
their legal rights simply in terms of sexual practices.175 It 
recognizes the legitimacy of different sexual gender orientations 
and the need to protect those who face discrimination based on 
their sexual orientation. Sexual orientation looks at different 
types of gender attractions and recognizes that they are natural 
and legitimate variations in human sexuality.176 It also reinforces 
its profundity and its importance to individual identity, as 
                                                                                                     
(2000) (describing how sodomy laws encourage discrimination and police 
harassment of LGB individuals). 
 173. This importance is evidenced by the Court’s shift in approach from 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which upheld a sodomy law, to 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which overturned Bowers. In Bowers, 
the Court addressed the issue as whether the constitution protected an isolated 
sexual act. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–95 (1986) (“The issue 
presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy . . . .”). The Lawrence Court, in contrast, 
focused on the importance of the act in the greater context of the gay identity. 
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566–78 (noting that the Bowers Court’s narrow 
framing of the issue “discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of 
the liberty at stake”). 
 174. See Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1468–69 (discussing the minoritizing 
view of gay identity, “which incorporates the idea of LGB people as inherently 
different”). This is the “minoritizing discourse” of sexual orientation, which 
views LGB people as inherently different (in contrast to the universalizing 
discourse, which views “homoerotic potential to be characteristically human”). 
Janet E. Halley, “Like Race” Arguments, in WHAT’S LEFT OF THEORY? NEW WORK 
ON THE POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY 40, 48 (Judith Butler et al. eds., 2000); see 
also Sedgwick, supra note 165, at 58 (discussing the minoritizing view of sexual 
identity); Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1468–73 (analyzing sexuality-based identity 
categories); Emens, supra note 149, at 338–39 (outlining the minoritizing 
model). 
 175. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the shift in the 
Court’s treatment of the LGB community). 
 176. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing shift in the 
Court’s treatment of the LGB community); see also Zander, supra note 18, at 29 
(stating that homosexuality was removed from DSM based on judgment that it 
is a natural variation in human sexuality). 
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opposed to terms such as “sexual preference” or “homosexual 
lifestyle.”177 
This shift has been marked by an increase in civil rights 
protections for LGB individuals. Many states repealed sodomy 
laws even before the Supreme Court’s landmark Lawrence v. 
Texas178 decision held them unconstitutional.179 Twenty-one 
states prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in a 
variety of contexts, and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) has argued that employment discrimination 
based on the sex stereotyping of lesbian, gay, or bisexual 
individuals violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.180 Federal 
law also punishes hate crimes targeting victims’ sexual 
orientation.181 Nineteen states and the federal government 
recognize marriage equality, a number that is growing since the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional much of the Defense of 
Marriage Act.182 These legal protections almost universally apply 
                                                                                                     
 177. See Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1466–68 (discussing historical roots of 
narrow understanding of sexual identity); GLAAD Media Reference Guide: 
Terms to Avoid, supra note 148 (classifying “sexual preference” and “homosexual 
lifestyle” as offensive). 
 178. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 179. See id. at 570–71 (“Over the course of the last decades, States with 
same-sex prohibitions have moved toward abolishing them.”). 
 180. Facts about Discrimination in Federal Government Employment Based 
on Marital Status, Political Affiliation, Status as a Parent, Sexual Orientation, 
or Transgender (Gender Identity) Status, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
federal/otherprotections.cfm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (stating that gay, 
lesbian, or bisexual individuals may bring a sex discrimination claim under 
Title VII) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 181. See Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012) 
(criminalizing offenses based on an individual’s sexual orientation and gender 
identity). 
 182. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (finding that 
DOMA unconstitutionally deprived same-sex couples from equal protection). 
Thirty-two states and Washington, D.C. give LGB individuals the freedom to 
marry, and an additional eight states have judicial rulings in favor of marriage 
equality. See Overview: Pending Marriage Equality Cases, LAMBDA LEGAL 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/pending-marriage-equality-cases (last updated Nov. 
7, 2014) (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (presenting marriage equality statistics) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); States, FREEDOM TO MARRY 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last updated Oct. 17, 2014) (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2015) (summarizing status of marriage equality in each state) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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only to sexual gender orientation, with one state including 
asexuality.183 
The law’s approach to sexual orientation, however, is not 
suitable for pedophilia because of the way pedophilia differs from 
sexual gender orientation. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals 
have historically faced discrimination based on unwarranted 
moral judgments about their sexuality. Same-sex sexual behavior 
is, in reality, no more harmful than sexual behavior between 
individuals of the opposite sex. On the contrary, such sexual 
behaviors and relationships can be beneficial, just as 
heterosexual sexual behaviors and relationships can be 
beneficial. Sexual gender orientation therefore involves desire 
and affection that is not simply tolerated; it is a valuable and 
important part of an individual’s life and identity. 
Pedophilia, in contrast, involves desire to perform sexual acts 
that are harmful to others. Sexual activity between an adult and 
a prepubescent child can cause the child physical and 
psychological harm.184 It is a violation of an individual who is not 
yet capable of giving consent to sex.185 Legal scholarship has 
implicitly relied on this justification to distinguish pedophilia 
while expanding the definition of sexual orientation. For example, 
Ann E. Tweedy argues that pedophilia should not be considered a 
sexual orientation because it would cause harm to others if acted 
upon: 
[A] more difficult problem is posed by sexual orientations, such 
as pedophilia, that are societally disfavored because they cause 
harm to others and to society at large . . . . [We would not 
want] to prohibit employers from making negative 
employment decisions based on such preferences or practices. 
Thus, a holistic definition of “sexual orientation” in an anti-
                                                                                                     
 183. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(27) (McKinney 2014) (defining sexual 
orientation to include asexuality); Emens, supra note 149, at 362 (indicating 
that New York is the only state to protect asexuality so far); Tweedy, supra note 
17, at 1463–65 (discussing state protection of sexual gender orientation); see also 
Dreger, supra note 7 (noting that the term sexual orientation, when used in the 
legal context, does not include pedophilia). 
 184. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing significant harm 
suffered by children); Balkin, supra note 37, at 2364–65 (discussing inherently 
exploitative nature of sexual relationships with children). 
 185. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing a child’s inability 
to consent). 
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discrimination statute would, in some principled way, have to 
exclude harmful sexual preferences while protecting those that 
are societally disfavored simply because of prejudice.186 
Tweedy is correct that, unlike sexual gender orientation, 
pedophilia involves a sexual desire that should not be acted on 
because it is harmful to others. While LGB communities face 
prejudice based on unwarranted concerns about their sexuality, 
there are good reasons to be concerned about the sexual practices 
that pedophilic desires entail. In contrast to sexual gender 
orientation, the nature of pedophilic sexual desire is not 
something of value. Pedophilia, therefore, lacks the legitimacy 
associated with the concept of sexual orientation. 
Pedophilia may nonetheless raise civil rights issues where 
individuals face discrimination based on their sexual interests as 
opposed to their behavior. As discussed more fully below, 
discrimination based on sexual attraction to children alone may 
be unwarranted and the law may have good reason to prohibit 
it.187 It is not that sexual attraction to children fails to raise civil 
rights issues that merit protection, but rather these issues are 
complicated by the fact that such preferences, if acted upon, 
would be harmful to others.  
For these reasons, the rubric of mental disorder is a better fit 
for the issues pedophilia raises. Like sexual orientation, mental 
illness is a status, not a behavior; it is not chosen; there is strong 
evidence of biological causes for many mental illnesses; and 
individuals living with mental illness have been the targets of 
unwarranted discrimination throughout history.188 Unlike sexual 
orientation, however, mental illness involves a dysfunction. 
The legal concept of mental illness incorporates the idea of 
dysfunction or impairment. Civil rights protections for the 
mentally ill under disability law are premised on the idea that 
the mental illness constitutes a “substantial impairment” on the 
individual’s functioning. Mental health parity laws protect 
treatment for mental illness, by their very nature implying that 
mental illness merits remedy.189 Criminal laws hold that 
                                                                                                     
 186. Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1478 (footnotes omitted). 
 187. Infra Part IV.A. 
 188. Infra Part IV.A. 
 189. See Stacy A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, 11 
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individuals are not criminally responsible where mental illness 
impairs their ability to understand or control their behavior.190 
Mental illness laws also acknowledge that these impairments 
can raise significant public health and safety concerns.191 For 
these reasons, mental health laws balance civil rights protections 
with concerns about public health and safety. For example, anti-
discrimination laws do not protect individuals with mental illness 
from discrimination where doing so would pose a direct threat to 
the health and safety of others.192 Mental illness can also justify 
limiting an individual’s civil rights, as where courts use a 
determination of mental illness to civilly commit a person.193  
This approach relies on the assumption that it is appropriate 
to consider intense and recurrent desires to harm others as the 
basis for a mental disorder, at least for the purposes of the law.194 
While, as discussed above, there is certainly no objective means of 
designating which desires should form the basis of a mental 
disorder, intense and persistent desires to harm innocent 
individuals may be one of the less controversial bases. This 
approach also echoes the work of psychologists Jerome C. 
                                                                                                     
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455, 467–69 (2012) (summarizing state law 
prohibiting discrimination against an individual with mental illness by failing 
to provide treatment). 
 190. See infra notes 346–348 and accompanying text (discussing criminal 
responsibility of an individual with mental illness); MOORE, supra note 111, at 
243–45 (analyzing theories behind precluding criminal responsibility). 
 191.  See infra Part V.A.1 (addressing mental illness laws and public health 
concerns). 
 192. See infra notes 249–254 and accompanying text (discussing the direct 
threat exception). 
 193. See infra Part IV.B (describing civil commitment law). 
 194. By “desire to harm others,” I mean a desire that inherently involves 
harm to others and not necessary the desire specifically to inflict harm on 
others. The individual who has the desire may not view it as harmful. See Fagan 
et al., supra note 28, at 2460 (characterizing pedophilia as “a chronic psychiatric 
disorder”); Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 156–57 (stating that pedophilia is 
when an individual’s erotic desire manifests itself as erotic attractions towards 
children); Schwartz, supra note 19 (describing pedophilia as a mental illness); 
Cohen & Galynker, supra note 35, at 279, 282 (defining pedophilia as a 
psychiatric disorder characterized by recurrent sexual desire towards 
prepubescent children). Many individuals who molest children do not believe it 
harms them. There is sufficient evidence to the contrary that the presence of 
harm should be beyond dispute, even if the individual is unaware of or refuses 
to acknowledge it. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing 
significant harm suffered by children). 
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Wakefield and Agustin Malón. Wakefield argues that mental 
disorders are best defined using a “harmful dysfunction” analysis, 
where the term “harmful” refers to conditions judged negative by 
sociocultural standards.195 Malón argues that disorders such as 
pedophilic disorders are better understood as relying on a 
“dangerous dysfunction” rationale, where the concern is not the 
harm to the individual with the disorder, but the threat that 
individual poses to others.196 
Reliance on harm and danger underlies many rationales for 
pathologizing pedophilia in psychiatry.197 The APA’s fact sheet on 
paraphilic disorders states that a diagnosis requires either: (1) a 
sexual interest that causes distress (which, as discussed above, 
lacks utility) or (2) “a sexual desire or behavior that involves 
another person’s psychological distress, injury, or death, or a 
desire for sexual behaviors involving unwilling persons or persons 
unable to give legal consent.”198 Psychiatric scholarship also cites 
the harm that sexual contact with minors would inflict when 
discussing why pedophilia should be considered pathological.199  
Distinguishing pedophilia as a mental disorder based on the 
dangerousness of the desires is not without problems. Relying on 
                                                                                                     
 195. See Wakefield, supra note 111, at 149 (defining “harmful dysfunction”). 
 196. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1088–93 (explaining “dangerous 
dysfunction” rationale). 
 197. See Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 155–57 (stating that “psychiatric 
help may be needed” if an individual “experiences strong erotic attractions 
towards unacceptable sexual partners, such as children”); Fagan et al., supra 
note 28, at 2460 (indicating that pedophilic behaviors are “the primary concern 
of mental health and criminal justice systems,” not fantasies or impulses); 
Berlin, Commentary on Pedophilia Diagnostic Criteria in DSM-5, supra note 
112, at 242–43 (noting society’s responsibility to protect children from harm). 
 198. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PARAPHILIC DISORDERS 1 (2013) (emphasis 
added), http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Paraphilic%20Disorders%20Fact%20S
heet.pdf.  
 199. See, e.g., Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 155–57 (stating that erotic 
desire to engage in behavior that harms others or with inappropriate partners 
may merit psychiatric treatment); Malón, supra note 9, at 1088–93 (arguing 
that the pedophilic disorder diagnosis reflects concerns that the sexual interest 
poses harm to others rather than harm to the diagnosed person); Robert L. 
Spitzer, Harmful Dysfunction and the DSM Definition of Mental Disorder, 108 J. 
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 430, 431 (1999) (“Because pedophilic behavior results in 
the victimization of children, the dysfunction also represents a harmful 
condition by social standards. Thus pedophilia . . . is correctly classified as a 
disorder, not a normal variant.”). 
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dangerousness to others to distinguish a mental disorder may 
medicalize all desire to engage in undesirable behavior. But this 
potential problem should be distinguished from the more 
troubling problem of pathologizing behavior. This Article 
suggests that pedophilia should be pathologized because of the 
intense and recurrent interest—a mental component—in harming 
others, not because of any particular behavior.200 It therefore does 
not raise the problem of pathologizing all criminal behavior. The 
potential for overbreadth can also be mitigated by drawing a 
principled boundary based on the intensity and recurrence of the 
interest.  
The proposed approach does fail, however, to resolve 
significant debate about whether sexual interests are appropriate 
bases for psychological diagnoses201 and, if so, what the precise 
parameters of a pedophilia diagnoses should be.202 The law’s 
normative distinctions should not rely on questionable science. 
Yet the law can appropriately consider pedophilia a mental 
disorder without perfect understanding of its parameters. It 
currently does precisely this for several mental disorders, from 
depression to obsessive-compulsive disorder.203 Courts, 
lawmakers, and legal scholars should continue to engage with the 
                                                                                                     
 200. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1093 (urging caution that the dangerous 
dysfunction analysis might pathologize bad behavior). 
 201. See Zander, supra note 18, at 37–40 (summarizing “debate about the 
conceptual validity of the diagnosis of pedophilia”); Studer & Aylwin, supra note 
24, at 776–78 (advocating that future DSM editions should drop pedophilia as a 
category); Malón, supra note 9, at 1086 (discussing controversy surrounding the 
appropriateness of considering paraphilias as mental disorders); Shindel & 
Moser, supra note 128, at 928 (arguing that all paraphilias should be removed 
from the DSM); Moser, supra note 110, at 92–93 (stating paraphilias are “a 
pseudoscientific attempt to regulate sexuality”); Prentky et al., supra note 168, 
at 366 (citing controversy regarding diagnostic validity); Green, supra note 127, 
at 469–70 (questioning validity of diagnosis of pedophilia). 
 202. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1088–90 (describing disagreement over how 
pedophilia should be operationalized); Zander, supra note 18, at 37–40 
(describing concerns about pedophilia’s validity and reliability). 
 203. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, The Empire of Illness: Competence and 
Coercion in Health-Care Decision Making, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 824–34 
(2007) (characterizing depression as a mental illness and noting the medical 
field’s evolving understanding of depression); Jerry Von Talge, Major Depressive 
Disorder, 26 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 1 (2014) (noting that “the precise 
etiology of depression is still not clearly understood”). 
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conceptual and practical issues surrounding pedophilia as our 
understanding of it—and mental illness in general—evolves.  
IV. Rethinking the Law’s Approach to Pedophilic Disorder 
This Part argues that, if the law conceptualizes pedophilia as 
a mental disorder, we should carefully reconsider areas of law 
that implicate it. While several areas of law recognize pedophilia 
as a mental illness, they often distinguish it as part of a special 
category with more limited civil rights protections. Part IV 
argues that distinguishing pedophilia is problematic, specifically 
in the context of disability law and civil commitment. There are 
legitimate reasons for denying some individuals living with 
pedophilic disorder employment based on their mental illness, 
and there are legitimate reasons for subjecting them to civil 
commitment. Current statutes, however, do not adequately 
distinguish the legitimate reasons from those based on disgust 
and unfounded fears.  
A. Pedophilia and Anti-Discrimination Law 
1. Disability Discrimination and the Pedophilia Exception 
Several federal and state statutes prohibit discrimination 
based on mental illness.204 Among these statutes are the ADA 
and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act).205 
                                                                                                     
 204. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination 
based on mental disabilities); 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793–94 (prohibiting employment 
discrimination based on mental disabilities). 
 205. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794. The Fair Housing Act (FHA) also prohibits 
housing discrimination on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B). Like 
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the FHA prohibits discrimination based on 
mental disorders that substantially impair major life activities. Id. § 3602(h); see 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (noting that the ADA uses the same 
definition for “disability” that the FHA does for “handicap”). Unlike the ADA 
and Rehabilitation Act, however, pedophilia is not explicitly excluded from 
coverage. Courts often interpret the FHA, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act 
definition of disability similarly, which would support excluding pedophilic 
disorder from coverage. See id. at 631 (noting similar interpretations of 
“disability”). Unfortunately, there is no case law resolving this issue. If the FHA 
covered pedophilic disorder, then the FHA’s direct threat analysis would apply. 
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Together, these laws prohibit both public and private actors from 
discriminating against otherwise qualified individuals with 
disabilities in areas such as employment, education, and medical 
care.206 These acts use similar terminology, and courts 
interpreting one statute will look to case law involving the 
others.207 States and municipalities also have statutes that 
mirror these acts and look to these federal laws for interpretation 
and implementation.208 
These federal laws define disability to include “a mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities.”209 A mental impairment includes “[a]ny mental or 
psychological disorder, such as . . . emotional or mental illness.”210 
Major life activities include the functions of major bodily systems; 
thus, an impairment that interferes with brain function or 
reproductive function will qualify as a disability.211 It also 
includes mental impairments that interfere with mental 
processes such as the ability to concentrate, think, or learn, as 
well as the ability to engage in sexual relations and interact with 
others.212  
                                                                                                     
The arguments set forth below about pedophilic disorder and the direct threat 
analysis would apply to the FHA.  
 206. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213; 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793–94. 
 207. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (interpreting the ADA through Rehabilitation 
Act regulations and case law); 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (mirroring the ADA’s 
terminology); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598–600 (1999) 
(discussing the history of the ADA); id. at 618–19 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(interpreting the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act). 
 208. See, e.g., Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining “Disability” 
Discrimination: A Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Protections for All Workers, 
14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 334 (2003) (describing the development of state 
anti-discrimination laws and their relationship to the ADA); Levy v. Comm’n on 
Human Rights & Opportunities, 671 A.2d 349, 355 (Conn. 1996) (reviewing 
federal precedent concerning employment discrimination for guidance in 
enforcing state anti-discrimination statutes). 
 209. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 705(9). 
 210. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2011). 
 211. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (“[A] major life activity also includes the 
operation of a major bodily function, including . . . brain . . . and reproductive 
functions.”); 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (referencing the definitions in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102). 
 212. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (“[M]ajor life activities include . . . learning, 
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 705(9) (referencing the definitions in 42 U.S.C. § 12102). 
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This definition would seem to include several instances of 
individuals living with pedophilic disorder. Pedophilic disorder is 
a mental illness that can impair major life activities such as 
reproduction, the ability to engage in sexual relations, and the 
ability to interact with others.213 Indeed, one of the diagnostic 
criteria for pedophilic disorder is interpersonal difficulty.214 
The ADA’s definition of disability, however, explicitly 
excludes “sexual behavior disorders” such as pedophilia.215 
Congress included this exception to ease Senator Jesse Helms’s 
concerns that the ADA’s coverage of mental disorders might 
protect transvestites.216 The Rehabilitation Act similarly excludes 
pedophilic disorder from its exception of disability.217 As a result, 
individuals living with pedophilic disorder have no legal 
protection against discrimination based on their mental disorder 
in employment or in medical treatment, education, and other 
public accommodations.218  
This has significant consequences for an individual living 
with pedophilic disorder. Most notably, he may lose his job and 
become unemployable if he openly identifies as living with 
pedophilia or if he fails to hide his disorder adequately, even if he 
                                                                                                     
 213. See Schwartz, supra note 19 (discussing the lives of those with 
pedophilic disorder). 
 214. DSM-V, supra note 39, at 697. 
 215. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2012) (listing exclusions from the ADA’s 
disability definition, including sexual behavior disorders, gambling, 
kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance use disorders resulting 
from current illegal use of drugs). 
 216. See Adrienne L. Hiegel, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with 
Disabilities Act as Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1473–77 (1994) 
(discussing the considerations which led to the exclusion of sexual and gender 
identity disorders from the ADA); Equality of Opportunity: The Making of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, 
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/1997/equality_of_Opportunity_The_Making_of_
the_Americans_with_Disabilities_Act  (last updated July 26, 2010) (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2015) (summarizing the legislative and political history of the ADA) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 135 CONG. REC. 10,765 
(daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (summarizing the debate over the ADA and sexual 
disorders). 
 217. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F). 
 218. See Hiegel, supra note 216, at 1467–75 (discussing the ADA’s standard 
for disability and its treatment of sexual behavior and gender identity 
disorders). 
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has engaged in no criminal conduct.219 He may therefore lose his 
job, and all future job prospects, if he is seen at a group therapy 
session or participates in an organization that counsels 
individuals on avoiding offending.220 He may even face these 
consequences if he is merely suspected of having pedophilic 
disorder.221 These consequences underscore the difficulty and 
importance of remaining closeted, as discussed supra in Part 
III.C. 
An individual living with pedophilic disorder also has no 
right to accommodations that might aid in his treatment or 
reduce the risk of engaging in sexual abuse. For example, he 
would be unable to obtain a reasonable accommodation that 
would allow him to attend therapy on a regular basis.222 This may 
seem like a slight inconvenience, but supportive treatment for 
individuals living with pedophilic disorder is actually quite 
rare.223 In the first thirty-eight months of Prevention Project 
Dunkelfeld, discussed above, patients traveled an average of two 
hundred and five kilometers to the outpatient clinic, with some 
traveling internationally.224 
Some individuals living with pedophilic disorder may also 
require an employer to accommodate difficulty working with 
                                                                                                     
 219. See id. at 1480 (“The ADA allows an employer to make distinctions 
among its workers based not on a general moral code, but according to a specific 
scheme of sexual ethics.”). 
 220. See id. at 1481 (“Hearing or knowing that an employee is a member of 
an unprotected group—the statement of an identity—may constitute ‘conduct’ 
sufficient to make the employee vulnerable to discharge.”).  
 221. See id. at 1481 (“It is the imaginative workings, through fear and 
stereotype, of employers and fellow employees which make these external 
activities a sign of ‘unqualified’ employment status.”). 
 222. Compare Hibbler v. Reg’l Med. Ctr. at Memphis, 12 F. App’x 336, 339 
(6th Cir. 2001) (noting that employer reduced hours so that employee could 
attend swimming therapy), and Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 
526 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing an employer accommodation granting an 
employee time off to attend TMJ therapy), with Johnson v. City of Blaine, 970 F. 
Supp. 2d 893, 912 (D. Minn. 2013) (noting that an employer was not obligated to 
excuse employee from mandatory overtime in order to attend group therapy for 
depression because mandatory overtime was an essential function of the job and 
employee was free to request leave for appointments). 
 223. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Beier et al., supra note 77, at 547 (describing the results of Project 
Dunkelfeld). 
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children. As a woman writing on the Virtuous Pedophiles website 
describes: 
I’m very good with children and love being with them. 
Everyone says so, I wanted to be a teacher growing up. But 
underneath it all there’s always been that attraction that pops 
up unexpectedly. I try and bury it and that works for a few 
weeks but then it comes back with force and I feel worse than 
ever. So I quit [a childcare course] and I couldn’t even tell 
anyone why. They still encourage me to get back into childcare 
and that is so hard . . . .225 
2. Rethinking the Pedophilia Exception 
Recognizing pedophilic disorder as a disability is consistent 
with the goals of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.226 The ADA 
and the Rehabilitation Act were passed to respond to the 
challenges individuals living with disabilities face in a 
community that often views them as inferior, isolates them, and 
denies them social and economic opportunities.227 While this may 
be true of several groups of individuals, lawmakers and courts 
are particularly concerned with the unwarranted and pervasive 
discrimination individuals with disabilities face.228  
The ADA recognizes that those with mental disorders often 
face unwarranted fear, stigma, and discrimination.229 They are 
isolated from social and economic opportunities based on 
stereotypes that they are morally weak, violent, erratic, deviant, 
                                                                                                     
 225. Who We Are, supra note 1. 
 226. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (listing the historical context of and 
purpose for the ADA). 
 227. See id. (including in a statement of findings that “many people with 
physical or mental disabilities have been precluded from [fully participating in 
all aspects of society] because of discrimination”); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING 
FROM HUMANITY 305 (2004) (discussing the social stigma surrounding people 
with disabilities); Korn, supra note 111, at 586–87, 605–07 (describing 
stereotypes and other negative views of the mentally ill). 
 228. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (noting the priorities of addressing 
discrimination against those with disabilities); NUSSBAUM, supra note 227, at 
305–07 (describing the discrimination that disabled individuals experience); 
Korn, supra note 111, at 605–12 (describing the negative stereotypes of the 
mentally ill). 
 229. See Korn, supra note 111, at 605–15 (cataloging the negative 
stereotypes of the mentally ill). 
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sexually unrestrained, and untreatable.230 They also face 
unfounded views that their disabilities are less legitimate and 
that they stem from moral failing.231 Individuals living with 
mental disorders are isolated and denied employment out of fear 
that they are prone to violence or crime, even though the 
correlation between violence and mental illness is weak.232 They 
face high unemployment rates despite the fact that most 
individuals with mental illness can work and, in fact, work may 
aid their symptoms.233 Individuals with mental disorders even 
face discrimination within the disabled community.234 As a result, 
individuals are more likely to remain silent about their disability 
and forego treatment rather than endure isolation and stigma of 
mental illness.235  
Pedophilic disorder is no less a mental disorder plagued by 
stigma and discrimination.236 It is unchosen, biological in nature, 
and not within the individual’s control.237 While an individual 
living with pedophilic disorder remains responsible for his 
actions, there is nothing blameworthy about having the mental 
illness of pedophilic disorder.238 Indeed, many individuals living 
                                                                                                     
 230. See id. at 605–07 (describing the social stigma of the mentally ill). 
 231. See id. at 605 (“Many believe that if mentally ill people would only try 
harder, they would get well. In this view, mental illness is due to internal 
weakness or other personal shortcomings.”). 
 232. See id. at 609–12 (describing the stereotype of violence that mentally ill 
people face).  
 233. See id. at 587 (“In the United States, 70-90% of persons classified as 
mentally disabled were unemployed and not seeking work. . . . Moreover, recent 
studies indicate that people with mental disabilities can work, and that working 
may decrease symptoms.”). 
 234. See id. at 601–02 (“[S]ome people with mental disorders . . . perceive 
that the disability rights movement has traditionally excluded people with 
mental illness. Accordingly, some people with a mental illness feel that they are 
discriminated against even within the disability community.”). 
 235. See id. at 606 (“The stigma of being diagnosed with a mental illness 
may cause some to forgo treatment, rather than incur the many disadvantages 
of being labeled ‘mentally ill.’”). 
 236. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (examining the stigma and 
isolation surrounding pedophilic disorder). 
 237. See Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 155 (describing human sexuality 
generally); Schwartz, supra note 19 (discussing differing views of pedophilia as a 
mental illness). 
 238. See Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 155 (describing human sexuality 
generally); Schwartz, supra note 19 (discussing pedophilia as a mental illness). 
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with the disorder are often distressed and disgusted by their own 
desires and have never acted on them.239 
The stigma of living with this mental disorder is perhaps 
unsurpassed. Individuals living with pedophilic disorder are the 
most universally despised group in modern society.240 Even 
among other marginalized groups, those living with pedophilic 
disorder are outcasts. The LGB community has worked, 
understandably, to distance themselves from unwarranted 
comparisons to pedophiles.241 The disability rights movement has 
made no effort to include it among its mental disorder 
protections.242 The contempt for pedophilia even limits funding 
for research on the causes and treatment of pedophilic disorder.243 
Those living with pedophilic disorder have no allies and are the 
allies no one wants. 
                                                                                                     
 239. See Schwartz, supra note 19 (noting that many people with pedophilia 
want help and try to control their behavior). 
 240. See BERING, supra note 9, at 156 (describing the stigma associated with 
people with pedophilia in society); Malón, supra note 9, at 1094 (noting that the 
diagnosis of pedophilia is closely associated with a moral judgment); Bleyer, 
supra note 4 (describing social attitudes towards people with pedophilia and the 
impact on treatment options); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (noting the social 
isolation people with pedophilia experience). 
 241. See Yoshino, supra note 17, at 846 (arguing that gays can “cover” by 
distancing themselves from people with pedophilia); Kenji Yoshino, The 
Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 427 (2000) (noting 
that the gay movement rejects pedophilia because it undermines their 
legitimacy); Balkin, supra note 37, at 2363–64 (noting that a standard attack on 
homosexuals is to degrade them by associating them with sexual deviants such 
as pedophiles); Bleyer, supra note 4 (describing accusations that pedophilia is 
driven by a “homosexual agenda” for gay men to have sex with boys); Charles 
Silverstein, The Implications of Removing Homosexuality from the DSM as a 
Mental Disorder, 38 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 161, 161–62 (2009) (describing 
that, when fighting for the removal of homosexuality from the DSM, the gay 
community did not want to discuss implications for other paraphilias, 
particularly pedophilia); Duncan Osborne, The Trouble with NAMBLA, 
ADVOCATE, Dec. 14, 1993, at 40 (describing the schism between gay rights 
activists and pedophile activists); Joyce Price, Pedophiles Resisting Expulsion 
from Gay Umbrella Organization, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1993, at A4 (noting the 
gay community’s resistance to including people with pedophilia). 
 242. See Hiegel, supra note 216, at 1474–76 (describing the moral 
qualifications behind the ADA’s definition of disability). 
 243. See Tarred and Feathered, supra note 19 (“Funders don’t want to be 
associated with pedophilia research. The stigma is too great.”); Ellsworth, supra 
note 42 (“But because of the societal disdain for the disorder, institutions are 
unwilling to fund pedophilia studies.”).  
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There are several arguments in favor of excluding pedophilic 
disorder from anti-discrimination statutes. Most notably, some 
individuals living with pedophilic disorder may pose an increased 
danger to others by nature of their mental illness.244 Those living 
with pedophilic disorder experience urges to commit abuses 
against children, a particularly vulnerable population.245 Anti-
discrimination law should not put children in increased danger of 
sexual abuse.246 
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, however, anticipate 
this issue and incorporate measures to protect public health and 
safety. Both acts, for example, require that the disabled 
individual is “otherwise qualified” for the position and does not 
pose a “direct threat” to the health or safety of others.247 An 
employer may therefore lawfully discriminate against an 
individual with a disability if that individual would pose a 
significant risk to the health or safety of others that could not be 
eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.248  
Courts have, for decades, used the direct threat analysis to 
balance the need to prevent unwarranted discrimination with 
concerns about the safety and health of employers. These cases 
often entail risks of serious injury or death. Courts have 
considered, for example, potential risk of HIV transmission by 
                                                                                                     
 244. See Courtney Flack, Chemical Castration: An Effective Treatment for 
the Sexually Motivated Pedophile or an Impotent Alternative to Traditional 
Incarceration?, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 173, 174 (2005) (“Sex offenders who commit their 
crimes against children often struggle with an inappropriate and uncontrollable 
sexual desire for their child victims. Pedophiles may act on their sexual feelings 
despite . . . confinement or lengthy incarceration.”). 
 245. See id. at 177 (“The sexual appetite of the pedophile can be dangerously 
insatiable.”). 
 246. Similar arguments about individuals who are attracted to adults are 
less convincing. One might argue, for example, that the logic that prohibits 
those with pedophilic disorder from caring for children should similarly prohibit 
heterosexual man from caring for women who lack capacity, such as severely 
mentally ill or unconscious women. But a defining characteristic of pedophilic 
disorder is an intense attraction to those who cannot consent. A heterosexual 
man does not have an attraction that is specific to those who cannot consent. A 
better analogy would be a man who has an intense attraction to unconscious 
women; such an attraction would raise valid concerns about his ability to 
appropriately care for unconscious women.  
 247. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112–113 (2012). 
 248. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (defining a “direct threat”). 
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health care workers,249 risk of tuberculosis transmission to school 
children,250 and the risk posed by a lifeguard’s hearing 
impairment251 or a truck driver’s visual impairment.252 In the 
context of mental disorders, courts have considered potential 
direct threats such as those posed by a surgeon whose manic 
nature causes him to be unable to successfully complete surgery, 
or a bus driver who is unable to safely operate a bus due to 
problems forming judgments, controlling his mood, and 
responding to stress.253 Courts have also considered the threat 
posed by an individual living with a mental disorder that is 
correlated with violent behavior.254 
While the direct threat analysis prioritizes health and safety, 
it rejects the use of sweeping generalizations about people with 
mental illness toward this end. The direct threat analysis 
requires employers to consider the specifics of the individual’s 
mental illness, including the diagnosis, its degree, its 
                                                                                                     
 249. See Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 
1998) (“All the evidence, together with the uncontradicted fact that a wound 
causing an HIV-infected surgical technician to bleed while in the body cavity 
could have catastrophic results and near certainty of death, indicates that [the 
worker] was a direct threat.”). 
 250. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987) 
(discussing the circumstances under which persons with contagious diseases are 
included under the ADA). 
 251. See Schultz v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 139 F.3d 286, 288–89 (1st 
Cir. 1998) (considering whether the ability to hear is an essential function of 
lifeguarding). 
 252. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 569 (1999) 
(considering whether a truck driver’s visual impairment posed a direct threat 
under the ADA).  
 253. See Haas v. Wyo. Valley Health Care Sys., 465 F. Supp. 2d 429, 435–36 
(M.D. Pa. 2006) (discussing the standards for the direct threat exception and 
determining it to be a triable issue of fact in this case); F.F. v. City of Laredo, 
912 F. Supp. 248, 254 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (“In light of the direct threat against 
public safety posed by his condition, Plaintiff could not perform the ‘essential 
functions’ of his job as a passenger bus driver.”). 
 254. See, e.g., Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the Workplace, and the Myth of the 
“Dangerous Mentally Ill”, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 867 (2001) (summarizing 
research correlating mental disorders with violent behavior); McKenzie v. 
Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1354–55 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that an individual 
living with post-traumatic stress disorder posed a threat to health and safety of 
others, as evidenced by her dangerous behavior, including shooting her off-duty 
revolver at her father’s grave). 
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manageability, and its behavioral consequences.255 In the context 
of mental health, for example, fears of violent behavior may not 
be based on generalizations about the individual’s mental 
disorder. An individualized inquiry must demonstrate that the 
person at issue poses a serious risk of violence, looking to 
evidence such as the individual’s threatening behavior or 
previous assaults.256 
This individualized inquiry requirement is critical because a 
general diagnosis of mental illness tells us little about the risk 
particular individuals pose. Although there is a correlation 
between certain mental disorders and violence, a diagnosis in 
itself provides insufficient information to determine whether an 
individual poses a risk of violence.257 For example, if multiple 
diagnoses are considered, the rate of violence among those 
diagnosed with schizophrenia-related disorders, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, panic disorder, major depression, or bipolar 
disorder is five to six times the rate of violence among those with 
no disorder.258 But the majority of individuals with these 
diagnoses are still non-violent, and a diagnosis alone provides 
little predictive value of future violence.259 Individual factors such 
                                                                                                     
 255. See Korn, supra note 111, at 600 (discussing the stereotypes and 
generalizations of the mentally ill and how such generalizations can be more 
personalized). 
 256. See McKenzie, 388 F.3d at 1347–48 (summarizing expert testimony on 
the direct threat issue as applied to the specific facts of the case). 
 257. There is a weak correlation between mental disorders and violence. See 
Hubbard, supra note 254, at 870–73 (summarizing epidemiological evidence 
analyzing the correlation between violence and various mental disorders). This 
correlation increases depending on the diagnosis, with higher rates of violence 
among those diagnosed with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. See Hubbard, 
supra note 254, at 870–71 (noting that schizophrenia and related disorders had 
the highest rates of violence in the study, with 8% committing a violent act in 
the preceding year); Seena Fazel et al., Bipolar Disorder and Violent Crime: 
New Evidence from Population-Based Longitudinal Studies and Systematic 
Review, 67 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 931, 934 (2010) (“[T]here was an 
increased risk of violent crime among the individuals with bipolar 
disorder . . . .”). 
 258. See Hubbard, supra note 254, at 871 (“Taking multiple diagnoses into 
account, the prevalence of violence among all persons with schizophrenia-
related disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, major 
depression or bipolar disorder ranged from 10.66% to 12.69%.”). 
 259. See id. (“Although these rates are five to six times the rates of violence 
by persons with no disorder, they also indicate that seven out of eight persons 
with schizophrenia and nine of ten persons with major depression did not report 
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as recent past violence, personal traits such as anger, 
aggressiveness, and impulsivity, alcohol and drug dependence, 
personal conflicts and perceived threats and hostility, and active 
psychotic symptoms are important in predicting violent 
behavior.260  
The direct threat analysis allows the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act to protect public health and safety while 
rejecting the assumption that individuals with pedophilic 
disorder are categorically too dangerous to employ. The risk of 
any individual living with pedophilic disorder committing sexual 
abuse cannot be discerned from generalizations about the 
disorder.261 While pedophilic disorder is likely a risk factor for 
offending, macro-level statistics are unable to determine the risk 
that any one individual living with pedophilic disorder poses. An 
individualized inquiry is necessary to consider the risks that a 
specific person with pedophilia poses. Several variables will affect 
this risk, including: the individual’s attitude toward offending 
and treatment, whether he has previously offended, and whether 
his mental disorder is co-morbid with other mental disorders, 
such as ones indicating impulse control or antisocial personality 
disorder.262 An individual who has never offended and believes 
child sex abuse is morally wrong will pose far less of a threat 
than an individual who has offended or believes that children 
enjoy sexual abuse.  
In this way, pedophilic disorder is similar to other mental 
illnesses that are associated with criminal behavior, and in 
particular with violence. It is no more a choice than bipolar 
disorder, can significantly impair an individual’s ability to engage 
in major life activities, and is subject to substantial stigma and 
discrimination. While pedophilic disorder likely correlates with 
an increased risk of sexual abuse, having pedophilic disorder does 
not make one a sexual predator; just as with other mental 
illnesses, different individuals living with pedophilic disorder will 
                                                                                                     
a single incident of violence.”). 
 260. See id. at 873–85 (reviewing literature on the individual factors likely 
to contribute to violent behavior). 
 261. See Schwartz, supra note 19 (noting that many people with pedophilia 
want help and try to control their behavior). 
 262. See SETO, supra note 35, at 150–55 (discussing risks for previous 
offenders). 
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pose vastly different types of risks in different contexts.263 The 
direct threat analysis protects public health and safety while 
ensuring that decisions are based on valid risk assessments 
rather than mere disgust with the mental disorder.  
In reality, it is likely that judges and juries will err on the 
side of finding a direct threat. Unless and until juries and judges 
see individuals living with pedophilic disorder more openly and 
safely acting as law-abiding members of society, cases are likely 
to face reflexive dismissal based on questionable evidence of 
direct threat. HIV provides a useful case study. Case law for HIV 
disability claims is replete with decisions in which a court, 
contrary to medical consensus, found that an individual living 
with HIV posed a direct threat or was not otherwise qualified for 
the position because of transmission threat.264 Several circuits 
accepted even a theoretical chance of transmission as sufficient to 
demonstrate a direct threat.265 It is likely that individuals living 
with pedophilic disorder will similarly face a presumption against 
                                                                                                     
 263. See Hubbard, supra note 254, at 885–86 (describing the wide variety of 
individual circumstances that can affect the threat presented by a single 
individual with a mental illness). 
 264. See, e.g., Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 
1281 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e conclude that the record establishes that the 
district court properly granted summary judgment to Valley Forge because an 
HIV-infected dental hygienist like Waddell poses a significant risk of HIV 
transmission to his patients.”); Montalvo v. Radcliffe, 167 F.3d 873, 878 (4th Cir. 
1999) (“[A] significant risk to the health and safety of others would exist if [the 
individual with HIV] were allowed to participate in the group karate classes.”); 
EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Mkt., Inc., 135 F.3d 1089, 1095 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(considering whether an employee who may have HIV constitutes a direct 
threat); Leckelt v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 829 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (“Although none of Leckelt’s duties apparently fell within the 
technical definition of an invasive procedure, at least some of these duties 
provided potential opportunities for HIV transmission to patients.”); see also 
Katrina Atkins & Richard Bales, HIV and the Direct Threat Defense, 91 KY. L.J. 
859, 879–90 (2003) (summarizing the different approaches of courts to 
determining whether HIV constitutes a direct threat); Dawn-Marie Harmon, 
Comment, HIV and the ADA: What Is a Direct Threat?, 55 ME. L. REV. 391, 407–
25 (2003) (analyzing the direct threat exception to the ADA across different 
circuits). 
 265. See Atkins & Bales, supra note 264, at 879–90 (discussing circuits’ 
differing views of HIV as a direct threat); Harmon, supra note 264, at 393 (“[A] 
showing of a theoretical possibility of transmission is enough to invoke the 
direct threat exception, even if the odds of transmission are extremely small.”). 
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their claims. Insofar as this presumption contravenes the 
requirements of the ADA, it certainly merits concern.266 
Another reason to exclude pedophilic disorder from the 
disability definition is that inclusion would likely increase 
burdens on employers. At the moment, employers need not justify 
the decision to fire an individual because he has pedophilic 
disorder—the pedophilic disorder itself is sufficient justification. 
ADA protection would require that an employer perform a direct 
threat analysis before firing the employee, just as he must for 
individuals living with mental illnesses such as schizophrenia or 
bipolar disorder. Many courts also place the burden on the 
employer to prove a direct threat if litigation arises.267 
This burden may not be as heavy as many fear. In many 
circumstances, this would pose little challenge to an employer. A 
defendant would have a strong argument that an individual 
living with pedophilic disorder who has a history of child sex 
abuse poses a direct threat in a position that involved contact 
with children, particularly if the position creates any possibility 
that the individual would care for a child. Other circumstances 
might be more challenging, such as where a plaintiff with no 
history of offending seeks a position that involves responsibility 
over children and provides evidence that he poses no threat in the 
form of testimony from psychiatrists. In other positions, 
individuals with pedophilic disorder will clearly pose no threat to 
others, such as a lab technician who works only with blood 
samples, a computer programmer in an office environment, or a 
neurosurgeon. In all situations, however, juries and judges are 
likely to err strongly on the side of finding a direct threat.268  
                                                                                                     
 266. I cite it not in approval but to demonstrate that the direct threat is 
likely to provide robust protection for defendants in this context. 
 267. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1164, 1171 (E.D. Mich. 
1996), rev’d on other grounds, 172 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that the 
employer carries the burden of proving a direct threat); Rizzo v. Children’s 
World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir. 1996) (“As with all 
affirmative defenses, the employer bears the burden of proving that the 
employee is a direct threat.”); see also Ann Hubbard, Understanding and 
Implementing the ADA’s Direct Threat Defense, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1279, 1283 
(2001) (“[T]he employer has the burden of persuading the fact finder that the 
employee or applicant poses a direct threat in the workplace.”). But see EEOC v. 
Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 142–44 (1st Cir. 1997) (putting the burden on the 
plaintiff to prove that he does not pose a direct threat). 
 268. See supra notes 264–265 and accompanying text (predicting how the 
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Regardless, it is not clear that pedophilic disorder should be 
categorically denied disability protection provided to other mental 
disorders simply because litigating such cases burdens 
employers. It is true that litigating will still pose a burden to 
employers even if the odds are stacked in their favor. But this is 
the case for all disabilities. This is true even when the stakes are 
high, such as when an employer must consider whether an 
employee’s mental disorder makes him violent, whether a 
physical or mental disability compromises his ability to drive a 
bus safely, fly a plane, or supervise children or the elderly, or 
whether the employee poses a risk of transmitting HIV, hepatitis, 
or other serious illness.269 
Another argument against recognizing pedophilic disorder as 
a disability is it will dilute the rights provided to other 
individuals living with mental disorders. As discussed above, 
courts are likely to interpret the direct threat analysis liberally 
and find direct threats even when they are unsupported by 
scientific evidence. The resulting case law may be used against 
other individuals living with mental disorders to diminish their 
ability to bring anti-discrimination claims. This may be the 
reason that the disability community has not sought to include 
those with pedophilic disorder. 
While this is a valid claim, it nonetheless seems questionable 
to deny a group civil rights protections for this reason. If 
pedophilic disorder is a mental illness that can substantially 
impair a major life activity, it is dubious to allow these 
individuals protection against unwarranted discrimination only if 
it does not adversely affect other disabled individuals. The ADA 
has thus far stood by controversial decisions to include unpopular 
groups that raise direct threat issues—most notably individuals 
with mental illness and HIV.270 It is not clear that pedophilic 
disorder merits an exceptional response. 
                                                                                                     
courts will handle a direct threat analysis for those with pedophilic disorder). 
 269. See supra notes 249–254 and accompanying text (discussing sample 
litigation under the ADA). 
 270. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 216 (discussing 
objections to the inclusion of individuals living with mental illness and HIV). 
See generally Hubbard, supra note 267 (discussing Congress’s decision to 
include in the ADA individuals living with mental illness and use of a narrow 
direct threat analysis to contend with those who pose threats). 
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Lawmakers may also exclude pedophilic disorder from 
disability protections because such protections have an important 
legitimizing role. Statutes such as the ADA send a message that 
disability is not a moral failing or adequate reason to exclude 
individuals from economic, social, and other opportunities.271 
They serve as a symbolic welcoming of individuals living with 
disabilities into the mainstream society—indeed, they redefine 
what mainstream society is and should be.272  
Lawmakers may hesitate to send this message about those 
living with pedophilic disorder. This may be due, in part, to the 
conflation of pedophilic disorder and sexual assault and other 
criminal behavior.273 It may also be a reaction to those with 
pedophilic disorder who seek to justify the sexual assault of 
children.274 Even the mental disorder itself—isolated from the 
despicable behavior or attitudes of some individuals who live with 
it—prompts widespread disgust and derision.275 
These concerns do not justify distinguishing this mental 
illness for the purpose of anti-discrimination law. Revulsion for 
sexual assault and those who attempt to justify it is well founded. 
But including pedophilic disorder among ADA and Rehabilitation 
Act protections would not provide civil rights protections for 
sexual assault or those who promote it. These behaviors are not 
equivalent to pedophilic disorder, and would be indicators that an 
individual living with pedophilic disorder poses a direct threat. 
Pedophilic disorder is not a choice for which an individual is 
responsible and therefore it is not a moral failing.  
                                                                                                     
 271. See Hiegel, supra note 216, at 1452 (“The ADA reconfigures our norms 
of physical capability at the same time that it revises our vision of America, 
guaranteeing equal political and economic rights to a population traditionally 
excluded from full participation in American public life.”). 
 272. See id. (“Intended to prohibit the use of myths and stereotypes 
associated with a disability as a basis for private decisions, the Act is an 
important symbolic gesture of ‘welcome’ into ‘the mainstream of American 
society,’ a statement about the respect and dignity of those considered physically 
or mentally limited.”). 
 273. See Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 776 (describing confusion of 
pedophilia as a status and describing child sexual abuse). 
 274. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the attitudes of 
people with pedophilia toward sexual abuse of children). 
 275. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (summarizing the stereotypes 
and stigmas surrounding those with pedophilic disorder). 
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In sum, the challenges involved in granting pedophilic 
disorder disability protections are not unique to it as a mental 
illness, and it is questionable that they warrant a categorical 
exemption from disability protection. The protections of the ADA 
and the Rehabilitation Act prohibit employers and other parties 
from excluding individuals with mental disorders based on 
stereotypes or disgust. It requires them instead to base decisions 
on evidence and to ensure their concerns are legitimate. If the 
law accepts that individuals living with pedophilic disorder do, 
indeed, have a mental disorder, then we should carefully consider 
our reasons for excluding them from these protections.  
The more practical arguments against including pedophilic 
disorder as a disability should also be weighed against the 
potential benefits. Recognizing pedophilic disorder as a mental 
illness under the ADA would improve the ability of individuals 
living with pedophilic disorder to seek help without fear of 
negative consequences. At present, an individual who discovers 
his attraction to children must keep the attraction secret; 
disclosure could result in the loss of his job, educational 
opportunities, housing, medical care, and other social and 
economic opportunities protected by the ADA and Rehabilitation 
Act. These consequences disincentivize individuals living with 
pedophilic disorder from seeking treatment that could assist 
them in refraining from illegal activities such as sexual assault or 
the consumption of child pornography. Distinguishing pedophilic 
disorder as undeserving of legal protections granted to other 
mental illnesses also legitimizes the stigma of this mental illness 
that keeps those suffering from it from seeking help.276  
The nature of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act 
protections may also help prevent individuals from committing 
criminal acts. In order to benefit from these civil rights 
protections, an individual must identify as or be regarded as 
having a disability. Such identification is inconsistent with the 
tactics of a sexual predator, who relies on his sexual attraction to 
children remaining secret.277 Individuals living with pedophilic 
                                                                                                     
 276. See Feierman, supra note 9, at 564 (describing stigma as discouraging 
individuals from seeking help for pedophilia). 
 277. See Gladwell, supra note 86 (describing the strategies of sexual 
predators). 
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disorder will also be more likely to pass the direct threat test if 
they provide evidence of treatment. Accommodations such as the 
ability to attend therapy sessions or avoid contact with children 
are similarly unconducive to sexual predation tactics. ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act protection therefore alerts employers to an 
individual’s disorder and encourages the individual to seek 
accommodations to minimize any potential threat he or she poses 
to others. 
B. Civil Commitment Law 
While anti-discrimination laws provide increased civil rights 
protections for those living with mental disorders, civil 
commitment laws allow the state to limit individual freedom 
based in part on mental illness. Ordinarily, states can civilly 
commit an individual under very limited circumstances. Part 
IV.B argues that Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) statutes lower 
the standard for civil commitment of people living with pedophilic 
disorder and, in doing so, raise several potential conflicts with 
important constitutional and criminal law principles. While it 
often is valid to compromise the liberties of some in order to 
protect the safety of others,278 a system that relies on 
unwarranted assumptions and questionable science is a poor 
means to accomplish this goal.  
1. Civil Commitment: Justifications and Limitations 
Until recently, civil commitment for mental health disorders 
was quite limited. The Due Process Clause requires states 
seeking to civilly commit an individual to demonstrate clear and 
convincing evidence that the person is (1) mentally ill and 
(2) dangerous to himself or others.279 While some individuals do 
need long-term care, civil commitment generally focuses on 
                                                                                                     
 278. See Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 84 (noting that public interest can 
outweigh an individual’s liberty interests). 
 279. See generally Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77–84 (1992); 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426–32 (1979); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 
U.S. 563, 574–76 (1975); Zander, supra note 18, at 18–19; Schulhofer, supra 
note 18, at 70. 
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providing care only as long as an individual poses a threat to 
himself or others.280  
The strict requirements of these laws reflect their basis in a 
state’s police and parens patriae powers.281 A state’s parens 
patriae powers allow it to stand in as guardian or protector for 
those who are unable to protect themselves because they lack 
capacity or competence.282 Involuntary civil commitment 
generally applies to those who are not competent to make their 
own decisions—unable to understand the consequences of their 
actions as opposed to merely unwilling to abide by the law. By 
standing in parens patriae to them, a state protects not only 
society, but also the committed individual who cannot 
appreciate or control his actions.283  
These justifications are vital to the constitutionality of civil 
commitment. The Supreme Court has held that civil 
commitment is unconstitutional unless the individual has a 
valid mental disorder; otherwise, it might be construed as 
punishment for future crimes.284 The American Psychiatric 
                                                                                                     
 280. For example, many states’ SVP commitment laws contrast their long-
term commitment with the short-term commitment goals of pre-existing civil 
commitment statutes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.910 (2014); IOWA CODE § 229A.1 
(2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2014). 
 281. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 
The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in 
providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional 
disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under 
its police power to protect the community from the dangerous 
tendencies of some who are mentally ill. 
See generally John Kip Cornwall, Understanding the Role of the Police and 
Parens Patriae Powers in Involuntary Civil Commitment Before and After 
Hendricks, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 377, 377 (1998); Gottlieb, supra note 18, 
at 1035; Zander, supra note 18, at 17. 
 282. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (discussing states’ parens patriae 
powers); Cornwell, supra note 281, at 379–90 (discussing the history of parens 
patriae authority over the mentally ill). 
 283. See Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks Care: Competency to Make 
Medical Treatment Decisions and Parens Patriae Civil Commitments, 45 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 561–62 (2012) (describing parens patriae power in the 
context of civil commitment); Elizabeth A. Weeks, The Newly Found 
“Compassion” For Sexually Violent Predators: Civil Commitment and the Right 
to Treatment in the Wake of Kansas v. Hendricks, 32 GA. L. REV. 1261, 1274 
(1998) (same). 
 284. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77–83 (requiring both mental illness and 
dangerousness for commitment); Frances et al., supra note 111, at 377–78 
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Association supports this limitation and recommends that civil 
commitment be limited to persons who have a “severe mental 
disorder” and “lack capacity to make a reasoned treatment 
decision.”285 Many state civil commitment statutes imply that 
psychosis, which entails some sort of loss of contact with reality, 
is required for such commitment.286 Prior to the 1990s, civil 
commitment proceedings were almost exclusive to persons with 
psychosis.287  
Criminal law theory also limits the extent to which 
individuals can be detained for offenses they could commit. 
Retributivism, the dominant theory in criminal law, entails a 
presumption of individual freedom and allows detention only 
insofar that it is morally justified.288 It allows criminal 
punishment of individuals only in accordance with their moral 
desert.289 Retributivism does not condone the punishment of 
                                                                                                     
(discussing the requirement of a mental abnormality coupled with 
dangerousness as a predicate for civil commitment); Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 
1037–38 (describing Foucha and the invalidity of preventive detention); Prentky 
et al., supra note 168, at 359, 362 (“[I]t is the presence of a mental abnormality 
that saves SVP laws from being unconstitutional preventive detention.”). Justice 
White’s plurality opinion in Foucha required states to justify commitment with 
clear and convincing evidence that a person is mentally ill and dangerous. See 
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76 n.3 (“[Psychiatric] opinion is reliable enough to permit 
the courts to base civil commitments on clear and convincing medical 
evidence . . . .”); see also Zander, supra note 18, at 30–32 (discussing Justice 
White’s plurality opinion in Foucha). Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in 
Foucha stated civil commitment requires “some medical justification,” or else 
the connection between the nature and purposes of confinement would be 
absent. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 285. Zander, supra note 18, at 19; see also Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1039 
(describing how a Kansas statute limited civil commitment to individuals 
detached from reality or unable to care for themselves). 
 286. See Zander, supra note 18, at 18–19 (detailing the major court decisions 
that addressed the scope of a state’s power to civilly commit individuals). 
 287. Id. at 32. 
 288. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: 
Justifying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. 
REV. 141, 149–51 (2011) (describing justifications for punishment under theories 
of retributivism); Morse, supra note 18, at 58 (“For people who are dangerous 
because they are disordered, the usual presumption in favor of maximum liberty 
yields . . . .”). 
 289. See Henry M. Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 
401, 412 (1958) (“[I]t is necessary . . . that the violation was blameworthy and, 
hence, deserving of the moral condemnation of the community.”); Ferzan, supra 
note 288, at 149; Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1033–34 (describing how criminal 
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individuals who cannot understand or control their actions 
because such individuals are not morally blameworthy. 
Retributivism also rejects punishment based on purely preventive 
grounds because it punishes those who have yet to act in a 
morally blameworthy way.290 Such punishment does not accord 
with retributivism’s respect for individual autonomy because it 
fails to provide individuals the opportunity to choose to comply 
with the law.291  
Most criminal law scholarship distinguishes and justifies 
civil commitment on the grounds that it is non-punitive.292 Civil 
                                                                                                     
law gives the state the right to assign moral blame); Schulhofer, supra note 18, 
at 80–83 (arguing criminal punishment can be only for voluntary acts and in 
proportion to blameworthiness of those acts, and this cannot be trumped by 
concerns about future dangerousness). 
 290. See Ferzan, supra note 288, at 178, 183–84 (discussing preventive 
interference under retributivism); Morse, supra note 18, at 58 (“There is no 
‘pure’ prevention—the confinement of dangerous people without desert or 
disease.”); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive 
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1439–41 (2001) (“[N]o 
person deserves punishment before committing an offense.”); Schulhofer, supra 
note 18, at 91 (arguing that to quarantine a diseased person in advance would 
violate her autonomy if she could avoid transmitting the disease to others 
through her conduct); see also R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 389 (1997) 
(making similar arguments against criminalizing preparatory steps). 
 291. See Ferzan, supra note 288, at 177–78 (discussing retributivism’s 
objection that pure prevention fails to take people’s autonomy seriously); Morse, 
supra note 18, at 57–58 (arguing that respect for autonomy constrains state 
intervention to instances of desert or disease); Robinson, supra note 290, at 
1434–41 (describing the conflict between punishment based on dangerousness 
and punishment based on desert); Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 91 (arguing that 
individuals are not responsible for harms that are not the result of chosen 
actions). 
 292. See Morse, supra note 18, at 57–58 (“Such deprivations are forms of 
greater or lesser quarantine and may include ‘treatment,’ but in theory they are 
not punishment.”). There is debate among retributivist scholars about whether 
detention based on predictions of dangerousness constitutes punishment. See, 
e.g., id. at 58 (discussing the justification of non-punitive intervention for non-
responsible people); Robinson, supra note 290, at 1444–46 (discussing the 
controversy surrounding the preventive detention legislation of the 1960s); 
Ferzan, supra note 288, at 180–84 (examining the bases for interference in civil 
and criminal contexts); Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak: Preventive Detention 
as Punishment, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173, 1180–91 (2011) (arguing that 
preventive detention constitutes punishment in some circumstances). Doug 
Husak, for example, argues that civil commitment is punishment if it involves a 
deprivation of freedom that the state intentionally uses to stigmatize an 
individual. Husak, supra, at 1188–91. Husak would therefore classify SVP 
commitment as punishment if the state has a punitive intention. See id. at 
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commitment is limited to those who are unable to exercise their 
autonomy.293 Retributivism, therefore, generally requires that the 
state limit civil commitment to those who have mental illnesses 
that significantly compromise their ability to choose to act in 
accordance with the law.294 Failure to make this distinction could 
result in the detention of individuals out of fear of the choices 
they will make. As preventive detention, this would fail to respect 
the individual’s autonomy to decide whether to commit an 
                                                                                                     
1189–90 (noting that involuntary confinement of the dangerous mentally ill 
differs from punishment because it lacks punitive intention). Husak argues, 
however, that retributivism allows preventive punishment only when the state 
demonstrates the individual has certain characteristics that make him pose 
substantial danger of future harm. Id. at 1191–1202. SVP statutes do not meet 
these criteria because they fail to require sufficient evidence that an individual 
has a mental illness that creates a substantial risk they will commit a sex 
offense, as discussed above. Husak also requires that the individual has control 
over the relevant characteristics, which would preclude consideration of 
pedophilic disorder. Id. at 1198–99 (“As long as we ensure that defendants have 
control over these characteristics, they need not worry that they could not 
possibly lose the status that rendered them eligible for liability in the first 
place.”). 
 293. See Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1045 (discussing constitutionally 
required justifications for civil commitment); Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert 
Nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 269–70 (1999) (“[A]gents incapable of 
rationality do not actually have to cause harm to justify nonpunitive 
intervention.”).  
 294. See Ferzan, supra note 288, at 162 (arguing that preventive 
interference is comparable to the elimination of an “Innocent Threat” in the self-
defense context); Morse, supra note 293, at 269–70 (comparing irrational agents 
to other dangerous but irresponsible instrumentalities, including hurricanes, 
microbes, and wild beasts). Civil commitment may be used in other 
circumstances, such as quarantine. Such commitment is likewise considered 
nonpunitive and limited to those unable to control whether they harm others. As 
both Schulhofer and Gottlieb have noted, we ought not to civilly commit an 
infectious individual who is able to control disease transmission purely on the 
grounds that we fear he will not act responsibly. See Schulhofer, supra note 18, 
at 91 (arguing that quarantining an infectious individual who can control 
transmission of the disease would violate her autonomy as a responsible 
person); Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1045–46 (arguing that the state may 
quarantine infectious individuals because they may have no way of preventing 
themselves from infecting others). We ought not to quarantine individuals with 
HIV, for example, because they are able to control disease transmission. Such 
quarantine would amount to preventive detention based on our fear about their 
future choices and would not adequately respect their autonomy. See 
Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 91 (“[I]f we simply fear that she may choose to 
ignore the sanctions deployed to prevent such misconduct, then a decision to 
quarantine her in advance is a decision to . . . violate her autonomy . . . .”). 
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offense; as punishment, it would improperly punish an individual 
who has not yet committed a culpable act.295  
2. The Content of Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment 
Laws 
SVP laws use civil commitment to detain sex offenders from 
society when they cannot be held by the criminal justice 
system.296 For one who is convicted of an offense, civil 
commitment occurs after the individual has served his prison 
sentence.297 SVP law requirements vary by jurisdiction but share 
common traits: (1) a connection with a sexual offense;298 (2) a 
mental abnormality of some sort;299 (3) the mental abnormality 
somehow predisposes the actor to commit sexual offenses;300 and 
(4) the actor must have some threshold likelihood to offend if 
released.301  
The first requirement is that the individual usually must 
have some connection with a sexual offense. Two things are 
                                                                                                     
 295. See Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 92–93 (“[A] free society should never 
resort to regulatory confinement measures that bypass the individual’s capacity 
for autonomous choice.”); Ferzan, supra note 288, at 177–78 (“[P]ure 
prevention . . . fails to take people’s autonomy seriously, to announce rules, to 
give individuals opportunities to comply, and to treat individuals as responsible 
agents when we punish them.”). 
 296. See Jill S. Levenson, Policy Interventions Designed to Combat Sexual 
Violence: Community Notification and Civil Commitment, in IDENTIFYING AND 
TREATING SEX OFFENDERS: CURRENT APPROACHES, RESEARCH, AND TECHNIQUES, 
17, 19 (Robert Geffner et al. eds., 2003) (describing that civil commitment 
statutes are used to detain dangerous sex offenders who can no longer be held 
by the criminal justice system); Frances et al., supra note 111, at 375, 376 
(discussing the emergence of SVP civil commitment statutes in order to detain 
dangerous offenders who would otherwise be released). 
 297. See Frances et al., supra note 111, at 375 (“Individuals identified as an 
SVP/SDP are civilly committed for treatment in designated mental health 
facilities after serving their prison terms.”). 
 298. See infra notes 302–307 and accompanying text (comparing how 
different states define and treat the predicate sexual offense). 
 299. See infra notes 308–312 and accompanying text (comparing how 
different states define the underlying mental disorder). 
 300. See infra notes 313–319 and accompanying text (comparing different 
states’ requirements of predisposition to commit sexual offenses). 
 301. See infra notes 320–325 and accompanying text (comparing different 
states’ requirements of likelihood to re-offend). 
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notable about this requirement. First, the type of offense and its 
connection to sexual violence can vary significantly. Some states 
define a category of “sexually violent” offenses,302 while others 
include any offense that a judge determines was sexually 
violent.303 Second, conviction is not necessary in many 
jurisdictions. Some states require that the individual was 
convicted, found not guilty by reason of insanity, or deemed 
incompetent to stand trial;304 others require only that the 
individual was charged;305 and neither federal law nor Minnesota 
require a formal charge.306 Some states also include minors 
adjudicated delinquent.307 
Several jurisdictions do not require a formal mental disorder 
diagnosis. In Kansas v. Hendricks,308 the Supreme Court upheld 
legislatures’ ability to define the parameters of a mental disorder 
                                                                                                     
 302. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701 (2014) (enumerating the 
offenses included under the term “sexually violent offense”); 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 207 / 5 (2014) (same). 
 303. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 2014) (providing that 
“sexually violent offense” means any offense which the court finds should be 
considered a sexually violent offense); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (2014) 
(providing that, in addition to certain enumerated offenses, “sexually violent 
offense” means any offense which the court finds should be considered a 
sexually violent offense). 
 304. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (defining “sexually violent 
person”); WIS. STAT. § 980.01(7) (2014) (providing the definition of “sexually 
violent person,” which requires that one have been convicted, adjudicated 
delinquent, or found not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent 
offense). 
 305. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 229A.2(11) (2014) (providing the definition of 
“sexually violent predator,” which requires that one has been convicted or 
charged with a sexually violent offense); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (2014) 
(providing that “sexually violent predator” means “any person who has been 
convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to 
engage in repeat acts of sexual violence”). 
 306. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5) (2012) (requiring only that the person 
has “engaged or attempted to engage” in sexually violent conduct or child 
molestation); MINN. STAT. § 253D.02 (2014) (requiring only that the individual 
has engaged in “harmful sexual conduct”). 
 307. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (2014) (providing the definition 
of “sexually dangerous person,” which includes one who has been adjudicated as 
a delinquent juvenile or youthful offender by reason of a sexual offense); 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 6402 (2014) (providing a separate definition of “sexually violent 
delinquent child”). 
 308. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
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sufficient for SVP commitment without relying on psychiatric 
terminology.309 Legislatures therefore drafted into SVP statutes 
terms such as mental “abnormality,”310 mental “dysfunction,”311 
and “behavioral abnormality.”312 The few that require a “mental 
disorder,” usually define the term broadly to include “a congenital 
or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional 
capacity.”313  
This mental disorder or abnormality must also undermine 
the actor’s ability to control his sexually violent impulses.314 
Unlike ordinary civil commitment laws, SVP laws do not 
require mental incapacity; they include individuals who are 
able to understand their actions and their consequences.315 
Instead, SVP statutes rely on the concept that these 
individuals are more predisposed to commit offenses because 
they have more difficulty controlling their behavior.316  
                                                                                                     
 309. Id. at 358–60. 
 310. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (including “abnormality” in the 
definition of “sexually dangerous to others”); FLA. STAT. § 394.912(5) (2014) 
(defining “mental abnormality”); IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014) (same); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 59-29a02 (2014) (same); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480 (2014) (same); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2 (2014) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 
2014) (same); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.03 (McKinney 2014) (same); 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 6402 (2014) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (2014) (same); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2014) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(18) (2014) 
(same). 
 311. See MINN. STAT. § 253D.02 (2014) (including “dysfunction” in the 
definition of “sexually dangerous person”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01 (2014) 
(including “dysfunction” in the definition of “sexually dangerous individual”). 
 312. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.003(a) (West 2013) 
(including “behavioral abnormality” in the definition of “sexually violent 
predator”). 
 313. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207 / 5 (2014) (defining “mental 
disorder”); WIS. STAT. § 980.01 (2014) (same). Some states also use this or a 
similar definition for mental abnormality. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014) 
(defining “mental abnormality”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2014) (same); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 632.480 (2014) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (2014) (same). 
 314. See Frances et al., supra note 111, at 375 (detailing the criteria 
necessary for categorizing an individual as an SVP). 
 315. See Hamilton, supra note 18, at 541–43 (“[T]he SVP law model 
represents gap-filling between desert and disease in which normal responsibility 
rules for criminal versus civil control are blurred.”). 
 316. See id. (“[C]ognitive plus volitional impairments substantiate a 
presumption of risk of future dangerousness and, in turn, are used by officials to 
justify segregation and containment of sex offenders.”). 
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In practice, states have often made this requirement quite 
vague.317 Federal law requires that the mental disorder cause 
“serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or 
child molestation.”318 Several jurisdictions require the mental 
disorder “predispose the person to commit” acts of sexual 
violence,319 with some specifying the predisposition must make 
them a danger or menace “to the health and safety of 
others.”320   
Many jurisdictions also specifically require some likelihood to 
engage in sexually violent acts in the future. This likelihood need 
                                                                                                     
 317. See Frances et al., supra note 111, at 376–77 (arguing that most states’ 
definitions of the qualifying mental disorders for SVP laws are vague and 
difficult to apply). 
 318. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2012); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2014) 
(requiring that the individual “find[] it difficult to control his predatory 
behavior”). 
 319. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (2014) (requiring a mental 
disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence); FLA. 
STAT. § 394.912(5) (2014) (requiring a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence); 725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 207 / 5 (2014) (requiring a mental disorder that makes it 
substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence); 
IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014) (requiring a mental abnormality that makes the 
person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2014) (requiring a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of 
sexual violence); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480 (2014) (requiring a mental 
abnormality that makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory 
acts of sexual violence); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 2014) (requiring a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to 
engage in acts of sexual violence); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(18) (2014) 
(requiring a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person 
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence); WIS. STAT. § 980.01 (2014) 
(requiring a mental disorder that makes it likely that the person will engage in 
one or more acts of sexual violence). 
 320. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(5) (2014) (requiring 
predisposition to such a degree as to render the person a danger to the health 
and safety of others); IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014) (requiring predisposition to a 
degree that would constitute a menace to the health and safety of others); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2014) (same); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480 (2014) (same); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2 (2014) (requiring propensity to such a degree 
that the person has serious difficulty in controlling his behavior as to pose a 
potentially serious likelihood of danger to others); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 71.09.020(8) (2014) (requiring predisposition to commit criminal sexual acts in 
a degree constituting such a person as a menace to the health and safety of 
others). 
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not be particularly strong. Most states require only that the 
individual is “likely” to engage in acts of sexual violence.321 Some 
jurisdictions require that the state show it is “more likely than 
not” that the individual will commit a future act of sexual 
violence.322 Other states define it as “such a degree as to pose a 
menace to the health and safety of others.”323 New Hampshire 
requires that “the person has serious difficulty in controlling his 
or her behavior as to pose a potentially serious likelihood of 
danger to others.”324 Others do not define “likely” at all.325 
California, which does not define “likely” in the statute, instructs 
                                                                                                     
 321. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (2014) (requiring that the 
person is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence); FLA. STAT. § 394.912(5) 
(2014) (same); IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014) (requiring that the person will, more 
likely than not, engage in acts of a sexually violent nature); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 59-29a02 (2014) (requiring that the person is likely to engage in repeat acts of 
sexual violence); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (2014) (requiring the person be 
likely to engage in sexual offenses); MINN. STAT. § 253D.02 (2014) (requiring that 
the person is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 135-E:2 (2014) (requiring that the person pose a potentially serious 
likelihood of danger to others); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480 (2014) (requiring that 
the person will, more likely than not, engage in predatory acts of sexual 
violence); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 2014) (requiring that the person is 
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.03 (McKinney 
2014) (requiring that the person is likely to be a danger to others and to commit 
sex offenses); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (2014) (requiring that the person is 
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 841.003(a) (2013) (requiring that the person is likely to engage in a predatory 
act of sexual violence); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2014) (requiring that the 
person is so likely to commit sexually violent offenses that he constitutes a 
menace to the health and safety of others). 
 322. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014) (requiring that the person will, 
more likely than not, engage in acts of a sexually violent nature); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 632.480 (2014) (requiring that the person will, more likely than not, engage in 
predatory acts of sexual violence); WIS. STAT. § 980.01 (2014) (requiring that the 
person will, more likely than not, engage in one or more acts of sexual violence). 
 323. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.912(4) (2014) (requiring propensity of such a 
degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§59-29a02 (2014) (requiring propensity of such a degree as to pose a menace to 
the health and safety of others); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01 (2014) (same); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (2014) (requiring that the person pose a threat to the 
health and safety of others); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (2014) (requiring that 
the person pose a menace to the health and safety of others). 
 324. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2 (2014). 
 325. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (2014) (omitting “likely” as a 
statutorily defined term); MINN. STAT. § 253D.02 (2014) (same); N.Y. MENTAL 
HYG. § 10.03 (2014) (same); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.003(a) 
(2013) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2014) (same). 
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jurors that the term “does not mean that it must be more 
probable than not that there will be an instance of re-
offending.”326  
3. Implications for Pedophilic Disorder 
SVP statutes do not apply to every individual living with 
pedophilic disorder, nor do they apply exclusively to those with 
pedophilic disorder. An individual living with pedophilic disorder 
usually does not fall within the purview of the SVP statute unless 
he is suspected of committing an offense, generally either a 
sexually violent or sexually motivated offense.327 These 
individuals also need not be diagnosed with pedophilic disorder to 
be subject to civil commitment under SVP statutes. Other 
diagnoses, such as antisocial personality disorder, may support 
SVP civil commitment. 
Despite these caveats, this Article addresses SVP civil 
commitment because pedophilic disorder is a major predictor of 
SVP commitment.328 Pedophilic disorder is one of the—if not 
the—most common diagnosis in support of SVP commitment.329 A 
                                                                                                     
 326. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–6609.3 (West 2014) (omitting 
“likely” as a statutorily defined term); CAL. JURY INSTR. CRIM. 4.19 (defining 
“likely” for juries in the context of deciding commitment of an alleged sexually 
violent predator). 
 327. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (noting that those who 
sexually abuse children are not exclusively those who are classified as 
pedophilic, but are a wide-ranging group); Zander, supra note 18, at 36 
(discussing the prevalence of paraphilia diagnoses among those committed 
under SVP statutes); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 553–54 (discussing the 
statistical correlation between paraphilia diagnosis and civil commitment). 
 328. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (describing the correlation 
between pedophilic disorder and civil commitment); Zander, supra note 18, at 36 
(describing the statistical connection between pedophilia diagnosis and civil 
commitment); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 553–54 (examining statistically the 
role diagnoses of sexual deviance play in imposing preventive detention). 
 329. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (“[Pedophilia] is the most 
common diagnosis in civil commitment procedures . . . .”); Zander, supra note 18, 
at 36 (“Pedophilia . . . is one of the most frequently made diagnoses in SVP 
cases.”); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 553–54 (“The strong influence of the 
paraphilias in committal proceedings is consistently shown by statistical 
analyses.”). The vast majority of civil commitments rely on a diagnosis of 
pedophilic disorder or hebephilic disorder. Hebephilia is an intense sexual 
interest in young adolescents, and is often confused with pedophilia. At present, 
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diagnosis of pedophilic disorder raises the odds of civil 
commitment by approximately 4,500%; it has an even higher 
correlation with a recommendation for civil commitment than an 
individual’s statement that he intends to commit a new sex 
crime.330 Courts often rely on pedophilic disorder as de facto 
evidence that the individual’s volitional control is compromised or 
that he is likely to re-offend.331  
Taken as a whole, SVP statutes expand the state’s power to 
civilly commit, and do so in a way that has especially severe 
repercussions for individuals living with pedophilic disorder. The 
consequences of SVP statutes for individuals living with 
pedophilic disorder are even more severe given the statutes’ 
scopes. Most statutes do not require a criminal conviction, and 
the federal statute does not require an arrest. Moreover, unlike 
ordinary civil commitment, SVP statutes are specifically drafted 
to ensure long-term detention.332 Some states explicitly cite the 
                                                                                                     
the American Psychiatric Association does not recognize hebephilic disorder in 
the DSM-V. See DSM-V, supra note 39 (omitting hebephilia from the recognized 
mental disorders). However, SVP civil commitment proceedings often cite the 
general category of unspecified paraphilias, arguing that hebephilia is an 
unspecified paraphilia. See Zander, supra note 18, at 36 (“[T]he paraphilias are 
commonly the diagnostic basis for the mental abnormality or mental disorder 
that is alleged as part of SVP commitment proceedings.”). 
 330. See Jill S. Levenson & John W. Morin, Factors Predicting Selection of 
Sexually Violent Predators for Civil Commitment, 50 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY 
& COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 609, 622 tbl.3 (2006) (providing data on the effect of 
pedophilia diagnosis on the odds of civil commitment); see also Hamilton, supra 
note 18, at 554 (“Pedophilia was also highly correlated and had a statistical 
effect greater even than the number of previous victims or the individual’s 
statement of intent to commit a new sex crime.”). 
 331. See, e.g., Shindel & Moser, supra note 128, at 927 (stating that 
paraphilia diagnoses have been misused in criminal and civil commitment 
proceedings as indication that individuals cannot control their behavior); 
Hamilton, supra note 18, at 554–55 (describing cases in which pedophilia was 
analogized to lifelong addiction); Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034, 
1040–42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (referring to expert testimony that defendant was 
likely to re-offend because pedophilia was incurable, lifelong disorder); United 
States v. Wetmore, 766 F. Supp. 2d 319, 336–37 (D. Mass. 2011) (citing expert 
testimony that the defendant was likely to re-offend because of pedophilia 
diagnosis); In re Kennedy, 578 S.E.2d 27, 29 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (finding 
pedophilia diagnosis alone sufficient to demonstrate sufficient likelihood of re-
offending). 
 332. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600–6609.3 (West 2014) (providing that 
a determination of danger to the health and safety of others does not require 
proof of a recent overt act while the offender is in custody); FLA. STAT. § 394.910 
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need to avoid using ordinary civil commitment proceedings, 
which are “primarily designed to provide short-term treatment to 
individuals with serious mental disorders and then return them 
to the community.”333 Permanent detention might in fact be the 
goal of such statutes.334 Several states’ legislative findings state 
that the prognosis for curing sexually violent offenders is poor, 
suggesting doubt about rehabilitating those offenders.335 
4. Rethinking Sexually Violent Predator Statutes 
SVP statutes contain an interesting mix of requirements. 
They provide for civil commitment of individuals who understand 
their actions but nonetheless have a mental disorder that affects 
their ability to control their behavior. The rationale of the statute 
therefore relies heavily on the state’s ability to distinguish 
individuals who have some sort of volitional impairment that 
makes them so dangerous that detention is warranted. 
The concept of volitional impairment is central to the 
constitutionality of SVP laws. In Kansas v. Crane,336 the Court 
held that the statutory requirements for SVP commitment must 
be able to distinguish those who have a mental abnormality that 
makes them dangerous from the ordinary criminal.337 To this end, 
it required that statutes show a degree of volitional 
impairment.338 The Crane Court held that states need not show 
that individuals it seeks to commit have complete inability to 
                                                                                                     
(2014) (“It is . . . the intent of the Legislature to create a civil commitment 
procedure for the long-term care and treatment of sexually violent predators.”); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2014) (“The legislature further finds that 
the . . . treatment needs of this population are very long term . . . .”). 
 333. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2014).  
 334. Frances et al., supra note 111, at 375 (noting that civil commitment 
occurs after serving one’s prison term and lasts for an indefinite period). 
 335. See Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 75 (discussing legislative findings in 
the Washington statute). 
 336. 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
 337. See id. at 412–13 (recognizing that lack of control must be sufficiently 
proven to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender from the dangerous, but 
typical, recidivist); Zander, supra note 18, at 30–31 (discussing the holding in 
Crane). 
 338. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (rejecting commitment without any lack-of-
control determination). 
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control their actions; indeed, the Court questioned whether this 
was even possible.339 But the Court required that states 
demonstrate that individuals show “serious difficulty” in 
refraining from sexually violent behavior.340 
Yet SVP statutes, and the Crane decision that upheld them, 
rely on questionable assumptions about the psychology of those 
living with pedophilic disorder and other mental disorders. At 
present, the concept of volitional impairment is highly 
questionable in both law and psychiatry.341 Psychiatric literature 
is rife with ambiguity and uncertainty about the concept of 
volitional impairment and self-control in general, and with 
concerns about its use in SVP proceedings.342  
For these reasons, the APA cautions against assuming 
impaired impulse control from a psychiatric diagnosis for the 
sake of legal proceedings.343 We should question whether the 
concept is sufficiently able to distinguish individuals with 
behaviors, preferences, or sexual orientations from those who are 
truly mentally ill. This is particularly true given that SVP 
commitment proceedings often rely on conclusions about 
volitional impairment that lack a proper evidentiary basis or that 
misconstrue the psychiatric literature.344 Members of the 
psychiatric community have cited these concerns to argue that 
                                                                                                     
 339. See id. at 411–12 (finding no requirement of total or complete lack of 
control); Frances et al., supra note 111, at 377–78 (discussing the Court’s 
decisions in Crane and Hendricks). 
 340. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412–13 (“It is enough to say that there must be 
proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”); Prentky et al., supra note 
168, at 362–63 (discussing the holding in Crane). 
 341. See Prentky et al., supra note 168, at 363 (“[I]t is problematic, and 
perhaps impossible, to distinguish between impulses that are irresistible and 
impulses that simply are not resisted.”); Zander, supra note 18, at 65–66 
(examining the issues in determining volitional impairment in paraphilia cases). 
 342. See Zander, supra note 18, at 65–66 (“[N]one of the paraphilias require 
any type of volitional impairment or inability to control impulses to make a 
diagnosis.”); Prentky et al., supra note 168, at 363–64 (“The volitional 
dysfunction standard as applied in insanity defenses is rarely appropriate in the 
SVP context.”). 
 343. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 25 (cautioning the use of DSM-V 
diagnostic criteria when making legal decisions); Morse, supra note 18, at 64–65 
(discussing the problems inherent in measuring lack of control); Frances et al., 
supra note 111, at 379 (discussing use of the DSM in forensic settings). 
 344. See Morse, supra note 18, at 64–65 (discussing the problems inherent in 
measuring lack of control). 
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SVP laws inappropriately use psychiatry to promote preventive 
detention of those deemed deviant.345 
Pedophilic disorder in particular is often used to determine 
volitional impairment. SVP commitment proceedings often use 
pedophilia and other paraphilia diagnoses as de facto evidence 
that the individual lacks volitional control.346 Yet psychiatric 
research has not demonstrated that paraphilic disorders are 
associated with volitional impairment or impulse control.347 For 
this reason, the DSM does not list impulse control as a symptom 
of pedophilic disorder or other paraphilic disorders.348 Research 
has also questioned the relationship between pedophilic disorder 
and long-term recidivism.349  
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that courts 
routinely fail to require appropriate evidence of volitional 
impairment. Most states allow courts to assume the actor has 
difficulty controlling his actions from the defendant’s mental 
disorder and his past acts.350 This practice essentially allows 
courts to conflate pedophilic disorder and other paraphilic 
disorders with volitional control, a presumption that is not 
supported by scientific evidence.351  
                                                                                                     
 345. See Frances et al., supra note 111, at 375–76 (describing the 
shortcomings of SVP definitions applied broadly by state statutes). 
 346. See supra note 331 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ reliance 
on pedophilia diagnoses as evidence of likelihood to re-offend). 
 347. See supra Part II.B (discussing the characteristics of paraphilic 
disorders). 
 348. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 697–99 (providing a description of 
pedophilic disorder and omitting impulse control as a symptom). 
 349. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (citing research that found 
a pedophilic diagnosis was unrelated to long-term recidivism). 
 350. See Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane’s “Serious Difficulty” 
Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L. REV. 291, 300–01 (2004) (arguing that 
Arizona, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, South Carolina, Texas, 
Washington, and Wisconsin fail to require a separate finding of lack of control); 
Janine Pierson, Comment, Construing Crane: Examining How State Courts 
Have Applied Its Lack-of-Control Standard, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1527, 1537–46 
(2012) (arguing that ten states do not require a separate showing of lack of 
control, and either ignore the requirement or inappropriately conflate it with 
the mental abnormality requirement). 
 351. See Michael B. First & Robert L. Halon, Use of DSM Paraphilia 
Diagnoses in Sexually Violent Predator Commitment Cases, 36 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 443, 450 (2008) (describing the distinction between diagnosis of 
paraphilia and volitional impairment). Courts’ willingness to assume volitional 
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SVP statutes therefore create a system in which 
individuals living with pedophilic disorder may be detained 
indefinitely based on questionable constitutional grounds. The 
problems inherent in the concept of volitional impairment 
undermine the requirement’s ability to accurately distinguish 
a group of individuals who merit civil commitment. Moreover, 
state courts have weakened the requirement, further 
undermining its validity in civil commitment proceedings. 
SVP statutes allow civil commitment of individuals who are 
able to understand and control their actions based on fear of 
the decisions they will make.352 This undermines the 
justifications central to the constitutionality of civil 
commitment.353 
SVP statutes also conflict with criminal law theory. As 
discussed above, the dominant theory of retributivism requires 
that the state limit civil commitment to individuals who are 
unable to act in accordance with the law.354 SVP statutes use 
mental illness to civilly commit individuals who can rationally 
choose their behavior. An individual in the throes of sexual 
interest does not act on reflex. He feels an interest, forms an 
intent, and acts on it.355 Refusing to engage in the sexual activity 
                                                                                                     
impairment, despite lack of evidence, may in fact be tied to the disgust 
pedophilic disorder instills. Historically, the determination that a sexual urge 
creates an impulse control problem has been linked to whether the underlying 
interest is considered acceptable. It was at one time commonly accepted that 
individuals could suffer from “compulsive homosexuality” and “compulsive 
masturbation” because same-sex attraction and masturbation were in 
themselves viewed as problematic. See Moser, supra note 125, at 323 
(“[C]ompulsive masturbators and compulsive homosexuals began to disappear 
once those behaviors were no longer seen as signs or symptoms of 
psychopathology.”); Moser, supra note 110, at 92 (detailing the history of and 
problems with paraphilia as a concept). Similarly, courts may be presuming that 
individuals with sexual interest in children must lack control over their actions. 
 352. See Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1037, 1045 (arguing that preventive 
detention of sane individuals is not constitutional); Schulhofer, supra note 18, 
94–95 (arguing that SVP commitments should be impermissible without proof of 
mental illness). 
 353. See Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1037–38, 1045 (arguing that there are 
constitutional limits to how far criminal and civil sanctions may overlap). 
 354. See supra notes 292–295 and accompanying text (detailing how 
retributivism applies to civil commitment). 
 355. See Morse, supra note 18, at 63 (examining how desire and control 
influence action and responsibility). 
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might be more difficult for an individual who desires it than for 
an individual who does not in that the former will suffer from 
frustration, tension, or loneliness. But these negative 
consequences do not prevent the individual from controlling his 
actions.356 Indeed, it is for this very reason that we hold such 
individuals responsible for their actions and deny them an 
insanity defense; criminal law expects the individual to suffer the 
negative effects and holds him responsible if he does not.357 
The above difficulties with SVP statutes may seem small in 
the larger context of preventing sex offenses. But a deprivation of 
liberty—particularly one so complete and indefinite as civil 
commitment—should not be undertaken lightly.358 It should not 
allow for the detention of those whose mental disorders might 
simply predispose them to choose to commit offenses.359 
Otherwise, states may use civil law to circumvent constitutional 
limits on criminal law.360 We must also take care not to detain 
people based on assumptions with questionable scientific merit, 
even with the best of intentions.  
If we take pedophilic disorder seriously as a mental disorder, 
then we must think critically about what it is and what it is not. 
As reviled as individuals with pedophilic disorder may be, and as 
horrific as the offenses of many individuals chosen for SVP civil 
commitment are, SVP laws still merit scrutiny. Disgust does not 
justify the state’s ability to indefinitely detain based on 
                                                                                                     
 356. See id. (“[A] desire is simply a desire . . . there is no literal physical 
compulsion, as there is in cases of reflex, spasm and the like.”). 
 357. See id. (“Even if the yielding conduct is the symptom of a recognized 
disorder, agents who yield in such circumstances appear quintessentially 
responsible for their conduct . . . .”). We might, potentially, excuse the action 
based on the idea that the discomfort in not acting is too much for an individual 
to bear. But such an excuse would be, as Morse notes, a “non-culpable hard 
choice” similar to duress rather than a lack of control or volition. See id. at 64 
(discussing potential loss of control as a result of compulsion or duress). 
 358. See Hamilton, supra note 18, at 541 (arguing SVP statutes are a human 
rights issue because civil commitment infringes on liberty and privacy). 
 359. See Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1045 (arguing that the state must show 
why civilly committed individuals differ from other criminals who commit sex 
crimes); Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 94–95. 
 360. See Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1035 (“If the government may simply 
recast its criminal proceedings as civil, it may be able to accomplish the goals it 
might otherwise achieve only through punishment by a simple change in 
nomenclature.”). 
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questionable assumptions and scant evidence. Undoubtedly, SVP 
statutes civilly commit many terrible people who have done and 
will do abhorrent things. But the SVP system inappropriately 
uses mental illness—and in particular pedophilic disorder—to 
justify preventive detention in a way that is inconsistent with 
constitutional and retributivist principles.  
This is not to say that constitutional and criminal law 
principles foreclose any civil commitment to prevent violent 
sexual offenses. There are two potential alternatives to achieve 
these goals. The first is to limit SVP civil commitment to 
individuals who are truly not competent to choose whether to 
abide by the law, as the law ordinarily does for the civil 
commitment of those who are mentally ill and dangerous.361 If 
such individuals have the capacity to choose whether to violate 
the law, the state may not detain them indefinitely. For those 
convicted of an offense, the state may impose probation and other 
limitations on their freedom after release, but the state may not 
use civil commitment to keep them in custody where criminal law 
cannot.  
A second alternative would be to consider models of 
preventive detention that rely on dangerousness and not mental 
disorder. Criminal law theorists have proposed several potential 
justifications for very limited detention of individuals who intend 
to commit offenses, analogizing it to self-defense.362 Current SVP 
                                                                                                     
 361. See Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 94–96 (“Preventive incapacitation of 
[individuals who are capable of choosing to act and responding to sanctions], as 
a substitute for reliance on the criminal process, is inconsistent with the core 
commitments of a free society . . . .”). 
 362. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, for example, uses a self-defense analogy to 
argue that states have a limited right to detain individuals who intend to 
commit an offense. Ferzan, supra note 288, at 162–63. Stephen Morse similarly 
uses a self-defense analogy to argue that preventive detention might be 
justifiable if predictive technology could accurately determine whether an 
individual will offend. Morse, supra note 18, at 69; Morse, supra note 293, at 
295. Michael Louis Corrado argues that the state can restrain individuals to 
prevent the crimes of those who intend to commit them and have begun to make 
an effort to commit the offense. See Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the 
Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 778, 790 (1996) (“Setting aside the question of preventive 
detention for the moment, punitive restraint in the case of ongoing efforts to 
break the law would seem to be as well justified as punishment for past 
crimes.”). Scholars differ on whether these detentions are punitive, preventive, 
or some combination of the two. See Husak, supra note 292, at 1180–91 (arguing 
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statutes rely on mental illness while undermining the parens 
patriae justification that makes mental illness relevant to civil 
commitment. These proposed systems of preventive detention 
rely instead on predicting when an individual intends to commit 
an offense and intervening beforehand.363 Because of its lack of 
mental disorder requirement, it is not clear where such a system 
would fit in with Supreme Court precedent requiring a disease 
justification for civil commitments based on dangerousness.364 
These proposed means of detention also require a strong showing 
that the individual will commit an offense.365  
                                                                                                     
punitive under some circumstances); Corrado, supra, at 790 (arguing punitive); 
Morse, supra note 18, at 58 (arguing preventive); Ferzan, supra note 288, at 
180–84 (arguing somewhat punitive and somewhat preventive). 
 363. See Ferzan, supra note 288, at 162 (“This structure has a natural 
application to preventive interference by the State. The aggressor is a 
responsible agent. He performs an act in furtherance of a culpable intention. 
And, based on that act, it becomes permissible to stop him.”); Corrado, supra 
note 362, at 790 (“If the state could never detain except for a crime committed, 
then the state could not intervene to prevent an ongoing attempt to harm. It 
seems clear that in some circumstances the state has the moral authority to do 
just that.”). This is not to say mental disorders would be irrelevant. An 
individual’s pedophilic disorder could be evidence of an individual’s intent to 
commit an offense. 
 364. See Foucha v. Lousiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77–84 (1992) (concluding that a 
person may be held without violating their due process rights so long as they are 
both mentally ill and dangerous); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426–32 
(1979) (“[T]he State has no interest in confining individuals involuntarily if they 
are not mentally ill or if they do not pose some danger to themselves or others.”); 
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574–76 (1975) (considering and rejecting 
reasons for detention in the absence of dangerousness and mental illness). 
 365. One reason for this is the view that a self-defense-like theory is needed 
to justify detention based on prediction of future crimes; it is a narrow exception 
for the state to intervene to prevent a crime. Thus, the showing should not rely 
on the general characteristics of the individual. See Ferzan, supra note 288, at 
173, 179 (“Importantly, what justifies the State’s interference is not a general 
prediction based on facts about the actor, but what the actor has done.”). Rather, 
the state should be able to demonstrate at the very least that the individual has 
the intent to commit an offense. See id. at 167–69 (explaining intent as an 
element in justifying state interference). Other potential requirements include 
an act in furtherance of the offense. See id. (describing the benefits of the 
evidentiary requirement of an act for the state to intervene). But see Husak, 
supra note 292, at 1194–97 (arguing against an act requirement). These 
proposals stand in stark contrast to current SVP statutes, which generally 
require only a likelihood of offending and rely on general characteristics such as 
the individual’s mental disorder. 
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V. Conclusion 
A. Implications for Other Areas of Law and Policy 
1. Public Health 
As with any mental disorder, the public needs public health 
interventions that identify and treat pedophilia early. Currently, 
states offer treatment programs for people with pedophilia that 
are sex offenders, but there are no outreach efforts and no large-
scale treatment or research programs that focus on early 
identification and the prevention of sexual abuse before an 
individual commits an offense.366 State intervention is almost 
exclusively limited to those in its custody or those who are on 
restricted conditions of release.367 
From a public health perspective, this approach is absurd. It 
would be likewise irrational for public health policy to ignore 
depression until it manifests in suicidal behavior or drug abuse, 
or to ignore schizophrenia until it manifests in a violent episode. 
Public health authorities recognize that early identification and 
intervention provide better prognoses for mental disorders, which 
is in part why public health authorities, such as the National 
Institute for Mental Health (NIMH), spend hundreds of millions 
of dollars studying and treating these disorders, and in particular 
on programs with preventive focuses.368 In contrast, NIMH funds 
no programs addressing the treatment of pedophilia, much less 
the early identification and treatment of individuals before they 
offend.369 Our lack of focus on early identification and 
intervention squanders important opportunities to prevent child 
sexual abuse. Experts argue that the best means of preventing 
                                                                                                     
 366. Interview with Michael Seto (Sept. 25, 2014). 
 367. Id. 
 368. See FY 2014 Budget Congressional Justification, NAT’L INST. MENTAL 
HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/budget/fy-2014-budget-congressional-
justification.shtml (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (identifying hundreds of millions 
of dollars allocated in NIMH’s budget to treat and prevent mental health 
disorders through programs, research grants and other uses) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 369. Interview with Erin Patricia Shannon, Acting Budget Officer, NIMH 
(Sept. 29, 2014). 
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child abuse is to focus on treatment before an individual commits 
the offense and enters the criminal justice system.370  
Limiting treatment and research to pedophiles that are sex 
offenders severely restricts our ability to study the effects of 
treatment. Studies of sex-offender treatment are commonly 
focused on the issue of recidivism and whether treatment 
successfully prevents re-offenses.371 This creates several 
problems. Recidivism is a common problem in U.S. prisons among 
all types of offenders, with sex offenses proving to be no 
exception. Several variables determine an individual’s likelihood 
of re-offending for any offense, including employment stability, 
housing, and community support.372 All offenders face obstacles 
in these areas, but such problems are particularly stark for sex 
offenders due to registration requirements and housing 
limitations.373 Focusing on recidivism among sex offenders 
therefore restricts research to a group of pedophiles with myriad 
intervening variables and for which treatment faces the most 
obstacles. 
Limiting research to sex offenders and recidivism also 
prevents us from studying the myriad other important effects 
treatment may have. For example, it forecloses the study of 
                                                                                                     
 370. Interview with Michael Seto (Sept. 25, 2014). 
 371. See sources cited supra note 73. 
 372. Recidivism of Sex Offenders, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT. (May 
2001), http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2015) 
(reviewing studies on sex offender recidivism) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); INDIANAPOLIS-MARION COUNTY CITY-COUNTY COUNCIL RE-
ENTRY POLICY STUDY COMMISSION, RE-ENTRY POLICY STUDY COMMISSION REPORT 
(2013), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/research/recidivism_and_reentr
y/; JOCELYN FONTAINE ET AL., SUPPORTIVE HOUSING FOR RETURNING PRISONERS: 
OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS OF THE RETURNING HOME—OHIO PILOT PROJECT, URBAN 
INSTITUTE JUSTICE POLICY CTR. (2012); Paul Heroux, Sex Offenders: Recidivism, 
Re-Entry Policy and Facts, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2011 3:41 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-heroux/sex-offenders-recidivism_b_976765. 
html (last updated Jan. 8, 2012 5:12 AM) (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 373. See Joseph Goldstein, Housing Restrictions Keep Sex Offenders in 
Prison Beyond Release Dates, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.ny 
times.com/2014/08/22/nyregion/with-new-limits-on-where-they-can-go-sex-offen 
ders-are-held-after-serving-sentences.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) 
(describing the challenges sex offenders within New York face in finding 
housing that conforms to the requirements of sex offender registration) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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treatment’s effects on those who have never offended or have 
never been in the criminal justice system. It also limits our 
ability to study how variables common to offending affect the 
success of treatment. This deprives us of information key to 
preventing child sexual abuse and to helping individuals living 
with pedophilia live law-abiding and productive lives. 
2. Criminal Law 
Careful consideration of pedophilia as a mental disorder has 
implications for criminal law, but would be unlikely to result in 
significant change. This is in large part because pedophilic 
disorder does not implicate culpability in a way that concerns 
criminal law. Individuals living with pedophilic disorder would be 
unlikely to argue successfully that they are not guilty by reason 
of mental defect or insanity. Nor does pedophilic disorder raise 
concerns about criminalization of the sexual abuse of children. 
Careful consideration of pedophilic disorder may, however, be 
cause to reexamine its use in sentencing. 
Insanity defenses have undergone substantial changes over 
the past century.374 Until a few decades ago, several insanity 
defenses incorporated a notion of both cognitive impairment and 
volitional impairment.375 Mental disorders provided a defense to a 
crime based on either a lack of rational capacity—for example, an 
inability to understand the wrongfulness of his actions—or a 
volitional impairment such that the accused was unable to 
control his actions.376 In the mid-1980s, Congress and several 
states, with the support of the American Psychiatric Association, 
                                                                                                     
 374. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 218–32 (describing the rise and fall of 
the volitional test in the 1980s following a number of political episodes involving 
mental illness, like the shooting of President Reagan); Michael Louis Corrado, 
Responsibility and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 60–62 (2005) (explaining the 
development and popularity of various tests, namely volitional and cognitive, for 
determining insanity for the purpose of criminal defenses since the 1950s). 
 375. See supra note 374 and accompanying text. 
 376. See Prentky et al., supra note 168, at 363–64 (“In some states, criminal 
acts may be excused on proof of irresistible impulses or an impairment in ability 
to conform one’s behavior to the law when caused by mental illness 
(psychosis).”). 
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abolished the volitional impairment criteria.377 The majority of 
states now rely purely on cognitive impairment.378 
Pedophilic disorder is rarely used as an insanity defense, and 
rethinking its place in the law should not affect this. Pedophilic 
disorder is, in itself, unlikely to provide an insanity defense under 
either the cognitive or volitional impairment criteria. A 
pedophilic disorder diagnosis is based on sexual attraction and 
either behavior, distress, or impairment.379 It requires no 
cognitive impairment, nor do any of these criteria imply an 
inability to understand the nature or wrongfulness of one’s 
actions. Nor does a pedophilic disorder diagnosis either require or 
imply an inability to control one’s actions. 
Careful consideration of pedophilic disorder also provides 
little reason to question the criminalization of sex with children 
or the production, dissemination, and possession of child 
pornography. It is true that individuals living with pedophilic 
disorder have urges to engage in these illegal activities. But the 
fact that some individuals, by nature of their biology, may desire 
to engage in unlawful activity is not in itself reason to make the 
activity lawful. On the contrary, there are ample reasons to 
criminalize child sexual abuse and child pornography offenses. 
Such offenses harm other individuals and deserve punishment 
when done with a culpable mental state. 
One concern of criminal law that may merit reconsideration 
is pedophilic disorder’s role in sentencing. Mental disorders are 
often mitigating factors in sentencing.380 Judges consider an 
                                                                                                     
 377. See Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience 
and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 85 (2006) 
(“The popularity of control tests began to wane by the 1970s, and grew even 
more unpopular in the wake of John Hinckley’s acquittal, under the Model 
Penal Code standard, for the shooting of President Reagan in 1981. . . . Most 
states, as well as the federal courts, use only a cognitive test for insanity.”). 
 378. See Corrado, supra note 374, at 61 & nn.16–17 (“By my survey, thirty 
states, in 1980, had two-prong insanity rules, with both cognitive and volitional 
prongs: only eighteen still had the older one-prong test. By 2004, only fifteen 
states still had the two-prong test, and thirty had the one-prong, purely 
cognitive test.”). 
 379. See supra notes 102–108 and accompanying text (describing the APA’s 
three criteria for pedophilic disorder). 
 380. See Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 885, 907, 945 (2011) (describing mental illness as a 
mitigating factor); Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating 
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individual’s mental disorder as reducing his moral culpability on 
the basis that it impaired his ability to act in accordance with the 
law. These individuals are sufficiently sane to be responsible for 
their actions and therefore do not merit an insanity defense. 
Nonetheless, judges often consider mental illness when 
determining how much punishment the individual deserves.381 
On the contrary, courts use pedophilic disorder to justify 
lengthier sentences or to justify the decision to incarcerate over 
less restrictive options.382 In contrast to other mental disorders, 
pathologizing pedophilic disorder seems to have exacerbated 
perceptions that such individuals are monsters incapable of 
empathy or self-control.383 Pedophilic disorder may even provoke 
more sentencing than other types of sexual disorders; in State v. 
Lottie,384 for example, a judge justified his imposition of a harsher 
                                                                                                     
Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 296–98 & nn.44–46 
(1989) (same). 
 381. See Morse, supra note 380, at 945 (“It is universally accepted that 
mental disorder is a mitigating factor, and many jurisdictions specifically list 
mental abnormality as a mitigating factor, using language similar to the Model 
Penal Code's ‘extreme mental or emotional disturbance’ criterion or a similar 
partial responsibility standard.”); Berkman, supra note 380, at 296–98 & nn.44–
46 (“Numerous state legislatures and courts have concluded that certain mental 
and emotional states may constitute mitigating factors.”). 
 382. See, e.g., United States v. Mantanes, 632 F.3d 372, 375–76 (7th Cir. 
2011) (basing sentencing in part on conclusion that defendant was a “pedophile 
with continuing urges”); State v. Lottie, No. 93050, 2010 WL 2333052, at *1–3 
(Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 2010) (“The judge then found that Lottie was not 
amenable to community control sanctions and that ‘[t]his type of crime calls for 
a prison sentence.’”); see also Hamilton, supra note 18, at 537–38 & nn.10–12 
(outlining cases). In Lottie, there does not appear to be a formal diagnosis of 
pedophilic disorder. The sentencing judge seems to have concluded that the 
defendant had pedophilia based on the defendant’s solicitation of young girls 
and the fact that, in the judge’s words, “Your girlfriend looks pretty young in the 
back sitting next to your mom, as well.” Lottie, 2010 WL 2333052, at *1–2. 
 383. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1092 
On the contrary, this diagnosis and especially its 
management by professionals or lay persons could be having 
in general the effect of reinforcing the image of these men as 
dangerous slaves of their own libido, without the capacity 
for love, lacking any empathic feeling for children, and 
incapable of managing their condition in a socially 
acceptable way. 
 384. No. 93050, 2010 WL 2333052 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 2010). 
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sentence by distinguishing the defendant’s pedophilic disorder 
from mere sex addiction.385  
Courts use pedophilic disorder to extend sentencing based on 
concerns about protection and deterrence, not based on 
blameworthiness.386 An individual living with pedophilic disorder 
arguably has an inherent motive to re-offend against children 
that might make him more difficult to deter from offending.387 
Thus, courts may extend the sentence of individuals living with 
pedophilic disorder in order to protect the public from a recidivist. 
Reconceptualizing pedophilia in the law requires us to 
reexamine the extent to which extended sentencing is justified. It 
is not clear that pedophilic disorder merits different treatment 
than other mental disorders in the context of sentencing. 
Recidivism for sex offenses is, contrary to popular belief, lower 
than for other offenses.388 Some studies report that offenders 
living with pedophilic disorder are more likely to re-offend than 
those who do not live with pedophilic disorder;389 others have 
demonstrated no relationship between pedophilic disorder and 
long-term recidivism.390 It is also difficult to accurately measure 
                                                                                                     
 385. See id. at *1–2 (quoting the trial court judge as stating, “I think what 
you are missing the point with, though, is that it’s not just sex addiction, it’s 
pedophilia. That it’s clear from your actions that you targeted young girls.”). 
 386. There is nothing more inherently blameworthy about an individual 
with pedophilic disorder who sexually abuses a child out of sexual desire than 
an individual without pedophilic disorder who sexually abuses a child out of a 
desire to humiliate or dominate a child. It is even possible that the former is less 
blameworthy than the latter, just as crimes of passion may be considered less 
blameworthy than cold-blooded ones. 
 387. See, e.g., United States v. Boroczk, 705 F.3d 616, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(citing concerns about greater recidivism due to pedophilia). 
 388. See Levenson, supra note 296, at 22 (explaining that a study that is 
often believed to show high recidivism rates “did not in fact conclude that sex 
offender treatment is futile, but that due to the methodological inadequacies of 
the studies they examined, they were unable to find a statistically significant 
treatment effect on recidivism”). 
 389. See Strassberg et al., supra note 35, at 379 (“Increasingly, there is 
empirical evidence that these two groups of sexual offenders against children 
differ in a number of important ways. For example, compared to non-pedophiles, 
pedophiles tend to have more victims, respond more poorly to treatment, and 
are more likely to reoffend.” (citations omitted)); Levenson, supra note 296, at 21 
(discussing a variety of studies which have been interpreted to show high 
recidivism rates for pedophilic sex offenders). 
 390. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (citing studies concluding 
that a pedophilic diagnosis is unrelated to long-term recidivism); Robin J. 
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recidivism given that it often relies on either self-report or 
criminal conviction. 391 One thing that is clear is that pedophilic 
disorder does not necessarily indicate recidivist tendencies; 
several variables specific to the individual are important in 
calculating an individual’s likelihood to reoffend.392 It is 
worthwhile to balance these considerations—as well as the need 
for additional research—when considering whether pedophilic 
disorder is an appropriate consideration for extending sentencing. 
The use of pedophilic disorder to extend sentencing is also 
relevant to more general debates about using recidivism (or 
predictions of recidivism) to extend sentencing, a controversy that 
is beyond the scope of this Article.393 
It is also worth reflecting on the role that disgust plays in 
extending the sentences of sex offenders because of a pedophilic 
disorder diagnosis. In Martha Nussbaum’s work on disgust and 
the law, she distinguishes indignation, defined as imputing blame 
on a person because of their wrongful behavior, from disgust, 
defined as distancing an object as less human.394 Sex offenses 
against children elicit legitimate indignation, which recognizes 
individuals as responsible moral agents. But extended sentences 
                                                                                                     
Wilson et al., Pedophilia: An Evaluation of Diagnostic and Risk Prediction 
Methods, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE 260, 268–70 (2011) (“However, individuals who met 
DSM-IV-TR-based diagnoses of pedophilia were no more likely to be convicted of 
a new sexual offence than those who failed to meet the DSM-IV-TR diagnostic 
criteria for pedophilia . . . .”); Heather M. Moulden et al., Recidivism in 
Pedophiles: An Investigation Using Different Diagnostic Methods, 20 J. FORENSIC 
PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 680, 693 (2009) (“The results suggest that those 
individuals diagnosed as pedophiles do not recidivate more often or more quickly 
than non-pedophiles.”); see also Hamilton, supra note 18, at 579–80 (“Nor is a 
DSM diagnosis of pedophilia correlated with sexual recidivism. Actually, a study 
using a regression analysis method indicates that a DSM diagnosis of pedophilia 
is not even a significant predictor for sexual recidivism.”). 
 391. See Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 533 (“Recidivism is a term with many 
definitions, which affect reported rates of repeated offenses. For example, some 
studies look at additional arrests for any offense, others only look at arrests for 
sexual crimes, and some only look at convictions, whereas others analyze self-
reported reoffenses.”). 
 392. See id. (explaining the impact of variables like sexuality and antisocial 
personality traits on recidivism rates). 
 393. See JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING 
COMMUNITY AND OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 3 (2008) (describing the “normative 
dilemmas” that accompany recidivist sentencing premiums). 
 394. NUSSBAUM, supra note 227. 
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for offenders diagnosed with pedophilic disorder may instead 
reflect disgust, a judgment that such individuals are inhuman 
monsters. Nussbaum has noted a similar effect where prosecutors 
seeking the death penalty in murder cases appeal “to a type of 
disgust that places the murderer in a class of heinous monsters 
more or less outside the boundaries of the jury’s moral 
universe.”395  
Courts should exercise caution when tapping the emotion of 
disgust for the purposes of punishment. Disgust is, in some ways, 
more comforting than indignation. It creates a boundary between 
us and the objects of our disgust.396 But using disgust to 
distinguish those living with pedophilic disorder may be in 
tension with the decision to hold the defendant responsible as a 
moral agent.397 Even the most horrific abusers of children are not, 
in fact, monsters—they are human beings who have done terrible 
things with no justification or excuse. Disgust only clouds our 
ability to punish the individual as a moral agent.398 
3. Constitutional Law and Sexual Freedom 
Reconsidering pedophilic disorder in the law should not raise 
concerns about constitutional protections for child abuse. In the 
last two decades, the Supreme Court has issued landmark 
decisions protecting the rights of sexual minorities to engage in 
relationships. These decisions, however, rely on foundations that 
are inapplicable to pedophilic disorder and child sexual abuse. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court’s landmark Lawrence v. Texas 
decision struck down a state sodomy law.399 Its decision argued 
that criminalizing sexual conduct that is intrinsic to the identity 
of a marginalized group—in particular, gay men—affects the 
                                                                                                     
 395. Id. at 65–66.  
 396. See id. (“Disgust is all about putting the object at a distance and 
drawing boundaries.”). 
 397. See id. (“Indignation works in the opposite direction: by imputing blame 
to its object, and by focusing on the wrongful nature of the person’s act, it 
presupposes the ascription of humanity and responsibility.”). 
 398. See id. at 165–68 (arguing that using disgust as a tool to distance 
oneself from others limits jurors’ ability to critically evaluate the moral 
culpability of defendants). 
 399. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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group’s full participation in society.400 Lawrence did not entirely 
prohibit states from criminalizing such sexual conduct; it 
required states to demonstrate a rational basis for such laws 
beyond “the fact that the governing majority in a State has 
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral . . . .”401 
Laws prohibiting the sexual abuse of children clearly have 
such a basis. Sexual abuse significantly harms children.402 It 
poses both physical and psychological harms, and is de facto 
harmful because such children lack capacity to give consent.403 
Thus, even if criminalizing sex with children could be viewed as 
denying those with pedophilic disorder relationships intrinsic to 
their identity, such concerns are far outweighed by the need to 
protect children from harm. For these reasons, Lawrence 
implicitly rejected any attempt to apply its reasoning to the 
sexual abuse of children by distinguishing gay sexual 
relationships from those involving minors or “persons who might 
be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where 
consent might not easily be refused.”404 
4. Mandatory Reporting Laws 
All fifty states have laws requiring health care practitioners 
to report suspected child abuse to authorities.405 Such statutes 
require psychologists to report suspicions of past, present, or 
future sexual abuse of a child based on disclosures by the 
                                                                                                     
 400. See id. at 575–79 (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their 
private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny 
by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the 
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in [homosexual 
sex] . . . .”). 
 401. Id. at 577–78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578). 
 402. See supra note 28 (discussing the long-term psychological harms to 
children as a result of child-sexual relations, including trauma, neurosis, and 
depression). 
 403. See id. (discussing the incapability of a child to give reasoned consent). 
 404. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 405. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2014), http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_polici
es/statutes/manda.pdf; Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 467, 468. 
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potential victim, perpetrator, or any party.406 An individual living 
with pedophilic disorder who consults a psychiatrist out of fear 
that he might offend may therefore trigger disclosure 
requirements.407  
These statutes must balance the critical need to prevent child 
abuse and to treat individuals who have been abused with the 
need to ensure confidentiality in health care.408 Non-offending 
individuals with pedophilic disorder avoid seeking treatment out 
of fear that psychiatrists will report them to authorities, resulting 
in the loss of their jobs and families.409 There is also evidence that 
these statutes deter sex offenders from seeking psychiatric help 
                                                                                                     
 406. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §17a–101a (2014) (explaining that 
“mandated reporters” who in the ordinary course of their employment have 
reasonable cause to suspect or believe that any child under the age of eighteen 
has been abused or neglected has a duty to report or cause a report to be made 
to the authorities); Gross v. Myers, 748 P.2d 459 (Mont. 1987) (applying a 
similar mandate in Montana); see also Schwartz, supra note 19 (“Studying the 
disorder is complicated by the fact that, in the U.S., laws that went into effect in 
the 1990s require therapists and physicians to report to child protective services 
(and other authorities that vary by state) anyone they believe poses a threat to a 
child.”). 
 407. See Dreger, supra note 7 (“Many jurisdictions have passed mandatory 
reporting regulations for psychologists and other health care providers. 
Consequently, when someone who thinks he might be a pedophile comes in for 
counseling or therapy, the psychologist may be compelled by law to report the 
person to the authorities.”); Schwartz, supra note 19 (“Since reporting a 
potential pedophile results in legal action, the law has deterred many 
pedophiles from voluntarily seeking psychiatric help—which troubles some 
researchers, since the disorder can be easier to prevent than treat.”). 
 408. See Schwartz, supra note 19 (“[I]t can be easy to forget that pedophilia 
is a mental illness, and that legally, it only becomes a crime when acted upon. 
Yet the key to preventing and treating the disorder may lie in its clinical 
details.”). 
 409. See Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 468–69 (“The opponents of [Megan’s 
Law and related laws] argue that, because of the laws, pedophiles will 
intentionally avoid treatment and not register because of fear (1) for their 
physical safety, (2) for their family’s safety, and (3) of not being able to obtain 
housing and employment.”); Dreger, supra note 7 (“[P]sychologist[s] may be 
compelled by law to report [people with pedophilia] to the authorities. . . . 
[T]hese people have simply stopped coming in at all, and instead of getting help 
to them, we now have pedophiles circulating in society receiving no support at 
all.”); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (“[V]ery few pedophiles will voluntarily out 
themselves, given the stigma; and due to mandatory reporting rules, which are 
open to interpretation, non-offending pedophiles can reasonably fear being 
reported to the police.”); Bleyer, supra note 4 (same). 
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to avoid re-offending.410 When Maryland passed a strict 
mandatory reporting law, the Johns Hopkins Sexual Offenders 
Clinic saw the identification of new offenses committed by the 
treated population decrease from 21% to 0%, with no increase in 
the number of abused children identified.411 
Germany’s Prevention Project Dunkelfeld, discussed above, 
provides an example of treatment and outreach that mandatory 
reporting laws prevent. The project’s success is dependent on 
Germany’s lack of mandatory reporting law, a fact featured on 
the front page of its website.412 The lack of mandatory reporting 
has allowed the project to reach individuals who have either not 
offended but fear they may, or who have offended but have never 
been caught.413 Not only does this expand access to treatment, 
but it has also allowed the project to gain additional insight on 
groups that usually elude researchers. The Project has since 
produced research on pedophilia itself and on creating public 
outreach campaigns to encourage individuals living with 
pedophilic disorder to seek treatment.414 
                                                                                                     
 410. See Fred S. Berlin et al., Effects of Statutes Requiring Psychiatrists to 
Report Suspected Sexual Abuse of Children, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 449, 451 
(1991) (showing that the number of self-reporting pedophiles in Maryland 
plummeted to and remained at zero after disclosure laws were passed); Hall & 
Hall, supra note 28, at 468–69 (“In 1988, Maryland required that all abuse that 
occurred during treatment be reported. This law caused the identification of new 
offenses committed by the population being treated at the Johns Hopkins Sexual 
Offenders Clinic to decrease from 21% to 0%.”). These studies were not limited 
to sex offenders living with pedophilic disorder, but there is no reason to believe 
that the laws would have a less significant chilling effect for those living with 
pedophilia. 
 411. See supra note 410 and accompanying text. 
 412. PREVENTION PROJECT DUNKELFELD, https://www.dont-offend.org/ (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 413. See Beier et al., supra note 77, at 4 (“[U]p to 45% of the present sample 
of self-identified pedophiles and hebephiles could be encouraged to participate in 
clinical diagnostics, even though they were not mandated to seek treatment. 
The majority of these men (66%) indeed met the diagnostic criteria of pedophilia 
and/or hebephilia.”). 
 414. See Janina Neutze et al., Predictors of Child Pornography Offenses and 
Child Sexual Abuse in a Community Sample of Pedophiles and Hebephiles, 23 
SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 212, 230–34 (2011) (describing the benefits 
of research afforded by increased self-reporting, including the proposition “that 
factors identified in research with detected child sexual abuse and child 
pornography offenders may not generalize to undetected offenders”); Beier et al., 
supra note 77, at 1–4 (describing the benefits to research caused by increased 
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Additional reflection on pedophilic disorder could contribute 
to the discussion of how legal standards can best balance 
concerns about encouraging preventive therapy with concerns 
about ensuring abused children are helped and sex offenders 
identified. It could also help develop legal standards that better 
enable health care providers to determine when they should 
report an individual living with pedophilic disorder who has not 
disclosed any offense. The identification and prevention of abuse 
are important public policy goals. Lawmakers must balance the 
efficacy of mandatory reporting statutes in achieving these goals 
with the potential obstacles they pose to treating pedophilia and 
preventing additional abuse. 
B. Implications for Other Paraphilias 
Further reflection on the legal meaning and consequences of 
pedophilic disorder has consequences for other paraphilias. First, 
this reflection helps us determine how to best conceptualize other 
paraphilias in the law. Second, the above discussion of pedophilic 
disorder raises relevant concerns for other paraphilias that are 
best conceptualized as mental disorders under the law.  
Although this Article argues that mental disorders provide a 
better rubric for the legal issues pedophilia raises, this conclusion 
is not warranted for every paraphilia. For example, fetishism 
(sexual interest in objects) may be better conceptualized as a 
sexual orientation than a mental disorder.415 The argument that 
fetishism, which does not involve harm to another human being, 
constitutes a dysfunction is far weaker than for pedophilia.416 
                                                                                                     
participation in studies and the efficacy of various types of media campaigns); 
Klaus M. Beier et al., Can Pedophiles Be Reached for Primary Prevention of 
Child Sexual Abuse? First Results of the Berlin Prevention Project Dunkelfeld, 20 
J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 851, 865 (2009) (explaining the potential of 
media campaigns as preventive measures vis-à-vis child sexual abuse). 
 415. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 531 (defining fetishism). 
 416. See Odd Reiersol & Sven Skeid, The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and 
Sadomasochism, 50 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 243, 248 (2006) (“If a person has an 
uncontrollable urge to do something that violates a partner’s personal 
boundaries, or has an uncontrollable urge to do something that causes harm to 
himself or herself, these are issues that must be addressed.”); Susan Wright, 
Depathologizing Consensual Sexual Sadism, Sexual Masochism, Transvestic 
Fetishism, and Fetishism, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 1229 (2010) (discussing 
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Similar arguments could be made for transvestitism, which the 
DSM continues to categorize as a paraphilia.417 
Other paraphilias are better conceptualized as mental 
disorders for the purposes of legal analysis. For these sexual 
disorders, the disability discrimination analysis above may 
provide a strong argument for their inclusion in the ADA and 
other anti-discrimination laws. Indeed, among paraphilias, 
pedophilia likely inspires the most concerns about inclusion in 
anti-discrimination law because of the nature of the threats such 
sexual desires pose. Other paraphilias will likely be far easier to 
justify as disabilities entitled to civil rights protections. 
C. Final Thoughts 
This Article begins, but does not resolve, a much larger 
discussion of how the law should conceptualize and approach 
pedophilia. It argues for a more reasoned and coherent concept of 
pedophilia. It further argues that the law should incorporate this 
concept in a way that is more consistent with important legal 
principles.  
Advances in this topic have significant implications for 
several areas of law. It is vital to understand sexual attraction to 
children in order to prevent child sexual abuse. At present, our 
laws and policies often isolate individuals with pedophilia from 
resources that prevent abuse, exacerbating public health and 
criminal law problems.  The rights of individuals with pedophilia, 
however, are in themselves an appropriate concern for the law. 
We should not ignore inconsistent or unjust laws simply because 
they only affect those who provoke revulsion. 
Lawmakers, courts, and scholars must continue to re-
examine this topic as our understanding of pedophilia evolves. 
Further reflection is vital to improve both the laws that address 
                                                                                                     
the policy problems with conflating sexual behaviors with mental disorders and 
the questions which much be answered to distinguish the two, like determining 
the meaning and boundaries of “significant distress”). 
 417. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 700–04 (listing the wearing of clothing 
usually worn by another gender as evidence of “fetishistic disorder”); Beech & 
Harkins, supra note 39, at 530–31 (“The most common fetishistic targets of this 
paraphilia are female underwear, feet, and shoes.”). 
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pedophilia and the lives of the individuals and communities these 
laws affect. 
